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Chapter 1
Synopsis
1.1 Introduction
In his symposium on economic growth, Acemoglu (2012) emphasizes the role
of organizations in recent studies on economic growth. “Organizations play the
role of coordinating economic activity and facilitating the use of existing tech-
nology” (Acemoglu, 2012, p. 547). Improving firm performance and e"ciency
leads to economic gains. These economic gains can accrue and improve natio-
nal competitiveness while leading to job creation and increasing tax revenues
that support the welfare system. From a political and economic perspective,
these benefits make organizational performance an interesting research topic.
Studies on organizational performance can be found in a wide range of
disciplines from sociology to economics and management. While the environ-
mental context plays an important role in organizational performance, many
studies focus on the organizational characteristics as the determinants of per-
formance. In his review of the literature on organizational routines, Becker
(2004) describes the importance of organizational routines to firm e"ciency.
The routinization of organizational actions a!ects the functioning of the orga-
nization and hence its performance. These “patterns of organizational activity”
may enhance the e"cient coordination of tasks and the allocation of resources
within the firm. Therefore, any factors that disrupt the internal processes of
the organization a!ect its e"ciency and thus performance.
Organizational disruptions are any events that alter organizational routines
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or key features of the organization, thereby disrupting the internal organiza-
tional processes (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hannan and Freeman, 1984;
Hannan and Freeman, 1989). These events can include both internal factors
(e.g., a management decision or the loss of key employees) and external factors
(e.g., a change in legislation). On one hand, organizational disruptions are
sometimes essential to facilitate necessary organizational change and lead to
positive performance outcomes (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996); on the other
hand, these disruptions also involve a potentially troublesome process of re-
sponse and/or remediation with possibly negative e!ects on the organization.
While some studies argue in favor of organizational vulnerability to organi-
zational disruptions, with inevitable consequences for employees and organi-
zational performance (e.g., Hannan and Freeman (1984), Baron and Hannan
(2002) and Dahl (2011)), others oppose this approach, arguing that organiza-
tions are already generally flexible and adaptive with fewer consequences for
their employees and firm performance (e.g., Nelson and Winter (1982), Nadler
and Tushman (1990) and Feldman (2000)). In response to this controversy,
the primary research question of this paper-based thesis is as follows:
“What are the e!ects of organizational disruptions on firm
performance?”
While the strength of structural inertia remains the subject of some disa-
greement, organizational ecologists still rely significantly on the premise that
any shock to the key organizational features of a firm is disruptive to that
firm’s internal organizational processes with detrimental e!ects on firm perfor-
mance (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Hannan and
Freeman, 1989; Hannan, 2005). Within the body of organizational ecology lite-
rature, previous studies have investigated the e!ects of organizational changes
and disruptions on a firm’s subsequent performance for a number of speci-
fic events, including managerial succession, technological change, regulatory
change, the introduction of new products, and alterations to the organizatio-
nal form (Carroll, 1984; Haveman, 1992; Barnett and Freeman, 2001; Baron
and Hannan, 2002; Hannan et al., 2006; McKendrick and Wade, 2009; Dahl,
2
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2011). Hannan et al. (2006) found that altering employment blueprints in-
creases the hazard of exit in Silicon Valley start-ups. Similarly, Carroll (1984)
found that publisher succession increases the hazard of exit in US newspaper
organizations. These studies, however, focused on a limited number of disrup-
tive and often endogenous events. Moreover, with Dahl (2011) as a notable
exception, these studies’ findings were relevant to specific industries.
The above arguments suggest that structural inertia might increase the
vulnerability of firms to organizational disruptions. In other words, inert orga-
nizations, because of their greater resistance to change, might su!er significant
setbacks in their performance in response to organizational disruptions. At the
same time, however, organizational inertia implies a degree of accountability
and reliability (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Carroll and Hannan, 2000, Chap-
ter 16). Furthermore, inertia implies the existence of routinized organizational
behaviors and, possibly, of an optimized operational e"ciency. Organizational
activities require fewer resources when they are routinized, and routines en-
hance the e"cient coordination of tasks and resources. Moreover, routines are
built on prior experience, which may include experience in how to adapt to
changing environments. In uncertain situations, organizational routines may
chart a course of action (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996; Becker, 2004).
However, because they are derived from previous experience, routines might
not trigger an appropriate response to a new situation. Moreover, organiza-
tional inertia can retain the organization in a suboptimal position because it
might legitimize ine"cient behaviors (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen and
Bacdayan, 1994). Under these circumstances, organizational disruptions could
benefit the organization by providing an opportunity to make the necessary
organizational changes.
I argue that it is still largely an open question of when and at what mag-
nitude, organizational disruptions will a!ect firm performance. For example,
what types of organizational disruptions are likely to impact a firm’s perfor-
mance? How significant are these disruptions, and how does this di!er for hete-
rogeneous organizations? The three primary papers that are contained in this
thesis and presented in Chapters 2-4 investigate various aspects of these ques-
tions. I investigate three di!erent types of organizational disruptions and their
3
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possible e!ects on a firms’ subsequent performance. In the first paper, “Heroes
today but what about tomorrow? Gazelles and their long-term performance”, I
investigate the negative trade-o! between an initially high rate of employment
growth and firm performance in the long run (Chapter 2). I hypothesize that
the inability to establish e"cient organizational routines and structures and
the eventually inevitable alterations in the initial organizational model explain
the relatively poor long-term performance of gazelle companies. In Chapter
3, I present the paper “The e!ects of top-employee migration and spin-o!s on
incumbent firms”. This paper investigates the e!ects of di!erent types of top-
employee migration on firm performance. I argue that these events can trigger
organizational disruptions, which may partly explain the frequently negative
performance e!ects that result from top-employee migration. Following simi-
lar arguments, Chapter 4 investigates the performance e!ects from unexpected
deaths in top management teams. The chapter is titled “Who loses a leader
without losing ground? Unexpected deaths in top management teams and firm
performance”. In addition to identifying the performance e!ect that result
from an exogenous organizational shock, this paper investigates the organi-
zational characteristics that can positively or negatively mediate the negative
e!ect on the firm’s subsequent performance. I hypothesize that stable, routi-
nized and inert organizations are better prepared to handle this particularly
type of organizational disruption, leading to higher post-death performance by
these firms. This thesis also includes a fourth paper, Chapter 5, which serves
as a background paper for Chapter 3. Chapter 5 is entitled Spin-o! growth
and job creation: Evidence on Denmark”, and it investigates the job creation
capabilities of spin-o! entrepreneurs in comparison with other new entrants.
The final section provides a detailed summary of the four papers.
In the three primary papers that are presented in Chapters 2-4, organi-
zational disruptions a!ect firm performance through various, but interrelated,
elements of the organizations. The following section introduces the thesis’ theo-
retical basis for explaining the process from an organizational disruption to the
e!ects on firm performance. At the end of the section, Figure 1.1 provides a
summary illustration of this theoretical foundation.
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1.2 Key concepts in investigating the e!ects of orga-
nizational disruptions
It is important to make a clear distinction between organizational changes
and organizational disruptions. While organizational disruptions includes or-
ganizational change, the reverse is not necessarily the case. Organizational
ecologists only consider organizational changes to be disruptive when they al-
ter the core features of the organization. Hence, the definition does not include
peripheral organizational changes. Di!erentiating between core and peripheral
organizational changes, Hannan and Freeman (1989) identify four core features
of organizations. These are the organization’s mission (stated goals), the form
of authority, the core technology and the general marketing strategy (Hannan
and Freeman, 1989; Hannan, 2005; Hannan et al., 2007). The structural iner-
tia theory is not incompatible with the belief that organizations should have
the ability and capacity to reorganize and adapt to changing environments.
However, this ability is usually conceptualized, primarily with reference only
to peripheral organizational changes. Core features of an organization may
also be subject to (successful) modification, but because of inertial forces, the
organization responds relatively slowly to these more central changes. More-
over, alterations to core features often result in multiple changes across the
organization. Peripheral modifications by comparison can be isolated to a
single routine or division of the organization. The following section explains
this in more detail, presenting the concept structural inertia, which is the focal
theoretical basis for answering the research question: what are the e!ects of
organizational disruptions on firm performance?
Structural inertia and resistance to change
To explain the concept of structural inertia, I begin with an example that
illustrates the strength and outcomes of inertial forces. Stinchcombe (1965)
introduces the imprinting hypothesis, after observing that organizational cha-
racteristics (e.g., employment model and form of authority), generally persist
over time. These characteristics continue to reflect the organization’s founding
contexts, even if substantial environmental changes have occurred in the inter-
vening period, and more e"cient organizational forms have developed. At the
5
1. Synopsis
time of its founding, an organization develops structures, routines and ope-
rations that function e!ectively in a particular environment and at a specific
point in time. Moreover, the initial organizational form is limited by the avai-
lable devices and social technology of the time. The original form becomes
institutionalized over time and tends to remain relatively stable thereafter
(Stinchcombe, 1965). At least two questions emerge from this observation:
first, what are the sustaining forces within the organizations? Second, why are
such organizations not outperformed by newer and potentially more e"cient
organizations? As to the latter question, Stinchcombe (1965) argues that it
is not clear that the increased e"ciency of new organizational forms is suf-
ficient to dethrone older organizational forms. New organizational forms will
not automatically replace existing ones simply because the former are generally
more e"cient. Firm production and productivity might rely more heavily on
idiosyncratic resource endowments that were accumulated over time through
experience and are based on learning and routinization, rather than on the
resources from current activities (e.g., sales). Once an investment is made in
idiosyncratic endowments, it becomes a type of sunk cost, i.e., irrelevant to
considerations of current costs. This reflects a prioritization of the initial orga-
nizational form over potentially more competitive ones (Stinchcombe, 1965).
This phenomenon of sunk costs might be su"cient to explain the persistence
of initial structures.
Another preserving force that is highlighted by Stinchcombe is what he re-
fers to as the “traditionalizing forces, the vesting of interests, and the working
out of ideologies” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 169). This theory bears a strong re-
semblance to the structural inertia theory (Hannan, 2005). In introducing the
concepts of organizational ecology and structural inertia, Hannan and Free-
man (1977) argue that organizational structures contain a significant internal
component, which increases the costs and heavily prolongs, or even prevents,
the process of structural organizational changes. Hannan and Freeman (1977)
list four internal structural constrains. First, in line with Stinchcombe (1965),
they denominate an organization’s investments in both physical and human
capital as sunk costs. Moreover, these resources are not easily transferrable for
fulfilling di!erent tasks. The second constraint is a case of imperfect informa-
tion. Because leaders rarely have full information on all activities within the
6
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organization and the environmental constraints facing them, it is impossible to
fully optimize the arrangement and functioning of organizational structures,
and it may even be di"cult to perceive the need to do so. Third, reorganization
has the potential to disrupt the internal political equilibrium of an organization
because it involves the redistribution of resources and authority among orga-
nizational members, oftentimes altering the prevailing hierarchies within the
organization. Such disruptions are likely to spur resistance to reorganization,
with short-run costs to the organization, which may discourage decision makers
from restructuring plans. Fourth, in keeping with the arguments above, the
organization gradually “routinizes” its production and the division of tasks and
authority. Hannan and Freeman (1977) refer to this process as the emergence
of normative agreements within the organization. Normative agreements help
preserve organizational structures and constrain adaptive capacity, as they
provide justification for the status quo and thus potentially disable an organi-
zation’s ability and willingness to perceive and consider alternative models of
operation, resulting in organizational inertia.
In Chapter 2, I illustrate the long-run organizational e!ects of imprinting.
Organizations that experience an initial period of rapid growth will adopt an
organizational form that is suited for that specific context. However, if growth
rates eventually slow down and the initial organizational model becomes ill-
suited to the shifting business climate, it can be a troublesome process to adapt
to the new situation. This process of adaption can be a perilous exercise if core
features of the organization are subject to change. Managers can even fail to
perceive the need for making necessary changes. Moreover, structural changes
may lack the necessary organizational support because routinization legitimizes
the extant model of operations and hence supports the status quo. Finally, the
restructuring of an organization can disrupt its internal political equilibrium,
leading to further internal opposition toward these potentially inevitable orga-
nizational changes. This opposition both increases the costs associated with
and prolongs the adaptation process, and in a worst-case scenario, such intran-
sigence can result in firm failure. Similar mechanism are in play in Chapter
4, where I discuss the role of continuity in the top management team and the
ways in which it preserves organizational structures and reinforces organiza-
tional inertia. I argue that this can lead to fewer and smaller organizational
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changes in response to the exogenous shock of top management unexpected
death.
Relying on a di!erent line of reasoning, Argyris (1990) also argues in favor
of organizational resistance to change. He refers to the notion of “organiza-
tional defense mechanisms”, which, similar to organizational inertia, can make
it increasingly di"cult to detect and correct organizational errors. However,
organizational defense mechanisms are distinct from the concept of organizatio-
nal inertia: they are rules that are intended to prevent organizational members
from experiencing embarrassment and threat. Because they are frequently and
extensively used, these defensive actions are legitimized and become the norm.
This develops into defense routines, and ignoring and hiding errors is conside-
red not only appropriate but the rational response (Argyris, 1990). Moreover,
these defense routines are reinforcing mechanisms that sustain the status quo,
even in situations where self-examination and significant changes in actions are
urgently called for (Argyris, 1996). The following section discusses the concept
of organizational routines in more details.
In sum, because of inertial forces, the modification of the core features of
an organization is a potentially conflictual and protracted process, involving
moral and political opposition within the organization (Hannan and Freeman,
1989; Hannan, 2005; Hannan et al., 2007). However, structural inertia also
implies the presence of increasingly routinized activities. As is discussed in the
following section, this inertia may actually increase organizational e"ciency.
However, inert organizations may be more vulnerable to organizational dis-
ruptions with significant negative e!ects on organizational members and firm
performance.
Organizational routines
I argue that organizational disruptions primarily a!ect performance through
their negative e!ects on firm e"ciency. One explanation for this drop in e"-
ciency and performance involves the opposing, inertial forces that constitute
organizational inertia, which are described in the section above. Another,
perhaps more obvious e!ect on e"ciency is the disruptive e!ect that core or-
ganizational change can have on organizational routines. In short, routines in-
crease e"ciency because they ensure the smooth functioning of organizations.
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Through learning-by-doing experience and the formation of mutually reinfor-
cing expectations by organizational members, recurrent patterns of activity
become increasingly e"cient. Routines improve the e"cient coordination of
tasks and allocation of resources by linking organizational (tacit) knowledge
through the interactions of organizational members. Routines foster legiti-
macy, provide stability and direction, and in uncertain situations, routines can
help organizational members to pick a course of action. Moreover, organizatio-
nal activities require fewer resources when routinized, due to the semi-conscious
nature of repeated actions (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Becker, 2004). Therefore, when routines are dis-
rupted or broken, one might expect the disruption to have a negative impact
on a firm’s performance. Moreover, because routines can increase e"ciency,
disrupted routines can lead to setbacks in a firm’s relative e"ciency, narrowing
or eliminating its competitive advantage over other firms.
The disruption of organizational routines and the subsequent drop in e"-
ciency and performance, underlie the central argument of the three focal papers
presented in this thesis. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter
4, the loss of key employees through migration or death destabilizes organiza-
tional routines. The removal of one human link in the chain that constitutes
an organizational routine represents a loss of the task-related knowledge that
was associated with the organizational actions of a specific routine. Under
these circumstances, the organization must restore or remediate the a!ected
organizational routines. Re-establishing e"cient patterns of activity involves
re-instituting the tasks and restoring the knowledge of the employee that was
lost. Moreover, it involves reforming the expectations of organizational mem-
bers. As discussed in Chapter 3, top-employee migration can even result in the
transfer of tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic routines to rival firms, harming
the focal firm’s competitive position.
Finally, even though the discussion above argues that organizational rou-
tines increase e"ciency, they can also have the opposite e!ect. Recall that the
routinizing of organizational behavior can spur the creation of normative agree-
ments within the organization, leading to the legitimization and preservation
of potentially suboptimal routines. In other words, organizational disruptions
and the subsequent breaking down of potentially ine"cient routines can have
9
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positive e!ects on organizational performance in the long run. I return to this
discussion in a later section.
Definition and application
The meaning of the concept of organizational routines is often implicitly un-
derstood, and no attempt is made to provide a precise definition. This implied
definition stands for the three focal chapters of this thesis also. Therefore, the
following section provides a brief discussion of the concept and its application
in this thesis. I use the term “organizational routine” in a broad and flexible
way, drawing on multiple definitions from the literature. Building on Becker’s
(2004) literature review on organizational routines, one reason for adopting
this flexible understanding is that an unambiguous conceptualization of orga-
nizational routines does not exist in the literature today (Becker, 2004). More
importantly, a precise and hence bounded definition of organizational routines
does not serve the purpose of this thesis. First, I do not analyze or observe
organizational routines per se, and my analyses do not depend on a distinct
and measurable definition of the concept. Second, organizational disruptions,
I argue, are likely to hit broadly, a!ecting several aspects of organizational
routines. Third, these disruptions target di!erent aspects of di!erent orga-
nizations, depending on the type of disruption and organization. For these
reasons, I do not employ one particular theoretical framework to define the
concept of organizational routines; rather, I interpret the concept in broa-
der terms in a manner that spans multiple dimensions in the literature. The
following section introduces two general definitions that can be found in the
literature. My interpretation and use of the concept of organizational routines
draws on components from both.
The literature often defines organizational routines as either “behavioral re-
gularities” or “cognitive regularities” or, simply, “behavior patterns” or “rules”,
respectively (Becker, 2004; Becker and Zirpoli, 2008). The first term, behavio-
ral regularities, refers to recurrent patterns of activity. By repeating a task on
a regular basis, an organization develops a pattern of action for how best to
process this task. For example, standard phrases are adapted over time when
approaching customers on the phone. In general, these are the patterns of acti-
vity and operational knowledge that underlie the entire process of transforming
10
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inputs into outputs. The second term, cognitive regularities, refers to (codi-
fied) standard operating procedures, for example, the written guidelines on
“best practices”. However, “even directives that appear to be in “plain English”
often require interpretation in a manner that is quite specific to the organiza-
tional context” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 102). In other words, standard
operating procedures, though documented, are never fully specified and still
require context-specific, individual interpretation (Becker, 2004). Moreover,
when organizational members follow these sets of rules, they often transform
into behavioral patterns. Hence, the line between the two definitions is in-
distinct. My understanding of organizational routines embraces both, while
putting greater emphasis on the former.
Many researchers describe routines as a collective phenomena involving
multiple actors. Put di!erently, routines are the interplay of individual mem-
bers’ or subunits’ routinized actions that make up the collective organizatio-
nal routines. The literature makes a clear distinction between individual ha-
bits/rules and collective routines (Becker, 2004). However, I shall not attempt
to separate the two in my interpretation and analysis. While I believe that
organizational routines often emerge from and consist of interactions between
multiple organizational members, I do not wish to leave out the possibility
that individuals might carry out some (crucial) routines on their own as well.
Furthermore, individuals, I argue, have the ability to trigger core organiza-
tional changes. For example, a manager might make a decision on his/her
own to change an organization’s strategy. As was emphasized in a previous
section, such an action is likely to hit broadly, leading to multiple changes
throughout the organization and to its routines. I will elaborate further on
this below. Moreover, this might vary with di!erent organizational charac-
teristics, including the size of the organization, the type of routines, and the
degree of individual specialization.
In Chapters 3 and 4, the organizational disruptions are triggered by in-
dividuals. In schematic terms, these events can a!ect routines in one of two
ways. First, moving a central organizational member triggers a reorganization
of roles within particular routines, thereby a!ecting collective organizational
routines. The more routines he/she takes part in, the broader the disruption to
the organization. Second, a top manager, for example, might carry the burden
11
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of certain routines almost exclusively. These routines could include routines
related to wage determination, strategic development or raising capital. Under
these circumstances, an entire routine could be lost with him/her, triggering
a potentially stronger, albeit similar reorganization, as others swoop in to fill
this position. Therefore, the distinction between the collective and individual
components of an organizational routines is neither necessarily meaningful nor
essential. However, as this discussion illustrates, referring to individual rou-
tines can be misleading in the context of this thesis. The expected negative
e!ects on firm performance are driven by the destabilization of collective rou-
tines or organizational change. The disruption of individual routines might be
more accurately categorized, instead, as a loss of human capital.
Developing e"cient routines
Developing e"cient patterns of organizational activity takes time. E"cient
routines evolve from learning-by-doing experience and stable repeated interac-
tions between organizational members and involves the development of social
trust relationships. Moreover, organizations continuously update and improve
their existing routines (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). As I argue above,
the more routinized an organizational behavior becomes, the more e"cient the
production. However, while the argument for routinization’s positive e!ect on
productivity and performance may be intuitive, it is also important to note
that organizational routines also a!ect an organization’s ability to enhance
existing routines and adapt to changing environments.
Nelson and Winter (1982) describe routines as the analogue of individual
skills. The role of organizational routines, as well as individual skills, is to pro-
vide the capability (or choice) to ensure smooth functioning in a given context.
Another shared characteristic of routines and skills is that both are program-
matic and involve sequences of interdependent actions. Both routines and the
exercising of skills involve numerous, but automatic, choices. Moreover, the
knowledge underlying both routines and skillful performance is increasingly
tacit knowledge and not easily articulated (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Chapter
4).
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Nelson and Winter (1982) refer to organizational routines as “organizational
memory”: “Essential coordinating information is stored in the routine functio-
ning of the organization and remembered by doing” (Nelson and Winter, 1982,
p. 134). As I mentioned above, this also implies that routines are mostly based
on tacit knowledge, built on experience. Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) extend
this argument further, suggesting that organizational routines are stored and
distributed as procedural memory by individuals (organizational members).
First, this assumes that primarily recurrent organizational activities make up
organizational routines (Becker, 2004). Moreover, it suggests that some or-
ganizations might be better at adapting to changing environments because
they have experience with changing and adapting routines or because change
and adaption are somehow built into some of the existing routines. This may
include standardized procedures for searching for and developing new techno-
logies and products. However, if decision rules are “a legacy from the firm’s
past” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 165), they are unlikely to produce ap-
propriate responses to novel, irregular or unexpected situations (Nelson and
Winter, 1982). In addition, the routinizing of organizational behavior can lead
to lock-in or accustomized behavior, which can make it di"cult to escape pre-
vailing routines, even in situations where these routines are suboptimal (Cohen
and Bacdayan, 1994). “Thus routines are like a two-edged sword. They allow
e"cient coordinated action, but also introduce risk of highly inappropriate re-
sponse” (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994, p. 555). Cohen and Bacdayan (1994)
also note that routines can include extraneous components or artifacts from
previous periods. They argue that the procedural memories of organizational
members partly explain this apparently non-rational organizational behavior
and other counterintuitive properties of organizational routines, as well. Each
members stores the repetitive actions that constitute routines as procedural
(unconscious) memory (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). Cohen and Bacdayan
(1994) emphasize the durability of procedural memory and its resistance to
decay in explaining how routines transform into inert organizational behaviors.
As I have previously described, Chapter 2 o!ers an example of the nega-
tive consequences for firm performance that result when organizations are faced
with the need to realign organizational actions. When growth rates decline,
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firms might need to switch focus away from, for example, research and deve-
lopment and other expansionary e!orts to focus on consolidating their position
in existing markets. At the same time, these firms may wish to increase their
e"ciency through routinization, in response to increased competitive pressure.
All of these e!orts involve altering the prevailing organizational behavior and
reallocating tasks and resources, with potentially negative e!ects on subsequent
performance.
Organizational members
The above suggest that organizational disruptions may reduce firm perfor-
mance because of organizational inertia and an inability to respond in a flexible
manner. Opposing, inertial forces to change reflect the reactions of organiza-
tional members, and it is these same members who carry out the organizational
routines. In other words, as Nelson and Winter (1982) describe it: “An organi-
zation’s behavior is, in a limited but important sense, reducible to the behavior
of its members” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 172). Therefore, organizational
members play a central role in shaping how organizational disruptions will af-
fect a firm’s performance. Developing and illustrating this argument in more
detail, this section discusses the role of organizational members and defines
the concept of organizational membership, itself.
When I refer to organizational members throughout this thesis, I am pri-
marily referring to members within an organization, i.e., the employees, mana-
gement team and owners. Sometimes, however, it is useful to consider external
members, such as customers, suppliers and creditors. This situation is obser-
ved when organizational disruptions challenge organizational legitimacy, for
example, or disrupt the social bonds of trust, which have negative consequences
for firm performance. This situation is observed when an organization’s credi-
bility with external parties is built on social relationships that are contingent
upon the credibility of individual organizational members. In Chapter 4, which
investigates the impact of unexpected deaths in top management teams, we
see that this scenario might be relevant to some organizations. A charismatic
leader might be perceived as being synonymous with the organization he/she
represents. The organization’s credibility to external stakeholders and custo-
mers might therefore rely heavily on this one individual and potentially su!er
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in the wake of that person’s death.
In investigating the performance e!ects of organizational disruptions, my
unit of analysis is the firm itself. Dahl (2011) moves this discussion (on the
e!ects of organizational change) to the individual level, investigating the rela-
tionship between organizational changes and employee health. Because firm ef-
ficiency and performance rely primarily on employee productivity (Dahl, 2011),
organizational members play a key role in this thesis, linking organizational
routines and inertia with firm e"ciency and performance. In other words,
the e!ects of organizational disruptions on a firm’s performance are primarily
driven by its employees.
Dahl (2011) lists various explanations for why organizational change might
spur negative emotions among employees. Changing core organizational fea-
tures and structures can alter organizational reliability and accountability, shift
the internal balance of power, and erode the implicit contract between employer
and employees. As a result, organizational disruptions often engender the ne-
gative emotions of confusion and frustration, demotivation and dissatisfaction,
leading to decreased employee loyalty and even significant psychological out-
comes, such as employee stress (Dahl, 2011). Dahl found that significant or-
ganizational changes, particularly multiple concurrent changes, increase the
risk that employees will receive stress-related medication. This finding has
obvious implications for the structural inertia argument, underscoring the fact
that core organizational changes can engender moral and political opposition
within the firm (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Changing organizational struc-
tures alters the political base and/or power status of certain members and
involves the reallocation of organizational tasks and responsibilities. This pro-
cess can give rise to uncertainty and frustration among employees regarding
the future goals and direction of the organization. Moreover, the inevitable
questions regarding one’s own future role in the altered organization are also
likely to spur frustration and uncertainty. Members may be wondering, “Will
I be able to do as good a job when my tasks change? Am I going to get fired
or lose status/authority within the organization?” Such questions reflect com-
mon employee frustrations and uncertainty and are likely to be relevant to all
situations in the three focal papers presented here.
Employee dissatisfaction might arise when gazelle companies change their
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initial organizational model. This scenario is discussed in Chapter 2. As was
previously argued, this change might explain the negative trade-o! between
an initially high growth rate and a firm’s performance over the long run. Even
high-growth start-ups have the potential to become increasingly bureaucratic
and routinized and to implement hierarchical structures. However, if their
employees were attracted by and have grown accustomed to an entrepreneu-
rial, innovative, and stimulating growth environment, such changes to the or-
ganizational model are likely to be met with resistance from organizational
members. In Chapters 3 and 4, the internal political equilibrium is disrup-
ted when firms lose key organizational members. These events are likely to
trigger the reallocations of tasks and responsibilities and may potentially alter
organizational routines and structures. Furthermore, in Chapter 4, I suggest
that employees can experience the organizational shock from an unexpected
death in top management and the subsequent structural changes as a violation
of their psychological contract with the firm (Robinson and Rousseau, 1994;
Morrison and Robinson, 1997). I argue that this shock can increase employee
dissatisfaction and uncertainty, leading to reduced employee productivity and
potentially higher rates of employee turnover.
From organizational disruption to firm performance
In sum, this thesis primarily builds on the organizational ecology literature,
relying on the premise that organizations are inherently inert and hence re-
sistant to change. I hypothesize that organizational disruptions are likely to
have negative e!ects on a firm’s performance, due to the internal opposition to
change and involving disruptive and negative e!ects on organizational routines
and e"ciency. The mechanisms of this process rely heavily on the organiza-
tional members, and on employees in particular, making them the primary
factor mediating the relationship between organizational disruptions and firm
performance.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the sequence from the onset of an organizational dis-
ruption to an e!ect on firm performance and summarizes the key concepts
that were discussed throughout this section. Organizations can experience a
shock to one or more of their core features. Significant disruptions can spread
throughout an organization, and organizational members play a central role in
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Organizational
disruption
Organizational
members
Structural
inertia
Routines
Firm
performance
Figure 1.1: From organizational disruption to firm performance
determining the consequences of these disruptions for firm performance. Dis-
ruptions to firm e"ciency are potentially detrimental to the firm’s subsequent
performance. This process and its outcomes are the common denominator
of Chapters 2 to 4. I must emphasize that Figure 1.1 is not exhaustive in
illustrating the sequence from a disruption to its e!ects on firm performance.
Moreover, the arrows in Figure 1.1 do not represent causal relationships.
Finally, while organizational disruptions are potentially detrimental to firm
performance, these events can also motivate organizational improvements and
the acceptance of changes that eventually become inescapable. At the same
time, other studies contradict the notion that organizations and routines are
inert and resistant to change (Becker, 2004). For example, Feldman (2000)
argues that routines are essential, not oppositional, to organizational flexibi-
lity and for facilitating significant change and adaptation. She argues that
organizational members continuously reflect upon their actions, evaluate the
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outcomes of routines, consider potential improvements, and adjust their ac-
tions accordingly. Essentially, “engaging in organizational routines can be a
process of learning” (Feldman (2000), p. 625). I do not dispute the indivi-
dual and collective ability of organizational members to learn and reflect and
improve upon existing routines. However, while acknowledging the power of
routines to facilitate incremental improvements and adaptation, the arguments
contained in this thesis advocate primarily in favor of the competing notion.
Thus, I do not argue that organizational routines are unable to accommodate
significant changes. However, applying an organizational ecology theory per-
spective, I argue that changing the core features of organizations is a generally
slow process because of the opposing, inertial forces in place and that sudden
changes are generally disruptive and hazardous to organizational performance.
I return to this discussion in the concluding section.
1.3 Method
All of the four papers that constitute this thesis are quantitative studies of
organizational performance. The primary source for these empirical studies
is the comprehensive, linked employer-employee database, the “Integreret Da-
tabase for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning” (“Integrated Database for Labor Market
Research”). The database is often referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA. This
section provides an overview of the IDA and its applications.1 I also discuss
how I approached the evaluation of firm performance followed by a discussion
of the strengths and limitations of the data and research approach.
Introducing the data
The IDA is maintained by Statistics Denmark, and it was developed specifically
for research purposes. It contains longitudinal register data with information
on all Danish plants, firms and individuals older than 16 years of age from
1980 onward. The data are collected annually, and the information refers to
the month of November for any given year. The most recent data that were
1The separate papers provide a more detailed description of the data and its use.
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available for the purpose of this thesis were from 2007.2 Statistics Denmark
collects the information in the IDA from the o"cial registers of the Danish go-
vernment. Because of the extensive nature of the Danish welfare system, these
registers contain highly detailed information. For example, on the individual
level, the IDA includes information on one’s salary, wealth, education, work ex-
perience, unemployment, age, residence, cohabitation and family. On the firm
level, the IDA provides information on a firm’s accounting figures, ownership,
start-up year, and industry among other variables. All (legitimate) firms have
an identification number that is listed in the o"cial tax registers. Similarly,
all individuals have a social security number, which is automatically assigned
at birth. These individual and firm identification numbers are anonymized in
the IDA but can be linked together to trace employer-employee relations over
time (Dahl, 2011). In addition, the IDA can be linked to the Entrepreneur-
ship database. Relying on board and registration information, this database
contains an annual census of the main founders of all new firms in Denmark
from 1994 to 2004. The thesis also utilizes the available deceased dates for
all individuals. This information is also provided by Statistics Denmark, and
can be linked to the IDA. For a more extensive description of the IDA and a
discussion of its uses and limitations, see Timmermans (2010).
The Danish longitudinal data receives international recognition for its value
to social science research, and the IDA is increasingly being utilized (Dahl,
2011). Examples of previous studies using the IDA are: Albæk and Sørensen
(1998), Sørensen and Sorenson (2007), Sørensen (2007), Dahl and Sorenson
(2010), Nanda and Sørensen (2010) and Dahl (2011).
Firm performance
Organizations or groups can take many forms. For example, political parties,
religious groups, sports clubs, charities, families, militaries and other public
institutions just to name a few (Stinchcombe, 1965). I interpret the concept of
“organizations” in a very narrow sense, excluding everything but commercial
organizations, i.e., firms. I also excluded hobby and one-man businesses. While
2One exception to this is the paper in Chapter 5. The most recent data that were available
when that paper was conducted were from 2006.
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I acknowledge the economic significance of small businesses, I argue that the
overriding purposes of these businesses are likely to be something other than
profit maximization. I define hobby businesses as firms with no employees
except for the founder. I do not dispute that larger companies might also
pursue goals other than profit maximization, for example, corporate social
responsibility. However, I will ignore this gray area throughout the thesis.
In line with the above definitions, my definition of firm performance is
limited to measures of economic performance. I operationalize firm perfor-
mance as firm failure, employment growth and sales growth. However, the
IDA provides information on additional performance variables, including value
added. While value added might seem to be an obvious candidate for asses-
sing firm performance, several breaks in this variable due to changes in the
method of accounting would have restricted the investigation period to only a
few years. This restriction would have both lowered the number of subjects
and limited the investigation to an assessment of more short-term e!ects. The
IDA also contains data on profits, but a great number of missing observations
for this category, in comparison with survival, employment and sales, would
have invited similar problems. Regardless, Delmar et al. (2003) have identified
sales and employment as the most commonly used measures of performance
in empirical studies of firm growth. Moreover, they emphasize a number of
shortcomings associated with the use of other growth indicators, which limit
their applicability to certain industries and time periods. For these reasons,
the three main articles contained in this thesis estimate the performance e!ects
of organizational disruptions by assessing the post-disruption e!ects on firm
sales, employment, and survival.
The three performance variables of sales, employment, and survival have
di!erent applications and serve di!erent purposes in this thesis, depending
on the research question, target audience and aim of the given paper. From
an organizational ecology perspective, survival is the accepted and most easily
understood measure of firm performance (Haveman, 1993; Barnett and Carroll,
1995). However, depending on the type of organizational disruption, firm
failure can be an unhelpfully long-term indicator and therefore not always
capturable within the observation period. Moreover, organizational disruptions
might also have smaller and more short-lived e!ects on firm performance that
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are not always detected in a survival analysis. From a firm-based perspective,
sales might be a more interesting performance indicator than employment,
assuming that the former better approximates profits. Moreover, sales are an
indicator of demand. Two weaknesses of this performance indicator, however,
are its sensitivity to inflation and currency exchange rates (Delmar et al.,
2003). While the latter might only be problematic in comparative studies, I
account for inflation by including only the real values of sales using the GDP
deflator. Nonetheless, increased and sustainable job creation might be a higher
priority for policymakers than sales growth, and it may makes sense to focus
on employment growth and firm survival as indicators of firm performance,
when concerned with the firms’ economic contributions. However, one obvious
drawback to using employment as a performance indicator is that it is a!ected
by labor productivity and machine-for-man substitutions (Delmar et al., 2003).
From both a political and firm-based perspective, other alternative and equally
interesting performance variables could have been the subject of investigation,
as well. For example, innovativeness and job satisfaction are highly relevant
measures of firm performance. However, the data at hand restricts me from
studying these aspects of performance.
Finally, it is important to note that organizational growth can be achieved
in numerous ways, such as through organic or acquired growth. Moreover,
patterns of growth vary significantly among heterogeneous organizations and
over time and particularly with demographic factors, such as firm size, age,
governance and industry (Delmar et al., 2003). I account, at least partly,
for this by controlling for various firm characteristics, region, industry-, and
time-specific factors. It is important to note that survival and firm exits from
the market are not necessarily equivalent to success and failure, respectively.
Exit is not always synonymous with bankruptcy. For example, a firm might
close down because the founder retires. In the current context, the risk of
mistaking mergers and acquisitions for failure is of greatest concern. With
reference to the cases presented in Chapters 2 and 4, one could expect that the
organizational disruptions in question might lead to mergers and acquisitions
for some organizations. Accounting for this, I discounted firm exits in Chapters
2 and 4, when I suspected that a merger or an acquisition might have taken
place.
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Strengths and weaknesses of the data and methodological ap-
proach
In relation to this thesis, one obvious advantage of the IDA is that it pro-
vides observations on firms and employees over a period of consecutive years.
Equally important, it spans a wide range of industries and heterogeneous orga-
nizations, encompassing the entire Danish economy. The degree of comprehen-
siveness di!erentiates this thesis from many previous studies on, for example,
high-growth firms, labor mobility and organizational disruptions with a limi-
ted focus on specific industries. While industry-specific studies are helpful in
developing and testing hypotheses, the question of generalizability often re-
mains open. By exploiting the availability of comprehensive databases, this
thesis extends and contributes to the findings from previous strudies, assessing
if the results generalize to other industries (and economies). Moreover, these
unique longitudinal databases allow for the development and testing of new
hypothesis as well3, thereby contributing both theoretically and empirically to
the literature.
In comparison with more qualitative work and questionnaire surveys, I can
construct and test objective measures of organizational disruptions. This ob-
jectivity is important, as firms undeniably di!er in their perception of what
constitutes an organizational disruption and the point at which they are de-
tected, making self-reported surveys problematic. Similarly, asking firms to
describe the performance-e!ects of a given event (e.g., top-employee migra-
tion) is likely to yield variable and imprecise responses. First, it is highly
uncertain that firms are capable of providing such an estimate, even if they
wanted to. Second, there is a risk of underestimation (or exaggeration) in self-
report, especially if, for example, poor managerial abilities constitute part of
the problem. In contrast, register data does not su!er from non-response bias,
and the richness of the IDA data allowed me to adjust for the various empirical
issues that plagued previous studies, such as the potential for endogeneity or
selection bias. Furthermore, verifying that a theory applies widely and that
the conclusions that derive from it are generalizable to most industries has a
3For example, the problematization of young high-growth firms in Chapter 2.
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greater political impact and is more likely to arouse the general public’s in-
terest. Together with the development of new hypotheses and arguments, this
approach helps to guide the political agenda as well, by demonstrating the
need for an increased focus in a variety of areas. In other words, the empirical
investigations that are contained in this thesis and build primarily on the IDA
source data, have both economic and political implications. I shall return to
this discussion in more detail in the concluding section.
Timmermans (2010) notes a number of limitations of the IDA. Two of
these limitations are especially relevant for this thesis and include the pre-
sence of breaks in several variables and the late introduction of key variables.
These problems a!ect, in particular, the observations related to industry and
sales, which narrows the starting period of investigation in this thesis to ei-
ther 1993 or 1995, depending on the research question at hand.4 Nevertheless,
this approach still left more than ten years of longitudinal data, which was
su"cient for undertaking the empirical studies presented in this thesis. More
importantly, however, Timmermans (2010) further mentions the limitations of
annual observations and register data. First, while annual observations might
be su"cient to study performance e!ects of organizational disruptions, some
details are inevitably lost. Firms are likely to di!er significantly in their short-
run responses to organizational disruptions. However, the data at hand only
allow for the identification of longer-term e!ects. Second, while the IDA has
a number of advantages over survey data or qualitative studies, it also has
disadvantages. One drawback of register data that is relevant for this thesis
is the potential bias that comes from the omission of certain variables. This
potential problem emerges because I cannot observe the exact circumstances
surrounding the di!erent types of focal organizational disruptions. In Chapter
3, for example, I do not know the cause of top-employee migration. More im-
portantly, however, I do not know how top-employee migration might relate to
both the firm’s previous and subsequent performance. In this thesis, I address
this uncertainty by estimating the magnitude and direction of the bias and with
a matching approach. In Chapter 4, I eliminate the endogeneity-related issue
of any potential correlation between the organizational disruption and a firm’s
4I describe this in more detail in the separate chapters.
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ex-ante performance by exploiting the exogenous variation in firm performance
due to the unexpected deaths of top managers.
Finally, although I might succeed in eliminating potential problems of en-
dogeneity, the data do not provide much information on how di!erent firms
deal with organizational disruptions. Do the firms prepare their employees
for organizational change, and how? Do they exercise di!erent managerial
styles or di!er in their organizational structure? Such factors will obviously
influence how a given organizational disruption a!ects the organization and
its subsequent performance. However, the data are not rich enough to enable
an investigation of such idiosyncratic organizational responses and characte-
ristics. While this deficiency does not necessarily a!ect the studies’ validity, it
limits the depth and the degree of detail. In other words, the available data
limits the thesis’ conclusions and, hence, limits its application to general firm
characteristics based on the register data. This imply that the findings of this
thesis are often limited to providing explorative hypotheses on “best practices”
at the firm level. The ability to draw conclusions that o!er immediately imple-
mentable advice on management or organizational forms, for example, would
require interviews or survey data. The findings from such research e!orts could
supplement the analyses of this thesis by further exploring and confirming (or
rejecting) the hypotheses provided here.
1.4 Conclusion
Organizations are not static entities. Changing markets, shifting demands and
technological progress require organizations to adjust their activities. This
condition suggests that organizations are generally flexible and adaptive (Nel-
son and Winter, 1982; Nadler and Tushman, 1990; Feldman, 2000). Hence,
changing core organizational features can be a generally smooth process with
little internal opposition and insignificant e!ects on the firm’s subsequent per-
formance. Furthermore, even though organizational disruptions can a!ect firm
performance, the e!ect is not bound to be adverse. In fact, organizational dis-
ruptions can help inert organizations escape or improve upon their suboptimal
routines. However, my findings suggest a di!erent view on the e!ects of orga-
nizational disruptions on firm performance. The focal hypothesis of this thesis
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suggests that the overall e!ect of organizational disruptions on firm perfor-
mance is an adverse one. In this thesis, three empirical studies on di!erent
types of organizational disruptions support this view.
The previous sections presented three key mechanisms that elucidate the
link between organizational disruptions and firm performance and suggest an
overall negative correlation between the two. Figure 1.1 illustrates this process.
The essence of the argument is that organizational disruptions primarily a!ect
firm performance through their negative e!ect on firm e"ciency thereby redu-
cing competitiveness and thus performance. This drop in e"ciency stems spe-
cifically from the disruption to organizational routines and from inertial forces
opposing structural changes. Moreover, the organizational members drive both
mechanisms. This process and its outcomes are the common denominator for
the three focal papers that compose this thesis.
In addition to the literature presented throughout the previous sections,
this thesis also embraces other fields of research. Each paper acknowledges the
significance of multiple factors and the interdependency with other disciplines.
I attempt to balance my hypotheses and empirical investigations to counteract
a one-sided focus on organizational disruptions in explaining the performance
e!ects of three di!erent and potentially disruptive events. For these reasons, all
three of the papers presented here take a multidisciplinary approach, drawing
from the organizational ecology perspective in combination with other streams
of literature. This approach will become evident in the following section that
provides a brief summary of the four papers.
E!ects of organizational disruptions on firm performance
Organizational disruptions can take many forms. In this thesis I investigate
three, including top-employee migration, unexpected deaths among top mana-
gement teams, and the high rates of employment growth in start-up firms. As
was previously described, I investigated these examples of organizational dis-
ruptions and their e!ects on firm performance in three separate papers. These
papers form the focal elements of this thesis, each one directly addressing the
unifying research question. The three papers are each built on the principles
illustrated in Figure 1.1 but emphasize di!erent mechanisms of organizational
disruptions. In addition, this thesis includes a fourth paper that investigates
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how spin-o!s’ job creation di!ers from that of other entrant firms. This section
provides a short description of the four papers in turn.
Chapter 2 presents the first paper, “Heroes today - but what about tomor-
row? Gazelles and their long-term performance”, which investigates the long-
term performance of young, high-growth firms. With reference to Figure 1.1,
the paper first focuses on the importance of organizational routines to firm
e"ciency and performance. We argue that high initial growth rates impede
the emergence of stable and e"cient routines and structures in newly founded
ventures, especially if the expansion is undertaken too hastily. This impe-
dance in turn, decreases their long-term performance, as the initial composite
of structures and routines or the lack thereof has a long-lasting e!ect on an
organization’s development. Supporting this hypothesis, we found that a high
initial employment growth rate negatively a!ects the long-term survival and
employment growth rates of these companies and increases employee turnover
in the long run. Moreover, we find that this trade-o! between an initially high
growth rate and a firm’s long-term performance is partly explained by the
higher initial rate of employee turnover in these high-growth firms. We argue
that a high rate of employee turnover can hinder the e"cient integration of new
members into the organization and hamper the development of a shared or-
ganizational culture and norms and of e"cient organizational routines. Thus,
organizational members play a key role by both contributing to organizational
disruptions and by driving the e!ect of these disruptions on firm performance.
This result illustrates the imprinting and inertia in organizational structures
and emphasizes the time aspect in establishing e"cient routines and the im-
portance of organizational foresight in choosing an organizational model at the
time of founding. In addition, this finding shows the limited capacity of firms
to integrate new members e"ciently into their organization, which significantly
restricts the pace at which firms can successfully expand. This study raises
important political questions about industrial policy initiatives that promote
the development of high-growth start-ups over other entrants. Such initiatives
might come at the cost of forgoing the creation of more sustainable jobs.
In Chapter 3, the second paper, “The e!ect of top-employee migration and
spin-o!s on incumbent firms”, investigates the performance e!ects of top-
employee migration, with a special focus on top employees who depart to
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spin-o! entrepreneurship. In addition to its disruptive e!ect on organizatio-
nal routines, we argue that top-employee migration is largely detrimental to
firm performance because it results in a loss of human capital and increa-
sing competitive pressure when top employees resign to work for spin-o!s or
incumbent rivals. We found negative performance e!ects from top-employee
migration regardless of where the employees end up working once they leave
the parent firm. While the departure of top employees to found spin-o!s has a
negative e!ect on the parent firm’s performance, the e!ect is not significantly
di!erent from when top employees resign to work for competing incumbent
firms. Moreover, all negative e!ects decrease over time. This study suggests
that disrupting organizational routines is detrimental for firm performance,
supporting the focal hypothesis of this thesis. However, the positive e!ects
from organizational readjustments and knowledge inflow have the potential to
mitigate or even reverse this e!ect over time. We also find that the e!ect
di!ers with the type of organizational disruption and that it depends on the
migrating organizational member and his/her destination. Finally, the paper
emphasizes the importance of top employees to firm performance. The de-
crease in post-departure performance explains, and to some degree incites, the
extensive focus on employee retention through, for example, non-competition
clauses.
In Chapter 4, I present the third paper “Who loses a leader without losing
ground: Unexpected death in top management teams and firm performance”.
This paper exploits the exogenous variation in firm performance due to a sud-
den death among the top management to investigate the consequences of a
disruptive organizational shock. Hence, the paper directly addresses the pro-
blem of endogeneity that has plagued previous studies on organizational dis-
ruptions. This paper seeks to identify which firms are better and faster at
absorbing the impact of this shock with fewer negative e!ects on their perfor-
mance. Although heavily routinized and inert organizations may, under some
circumstances, be more vulnerable to organizational disruptions, this paper hy-
pothesizes that structural inertia oftentimes protects organizations against or-
ganizational disruptions and reduces any negative e!ects on firm performance.
This organizational resilience is due to greater resistance to change and higher
levels of operational e"ciency at baseline. In support of this, I found that an
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extended tenure of and among the top management team mitigates the nega-
tive shock e!ect, leading to a higher post-death event performance. I argue
that this is due to the continuity of and within the top management team,
which increases organizational stability and facilitates routinization. Finally,
in line with Chapter 3, these results point to the value of focusing on e!orts
to retain top management personnel.
Chapter 5 includes the background paper “Spin-o! growth and job crea-
tion: Evidence on Denmark”. This chapter is particularly relevant to Chapter
3, which takes a di!erent approach to a related topic. This chapter adds to the
series of studies in the entrepreneurship literature that focus on spin-o!s as a
particularly successful type of entrant with superior capabilities in comparison
with other start-ups and sometimes even incumbent firms. However, the appa-
rently superior performance of spin-o!s almost exclusively refers to their higher
survival rates. Does this higher survival imply that spin-o!s are universally
the best type of entrant? We addressed this question by conducting a detailed
empirical study of performance di!erences between spin-o!s and other entrant
firms in terms of their employment growth and job creation. We found that
spin-o!s are not only surviving longer, as the existing literature suggests, but
that they are also relatively more important for job creation in the economy.
This finding has important implications for industrial policy and suggests that
substantial gains may result from targeted entrepreneurial policies that favor
spin-o!s over other entrants. Hence, Chapters 3 and 5 supplement one another,
with both addressing the economic e!ects of employee migration and spin-o!
entrepreneurship, while illustrating two di!erent sides of the story. These stu-
dies were not designed to assess the aggregated economic e!ects of spin-o!
entrepreneurship, but they do call attention to the complexity that is inherent
to the process of determining the economic consequences of spin-o! entrepre-
neurship. This tension is illustrated by two economic outcomes that pull in
opposite directions. At a minimum, industrial policymakers must consider the
potential for either or both to occur.
Contributions
The aim of this thesis was to illuminate the e!ects of organizational disrup-
tions on firm performance. The focal hypothesis suggests that organizational
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disruptions are detrimental to firm performance because of a negative e!ect
on firm e"ciency, which reduces competitiveness and therefore performance.
However, organizational disruptions can sometimes have beneficial e!ects on
firm performance by helping firms escape or improve upon suboptimal orga-
nizational routines. From a political and economic perspective, enhanced firm
performance and e"ciency leads to economic gains and increased standards of
living, all things being equal. Therefore, this thesis has obvious macro econo-
mic relevance, as it explores one of the various factors that a!ect firm e"ciency
and thereby the overall productivity level of the economy.
This thesis has microeconomic relevance as well, and the issues investiga-
ted here are relevant for a wide range of organizations, especially start-ups,
growing, inert and transitioning firms. The findings discussed here have im-
plications for organizational behavior and provide insight into how a firm’s
actions, organizing, decision making, and even external events a!ect its per-
formance. My work makes specific contributes to the literature on organizatio-
nal behavior and organizational ecology in particular. Within this framework,
I study the emergence, imprinting and inertia of organizational routines and
organizational willingness and/or ability to change and adapt under di!erent
circumstances. Moreover, I study the consequences of di!erent organizatio-
nal disruptions and the capability of heterogeneous organizations to resist and
overcome disruptive events. Individually and collectively, these contributions
increase the understanding of organizational processes.
Overall, this thesis adds to the stream of literature on inert organizations,
arguing that radical organizational changes are potentially disruptive. There is
significant evidence that stands in favor of this notion, and the content of this
thesis has broad implications for the management of the internal environment
of organizations. Successful firms establish the “right” organizational model at
the time of their founding and demonstrate caution, thoughtfulness and fore-
sight when implementing any structural changes. The evidence presented in
this thesis underscores the benefits of organizational stability and reliability as
a “defense mechanism”, preparing firms for organizational shocks. Finally, this
evidence highlights the important role of managers and other key employees
in creating stable and e"cient organizations, and the role of other employees
as well, as the implementers of organizational routines.
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The evidence I present in this thesis supports the structural inertia argu-
ment. This argument does not imply that organizations should never initiate
pervasive changes, especially if the environmental context or other factors make
such a change imperative. However, this thesis does imply that organizations
should implement such substantive changes with caution, awareness, foresight,
and with consideration for inert forces and the possible consequences for perfor-
mance. The practicalities of this approach, which go beyond the considerations
I mention above, are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Discussion
Enhanced firm e"ciency and performance can lead to economic gains. How-
ever, as has been discussed, this gain is not always observed. For example, de-
termining the economic consequences of top-employee migration into spin-o!
entrepreneurship is not an easy task. The negative e!ects on parent firm per-
formance underlie the increasing use of non-competition clauses. At the same
time, the economic gains from spin-o! entrepreneurship, in terms of higher job
creation, advocate in favor of top-employee migration. Put somewhat di!e-
rently, urging incumbent firms to intensify their e!orts for employee retention
to avoid the detrimental organizational disruption of losing a top employee
does not take into account the aggregated e!ects of such protective measures
on the economy. From this broader perspective, and after relaxing the implicit
assumption that all else is equal, one may draw di!erent conclusions about
the value of top-employee migration. This discussion illustrates the need for
caution in deriving direct policy recommendations based on the above conclu-
sions. Nevertheless, the following pharagraphs engage in discussing potential
implications, emphasizing my contributions and the need for increased focus
and further debate as well, in a number of areas noted in the thesis.
One fundamental goal of industrial policy should be to facilitate the esta-
blishment of the best possible conditions for firms under the current economy.5
This entails setting the terms for employee mobility and providing a good
framework of conditions to nurture entrepreneurship. In particular, market
5Of course, “best possible” is a vague term in this context, as politicians also take their
constituents, their own political convictions and other factors into consideration.
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failures in the labor market might call for regulation. The results of Chapters
3 and 4 emphasize the important role of key employees in firm performance
and organizational stability, which underscores the value of an increased focus
on employee retention. Previous studies have confirmed that non-competition
covenants are e"cient tools for reducing inter-firm mobility and entry into
entrepreneurship (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003; Marx et al., 2009). From an
economic perspective, however, reducing employee mobility implies reducing
knowledge flows, as well. Hence, restricting the e"cient allocation of labor
potentially stanches innovation and economic growth. At the same time, high
levels of inter-firm mobility and knowledge sharing might reduce a firm’s incen-
tives for investing in research and development. Finally, while non-competition
clauses can succeed in retaining top employees, they also limit the firm’s ac-
cess to new employees (Marx et al., 2009). Thus, for both the economy and
individual firms, e!orts to enhance employee retention have conflicting e!ects.
Another similar subject for discussion emerges from Chapters 3 and 5. On
one hand, the creation and entry of new firms into the market heralds the
positive economic e!ects that result from increased competition, job creation,
and productivity enhancement. On the other hand, these economic gains may
come at the cost of development, growth, and job creation by the incumbent
firms. From an economic perspective, this might not be desirable, conside-
ring that, on average, older and larger firms tend to have higher productivity
levels than start-ups, which have modest success rates (Økonomi- og Erhvervs-
ministeriet, 2007; Dahl et al., 2009; Idson and Oi, 1999; Parisi et al., 2009).
Moreover, the increased competition for labor can lead to wage increases, with
adverse e!ects on competitiveness. I do not argue against policies that pro-
mote entrepreneurship; rather, my aim is to illustrate the complexity of and
the conflicting elements in discussions of these topics and to emphasize that an
unambiguous answer does not exist. Similarly, Chapter 2 brings the subject
of short-term versus long-term economic gains up for discussion. This chapter
highlights the political conflict that results when the immediate and rapid job
creation by gazelle companies comes at the cost of forgoing the creation of
more sustainable jobs.
While this thesis brings into focus the negative e!ects of organizational
disruptions on firm performance, it is important also to emphasize the possible
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positive outcomes of organizational change. In the three focal papers presen-
ted here, significant changes to the employee and/or management composition
decrease the subsequent performance of a firm. However, one way or another,
these events might also signal the inflow of new organizational members, who,
once they acquire an organization-specific skillset, have the potential to renew
and strengthen the firm’s competencies. Bringing new knowledge, perspecti-
ves, ideas, and social relations to the firm, these new members are likely to
eventually increase the firm’s e"ciency and competitiveness (Tushman and
Rosenkopf, 1996; Kaiser et al., 2008; McKendrick et al., 2009; Corredoira and
Rosenkopf, 2010; Eriksen, 2011). In addition, organizational changes are, of
course, sometimes imperative. The relative e"ciency of any firm can decrease
over time and eventually lead to failure, if the organization and/or appro-
priate management team do not perceive the need for imperative organiza-
tional change and adaption. In this regard, certain types of organizational
disruptions might even provide the opportunity to make the necessary changes
to core organizational features with fewer disruptive e!ects (Tushman and Ro-
senkopf, 1996; Baron and Hannan, 2002).
In keeping with the above arguments and findings, routinization and stabi-
lity enhance firm performance and may act to cushion disruptive organizational
shocks. However, the significant routinization of firm operations can prevent
organizations from perceiving the need for making needed adjustment, while
also potentially legitimizing less e"cient and non-rational patterns of activity.
For example, firms that automatically favor the knowledge, ideas, and per-
spectives from organizational members over those of outsiders can miss out on
worthwhile opportunities. This resistance to external knowledge has been la-
beled the “not-invented-here syndrome”. This internally focused approach can
lock organizations into ine"cient routinized actions in which they fail to ac-
quire and exploit the best available knowledge and technology (de Araújo Bur-
charth and Fosfuri, 2012). Ultimately, organizational disruptions can some-
times be beneficial to firms. Moreover, the above arguments point to an upper
limit to the positive e!ects of organizational stability, beyond which the miti-
gating e!ects of stability diminish.
Two broad findings are common to the three focal papers contained in this
thesis; these are adverse a!ects associated with organizational disruptions,
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and there are benefits to organizational stability and reliability. However, as
discussed above, it is not evident that these conclusions are applicable to all
firms and all types of organizational disruptions, and I do not argue that these
conclusions are generalizable to all other types of organizational disruptions not
addressed here. However, I do argue that the call for caution, thoughtfulness
and foresight when initiating structural changes applies broadly. My results
consistently support this approach. Similarly, the ability of organizational
stability to mitigate the detrimental e!ects of negative organizational shocks
generalizes beyond the scenario of unexpected deaths among top management
personnel (Chapter 4). This finding is particularly true for other internal
shocks. Some types of external shocks (e.g., demand shocks), on the other
hand, might call for firm reorganization and a shift in focus.
Furthermore, because this thesis relies solely on Danish panel data, one
might argue that the results are limited to this geographic or cultural context.
One obvious point for discussion are the labor market di!erences that exist
between countries, particularly since labor mobility and the role of organizatio-
nal members are discussed extensively throughout this thesis. Sørensen (2007)
and Dahl and Klepper (2008), who also rely on the IDA database, argue that
the labor market in Denmark resembles the American labor market in many
ways. In comparison with many other European countries, the Danish and the
American labor markets are considered to be relatively flexible because the
employers’ cost of firing employees is low. Moreover, the annual rates of job
creation and destruction, the average firm tenure, and employee turnover rates
are similar in the two countries (Sørensen, 2007; Dahl and Klepper, 2008).
Higher rates of employee turnover might imply less incentive for employers to
invest in their employees’ firm-specific human capital. By comparison, this may
suggest that the perceived significance of employees to a firm’s performance
and particularly their role in achieving stable and e"cient organizations might
be greater in other European countries. However, in contrast to the U.S., the
Danish economy comprises many small and medium-sized companies, which
may suggest the greater reliance of Danish firms on their employees.
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Part I
What are the e!ects of
organizational disruptions on
firm performance?
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Chapter 2
Heroes today - but what about
tomorrow?
Gazelles and their long-term performance1
Abstract: Young high-growth firms, or gazelles, have been investigated
predominantly with respect to their outstanding short-term performance. The
paper at hand adopts a di!erent approach by analyzing the long-term perfor-
mance of such firms to shed light on the sustainability of these job-creating
machines. Using the Danish Integrated Database for Labour Market Research,
we find that former gazelles are not able to sustain their headstart in terms of
performance in the long run. We demonstrate that gazelles are often outper-
formed by initially slower growing competitors, as high initial growth negatively
a!ects a firm’s long-term survival. We also find that high-growth start-ups ul-
timately achieve lower employment growth and higher employee turnover. We
explain these counterintuitive findings by arguing that an initial period of ra-
pid employment growth impedes the emergence of a stable and e"cient routine
structure within the newly founded venture if expansion is undertaken too has-
tily. In turn, this impediment decreases these firms’ long-term performance, as
the initial set of structures and routines or the lack thereof has a long-lasting
e!ect on the organization’s development.
1Co-authored with Christina Guenther, Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena.
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2.1 Introduction
Birch demonstrated that new and young firms create more jobs than mature
firms (Birch, 1981). This concept has subsequently been supported by several
scholars (e.g., Davis et al. (1997) and Dahl et al. (2009)).2 Therefore, during
the current global economic crisis, many have pointed to entrepreneurs as being
part of the solution. In particular, young high-growth firms - or gazelles - have
received significant attention in this context. Over the past two decades, a
growing area of literature focusing on high-growth firms has emerged. Scholars
have focused on the disproportionate economic contributions that these firms
have made through innovations and job creation (Parker et al., 2010). The
evidence of their economic significance has sparked increasing interest among
policy makers and researchers, who ask how the number of these gazelles can be
increased (Halabisky et al., 2006; Stangler, 2010; OECD, 2010; Lopez-Garcia
and Puente, 2011).
Initial high growth rates signal that a new entrant is productive and com-
petitive relative to both its peers and incumbent firms in the market. More-
over, employment growth is argued to increase survival chances, especially
when growth occurs early in a firm’s life (Phillips and Kirchho!, 1989; Almus,
2004). Consequently, high-growth entrants are expected to survive longer and
perform better than the average start-up. Conversely, although the positive
short-term e!ects on economic growth and job creation originating from ga-
zelles are indisputable, the long-term economic gains resulting from these high-
growth start-ups are less obvious. The above-stated long-term performance
prediction for high-growth start-ups is not evident. Our empirical findings
suggest that although they begin with a flying start, high-growth start-ups are
often eventually outperformed by slower growing entrants. We find that an
initial period of rapid employment growth eventually reduces survival chances
and leads to lower employment growth and higher employee turnover. Thus,
an active industrial policy that works to ensure the best conditions for high-
growth start-ups and the possible promotion of potential gazelles over other
entrants does not guarantee the creation of sustainable firms (Stangler, 2010).
Despite the significant interest in this topic, we have limited knowledge
2See Henrekson and Johansson (2008) for a review of this area of the literature.
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on the long-term performance of high-growth start-ups. Because of gazelles’
initial disproportionate contributions towards job creation, which signals a
high-quality business idea and concept, above-average production e"ciency,
and favorable market conditions, it is assumed that gazelles can contribute
more than other entrants to sustainable employment and economic growth. In
opposition to this assumption, we argue that although high-growth start-ups
outperform other entrants in the short-term, their rapid employment expansion
causes initial instability, which leads to long-term disadvantages, as their orga-
nizational setup tends to be less e"cient. This suggestion implies a trade-o!
between firms’ initial employment growth and their long-term performance.
Within this paper, we o!er an organizational theory perspective for ex-
plaining this counterintuitive trade-o! between early and long-term perfor-
mance. One argument for the negative e!ects of initial growth on long-term
performance rests on the liability of newness hypothesis (Stinchcombe, 1965).
Although high-growth firms do not necessarily lack the access to critical re-
sources that other new entrants su!er, they are identical to their slower growing
competitors in their deficiency of a stable organizational structure, processes,
routines, and clear distribution of roles. Without exception, newly founded
ventures must first establish this initial organizational setup, which includes
employees’ obtainment of applied experience among the employees within the
specific organizational context, the development of strong social trust relation-
ships, and the realization of the organizational vision, or blueprint, as phrased
by organizational ecologists (Carroll, 1983; Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan and
Freeman, 1984; Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Hannan et al., 2007). We argue
that this process takes time and requires stability among the organizational
members to ensure the emergence of an e"cient structure. We argue that
high employment growth rates prolong the process of establishing initial orga-
nizational e"ciency in terms of routines or a blueprint. When this process is
prolonged, the organization expands faster than its members can gain expe-
rience with each other and the firm, and thus the organization cannot manage
to e"ciently integrate new members (Penrose, 1995; Garnsey et al., 2006). We
thus argue that although high-growth start-ups outperform other entrants in
the short run, early rapid employment expansion causes organizational insta-
bility that leads to long-term disadvantages and lower performance because
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their organizational setup tends to be less e"cient.
To our knowledge, no previous studies have empirically tested the above
propositions. This lack of evidence might exist because of a lack of applicable
data, as such an analysis places extensive demands on the data source. We
use a unique and comprehensive Danish panel dataset that provides annual
observations of all new firms in terms of such aspects as employment, firm
formation, and exits. In accordance with the above line of reasoning, we fo-
cus our analysis on how initial growth rates might facilitate the explanation
of performance di!erences among surviving firms. In other words, we investi-
gate gazelles’ long-term performance and compare them with their surviving
counterparts that experienced lower growth rates during their early years. In
support of our hypothesis, we find evidence that high-growth start-ups are of-
ten eventually outperformed by more slowly growing entrants. We find that
initial high growth and concurrent high employee turnover have persistent ne-
gative e!ects on firms’ long-term performance. Higher initial growth reduces
survival chances and leads to lower employment growth and higher employee
turnover in the long run. Although these negative e!ects on firm performance
decrease over time, we find that they persist even beyond the tenth year. We
also demonstrate that higher turnover among high-growth entrants partially
accounts for these negative e!ects. We conclude that attaining a larger size
via continuous moderate growth or higher growth at a later stage is superior
to attaining this size quickly through early, rapid employment growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly present the phenomenon
being studied: gazelles and their unexpected poor long-term performance as
compared with their slower growing competitors. Subsequently, we develop our
hypotheses and explain why initial rapid employment growth has persistent ne-
gative e!ects on firms’ long-term performance. Moreover, we elaborate on the
argument that hasty expansion is likely to result in higher turnover rates in
both the long and short run, which further fosters the organizational instabi-
lity that may threaten a firm’s long-term performance. Next, we present the
data and elaborate on the methodology. After presenting our results and a
discussion of these results, we conclude.
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The phenomenon
Because of their disproportionate economic contributions, high-growth start-
ups have received significant attention from both researchers and politicians.
Intuitively, growth signals e"cient production, and we might expect that early
employment growth reflects new firms’ competitiveness. Although gazelles’ po-
sitive short-term e!ects on economic growth and job creation are indisputable,
the long-term economic gains acquired by these high-growth start-ups are less
obvious. In opposition to the previously mentioned popular belief regarding
high-growth entrants’ sustainable economic contributions, we argue that initial
organizational instability, caused by these firms’ rapid employment expansion,
has persistent and negative consequences for these firms’ long-term perfor-
mance, including lower survival chances. To provide an empirical reference
point for the paper’s conceptual contributions, this section illustrates the coun-
terintuitive empirical phenomenon, i.e., the negative trade-o! between initial
high employment growth and firms’ long-term performance. Before proceeding
with this empirical evidence, we discuss and clarify the relevant definitions.
The literature generally refers to high-growth firms as firms with relatively
high growth rates regardless of age, whereas a gazelle company usually implies a
younger firm. However, previous studies di!er in terms of both their definition
of “high growth”, and which companies they consider “young”. For example,
OECD (2008) defines high-growth enterprises as firms with an average annual
growth (in terms of either employment or sales) of 20 % or more over a three-
year period. Moreover, OECD restricts the definition to companies with ten
employees or more in the first year. Gazelles are defined as a subset of this
population, so firms older than five years are excluded (OECD, 2008). Similar
definitions are found in other studies of young high-growth firms, but they
vary in terms of observation period, firm age, and performance measure (e.g.,
Halabisky et al. (2006), Acs and Mueller (2008) and Stangler (2010)). In this
paper, we define gazelles in relative terms. We examine the long-term e!ects
of initial employment growth over the entire spectrum of growth rates instead
of focusing on a subpopulation of extraordinarily high-growth firms.
When comparing the long-term performance of gazelles with that of their
less rapidly expanding counterparts, an initial requirement for all firms is survi-
val. Although new entrants that exit during the initial years of existence might
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Figure 2.1: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for three categories of ln(employment
growth)0!2, adjusting for ln(employees)t and ln(employees)0. The first thirdtile exhibits
low or negative growth, the second thirdtile exhibits moderate growth, and the third third-
tile exhibits high growth.
also have lasting e!ects on the economy, for example, through innovation spill-
overs, we argue that persistent positive economic e!ects and sustainable job
creation are primarily realized by surviving firms. Therefore, we follow Acs
and Mueller’s (2008) example, defining gazelles as high-growth firms that are
five years of age or younger. Consequently, we analyze their long-term perfor-
mance from the sixth year onwards, and we exclude firms that exit prior to
this point in time.
Figure 2.1 shows Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for young firms from age
5 to 13. These firms are divided into three groups according to their initial
employment growth.3 We define initial growth as total employment growth
during the two years following start-up. We elaborate on this definition below.
Figure 2.1 shows that firms with lower employment growth during the initial
3Dividing firms into four groups gives a similar result. However, many firms’ initial growth
rates equal the 25th or the 75th percentile intersection points, thus resulting in an uneven
distribution of firms among the quartiles. For this reason, we use thirdtiles instead.
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years (first thirdtile), have the highest likelihood of survival, whereas firms
within the third thirdtile (highest initial growth rates) have the lowest survival
rates.4 The aim of this paper is to explain this apparent counterintuitive
trade-o! between initial growth and long-term performance.
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
Growth rates serve as a major firm performance indicator that is generally
interpreted as a sign of a firm’s e"cient production, thus its competitiveness.
Early rapid employment growth could signify favorable market conditions, low
competitive pressure, and a first-mover advantage. Firms might utilize high
employment growth rates to realize economies of scale, and growth can thus
conduce further growth (Garnsey et al., 2006). Moreover, firms benefit from
newly hired employees, as they contribute new knowledge, networks, and new
perspectives and ideas to the company, thereby strengthening and renewing the
firms’ competences (McKendrick et al., 2009; Eriksen, 2011). This resource in-
flow further enhances a company’s resource base so that it can identify and
realize additional growth opportunities (Penrose, 1995; Garnsey et al., 2006).
Despite these positive attributes of growth, some scholars have emphasized
the inability of especially young and small firms to sustain high growth rates.
A firm requires more resources when growing. Although employment growth
increases a firm’s resource base, a delay exists in the planning and e"cient
integration of these acquired resources, which limits the firm’s growth oppor-
tunities (Penrose, 1995; Garnsey et al., 2006). Coad (2007) provides another
interesting study on firm growth patterns. In this study, which addresses serial
growth correlation, Coad (2007) finds that while larger firms are typically sub-
ject to positive autocorrelation, small firms are unlikely to experience above
average performance for two consecutive years. This negative correlation in
growth rates is especially significant for small high-growth firms. As firm size
and age are often correlated, one might expect similar results for young high-
growth firms.
In the following sections, we develop two arguments for why initial rapid
4Not adjusting for ln(employees)0 in Figure 2.1 does not alter this picture.
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employment expansion might negatively a!ect a firm’s long-term performance.
First, we argue that an organization requires time to establish e"cient struc-
tures and routines. Employees also need time to gain experience with each
other and with the firm. We argue that these aspects are particularly im-
portant within the first years of a venture’s lifetime. These factors limit the
growth rate at which an organization can e"ciently expand. Growth rates
beyond this point are harmful to an organization because high growth post-
pones the point at which an organization can finally develop persistent, e"cient
routines based on the continuous presence of experienced organizational mem-
bers. High initial employment growth may disrupt this process and prolong the
liability of newness. Second, we argue that the organizational blueprint that
corresponds with the challenges of high-growth start-ups eventually becomes
ill-suited to the organization. The subsequent inevitable change of the organi-
zational form’s core features may place the organization in a life-threatening
situation. Both arguments a"rm that overly rapid employment growth has a
negative e!ect on long-term firm performance.
Becoming an e"cient organization
Within the disciplines of economics, as well as business, an extensive area of
literature has emerged on performance and survival among new and young
firms. Most studies in this area concentrate on explaining the frequently ob-
served low survival rates of new and young firms. The baseline argument is
summarized in the “liability of newness” or, as firm age and size tend to corre-
late, the “liability of smallness” hypotheses (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Brüderl
and Schüssler, 1990; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994). First, new and young
firms lack legitimacy and networks, which might limit their access to customers
and resources, for example, capital and employees. Similarly, it might also be
more di"cult for smaller firms to attract resources. In addition, smaller firms
have higher unit production costs, as they cannot utilize economies of scale
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman et al., 1983; Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990; Brü-
derl et al., 1992; Hager et al., 2004). However, these points do not particularly
apply to young high-growth firms. On the contrary, one might argue that ini-
tial high growth signifies e"cient production, indicating that the new firm is
competitive in comparison with its peers, as well as incumbent firms within
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the same market. This signal of superior e"ciency might increase legitimacy
and render the attraction of resources, especially talented employees, easier for
these firms. However, even these high-growth firms are subject to a second
aspect of the liability of newness, as they also lack e"cient procedures and
organizational routines.
An organization’s ability to coordinate its skills e!ectively lies in the qua-
lity of its routines. Routines are thus essential to the e"cient exploitation and
integration of knowledge. Routines are the repeated interactions within a firm,
and routines evolve from practical experience, including the development of so-
cial trust relationships (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, it takes time to
develop these e"cient organizational activity patterns. Building strong social
relationships characterized by trust among the employees and among the em-
ployees and the management also takes time (Stinchcombe, 1965). However,
within young high-growth firms, these processes are repeatedly disrupted and,
hence, e"cient developments are prevented. High employee turnover and ex-
panding business render the distribution of roles unclear, as employees and the
job functions continuously change, and the development and implementation
of stable and e"cient organizational routines becomes infeasible. Moreover,
the organizational structure, including the explicit line of authority, the im-
plicit hierarchy, and the distribution of roles might be unclear, thus further
hampering the development of e"cient organizational routines.
An e"cient allocation of tasks and resources and the development of e"-
cient organizational routines also include organizational members’ acquisition
of experience with each other and with the firm. Penrose (1995) was the first
to make note of this growth-limiting factor:
“if a firm deliberately or inadvertently expands its organization more rapidly
than the individuals in the expanding organization can obtain the experience
with each other and with the firm that is necessary for the e!ective operation
of the group, the e"ciency will su!er, even if the optimum adjustments are
made in the administrative structure; in the extreme case this may lead to such
disorganization that the firm will be unable to compete e"ciently in the market,
and a period of stagnation may follow” (Penrose, 1995, p. 47).
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Because of the necessity of the individual obtainment of experience with
one another and the firm to establish an e"cient structure, there is a limit to
firm growth, beyond which, a firm becomes ine"cient (Penrose, 1995). Only by
gaining these types of experience and obtaining knowledge of and establishing
confidence in each other are employees able to provide valuable services to the
firm according to its unique vision and setting not only individually but also
as cogwheels within the organization as a whole. Although, a clear picture,
plan or blueprint of a sizable organization might exist, it is simply impossible
to continue “to hire people to fill the various positions and carry out functions
laid down in detailed job descriptions” (Penrose (1995), p. 46). Newly hired
individuals require not only instruction but also time to obtain the required
experience in various dimensions to become an e"cient part of the organiza-
tion. Consequently, only moderate growth rates allow for this experience to be
obtained, thus for the development of stable, e"cient procedures.
The organizational blueprint: not built to last
Although the above requirements for an e"cient organizational behavior are
valid throughout a venture’s lifetime, we argue that they are especially crucial
directly after a firm’s foundation. During this very early stage, the organization
must establish the very first set of processes and procedures so that the original
blueprint and business vision can be realized. The organization must establish
its fundamentals of interaction on which grounds the future organization will
evolve.
The organizational blueprint is imprinted at birth and during the initial
years, and organizations will retain their founding structures for long periods
of time (Stinchcombe, 1965). We utilize the definition of the organizational
blueprint or simply, the organizational form, as proposed by Hannan and Free-
man (1977): “an organizational form is a blueprint for organizational action,
for transforming inputs into outputs” (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, p. 935).
This definition includes i) the formal structure of the organization, ii) the pat-
terns of activity within the organization, and iii) normative order (Hannan and
Freeman, 1977). According to the imprinting hypothesis, it is the environment
(external and internal circumstances at the time of founding) that shapes - or
imprints - a firm’s unique organizational characteristics (Delacroix and Carroll,
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1983; Phillips, 2005; Beckman and Burton, 2008). This hypothesis suggests not
only that origin matters but also that imprinting has long-term or even lifelong
e!ects on the organization. Thus, when an organization achieves high growth
during its initial years, it will establish an organizational form suited to that
specific context. However, we argue that this strategy might not be suitable in
a more stable environment where growth rates eventually slow. For example,
if the organizational form that was appropriate during the initial high-growth
phase becomes ill-suited at some point because of external threats, such as
increased competition or a decrease in demand, the organization might find
it very di"cult to change and adapt to the new conditions, even to a point
at which change will become a perilous exercise. This transition is especially
perilous if core features that are embedded in the organizational blueprint are
subject to change (Baron and Hannan, 2002; Hannan et al., 2006). With refe-
rence to the industry life cycle literature (Klepper, 1996; Agarwal et al., 2002),
we thus propose that although the initial organizational form might be the
optimal choice during the entrepreneurial phase, industries eventually stabi-
lize, thus rendering this organizational form unsuitable, independent of the
managerial professionalism upon which it was originally built.
In sum, although exceedingly fast growth during the very early years of a
venture’s lifetime follows a clear expansion plan, it might ultimately harm the
organization. This harm may either result from an ine"ciency that decreases
the initial comparative advantage, as argued in the Penrosean framework, a
delay in the emergence of solid and e"cient organizational routines, or the
alteration of an organizational form that ultimately proves to be incompatible.
It follows that, independent of which organization theory lens we apply, all fra-
meworks univocally suggest that extraordinarily high growth during the initial
life cycle stage of an organization has negative e!ects on performance, though
because of varying reasons. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: High initial employment growth has persistent negative e!ects
on firms’ long-term performance
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High growth, employee turnover and long-term performance
The following sections are built on the premise that an initial period of ra-
pid employment growth has persistent negative e!ects on firms’ long-term
performance (Hypothesis 1). To explain and investigate this counterintui-
tive trade-o! in more detail, we rely on a more explorative approach than
above because, as previously noted, previous research on this particular topic
is limited. Although we also acknowledge the existence of potential supple-
mentary explanations, we choose to focus on the employees and, in particular,
employee turnover, as the key mechanism to further explain why excessively
high initial employment growth rates result in poorer long-term performance.
Previous studies have shown that employee turnover has negative e!ects on
a firm’s productivity and financial performance (revenue and return over as-
sets) (Baron et al., 2001; Eriksen, 2011; Eriksen, 2012). These results suggest
that high initial growth can be harmful to the organization’s long-term perfor-
mance because high employment growth is often associated with higher rates
of employee turnover (Baron et al., 2001). In this section, we propose that
there is a correlation between initial high growth and employee turnover. We
argue that initial growth increases early employee turnover rates and that it
also has persistent e!ects on firms’ long-term employee turnover ratios. We
also suggest that initial high turnover ratios might make an imprint on the
organization and lead to consistent higher employee turnover in the future. If
high employee turnover has disruptive e!ects on mature firms, as well as on
young firms, this proposition can facilitate the illumination of the mechanisms
behind initial high growth’s negative e!ect on firms’ long-term performance.
We return to this discussion of the employee turnover’s negative e!ects in the
next section.
Long-term employee turnover as a consequence of high initial growth
In this section, we will argue that both the type of employees typically em-
ployed by rapidly growing start-ups, as well as the dominant employment
model within these firms, are likely to entail (additional) challenges to the
organization’s achievement of high long-term performance by increasing long-
term employee turnover ratios. First, in the very early days, gazelles clearly
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benefit from their premium access to talented employees by o!ering an inno-
vative and vivid growth environment, which allows their employees to address,
for example, technical challenges, without contending with a confining bu-
reaucratic apparatus (Baron et al., 2001). However, as we argue above, the
development of a solid set of procedures and routines is necessary for ensuring
an e"cient course of action and enhancing survival chances. The eventual im-
plementation of hierarchies, thus bureaucracy, is inevitable. Consequently, as
the former gazelle company ages and becomes increasingly bureaucratic and
routinized, its highly valuable technical labor force, with its “renowned antipa-
thy to rigid bureaucracy” (Baron et al. (2001), p. 976), is very likely to leave
the organization to strive for higher financial rewards and challenges in new
ventures. In addition, Baron et al. (2001) point to other arguments for why
high-growth start-ups are likely to experience higher turnover rates than their
competitors. First, high growth often stresses organizational members, poten-
tially because of the lack of stability. Second, as these high-growth start-ups
are forced to expand the level of employment, quick or even hasty hiring de-
cisions are likely to result in mistakes. In turn, this lack of stability and poor
hiring decisions lead to premature employment contract terminations. Finally,
gazelles are often active in flourishing and growing industries. Therefore, the
labor market in their environment tends to be highly competitive, and valuable
employees might simply be headhunted by competitors.
Second, although the organization cannot control some of these factors, to
a certain extent, it can control the applied employment model. As we argue
above, founders choose an organizational form, i.e., a coordination mechanism,
including an employment model, that fits the internal and external environ-
ment during the early phases of the organization. As newly founded ventures
do not have an established bureaucratic apparatus, they tend to rely on coor-
dination mechanisms based on peer group control, attachment via challenging
tasks, and emotional commitment to the organization’s vision, and these or-
ganizations often allow their members to have a certain degree of autonomy.
Alternatively, the employment model can be based on a rather formal pure
money-for-work exchange relationship, in which employees are selected based
on their skills rather than on their potential or fit within the organizational
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culture (Baron et al., 2001; Baron and Hannan, 2002). All of these employ-
ment models could be applicable and structure and guide the expansion of
a newly founded high-growth firm. Thus, we do not argue that high-growth
firms run a greater risk of choosing the wrong employment model per se. How-
ever, the crucial point is that, ultimately, even the optimal choice of any of
these employment models might not be optimal. External factors, such as the
product or industry life cycle, change over time and enter new stages, and
firms’ growth rates eventually decrease. Therefore, changing the original em-
ployment model, which was designed to optimize the rapid expansion of the
high-growth firm’s business, becomes inevitable. Although some employment
models are more di"cult to change than others, merely having to change the
employment model, and thus, one of the core features of the organizational
blueprint, challenges the organization’s coherence and threatens the organiza-
tion’s survival. The unavoidable increase in turnover associated with altering
the deeply rooted organizational blueprint constitutes one of the most severe
consequences in this respect.
In accordance with the organizational ecology line of reasoning, which sug-
gests an internal resistance to core organizational changes (Hannan et al.,
2007), we argue that increased turnover can be expected among not only em-
ployees with a long tenure in the organization but also, perhaps less obviously,
among newly hired personnel. First, Baron et al. (2001) find evidence that
employees with higher tenure are more likely to leave when an organization
alters its employment model. In addition, they propose that changing the or-
ganization’s employment model might also lead to early contract terminations
among newly hired employees. Although the original organizational model
might be known by the outside labor force, thus attracting a certain type of
employees, the new model lacks awareness and legitimacy with regard to the
external environment, which increases the risk of a mismatch between newly
hired employees and the new organizational form (Baron et al., 2001).
In sum, we argue that the type of employee in gazelle companies and the
potential mistakes resulting from hastily made hiring decisions, will ultima-
tely lead to higher employee turnover. We also suggest that, although optimal
in the short run, these gazelles’ initial employment models must eventually
be altered as growth rates slow. We expect this potentially disruptive and
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destabilizing change in the organization’s core features to increase long-term
turnover rates. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2a: Higher initial employment growth ultimately increases em-
ployee turnover
Hypothesis 2b: Higher initial employee turnover ultimately increases em-
ployee turnover
Employee turnover’s negative performance e!ect
The positive correlation between initial employment growth and employee
turnover, which we suggested in the previous section, can be an important
factor in explaining the negative trade-o! between initial and long-term per-
formance if employee turnover impedes firm performance. The most obvious
reason why employee turnover is expected to negatively a!ect firm performance
is employee outflow, as it implies the loss of human capital. More precisely, the
company risks losing crucial knowledge, including not only technical knowledge
but also idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge of the organization and its inter-
action style (Eriksen, 2011). Consequently, the organization su!ers from this
employee outflow, as it loses valuable resources that originally determined its
success. This loss of skills might cause a decline in productivity. Eriksen
(2011) further adds that the normally steeper learning curve that exists du-
ring the early years might suggest that the initial employees’ accumulation of
firm-specific human capital is especially important.
When employees leave a firm, it needs to fill the resulting gaps. Therefore,
the costs of employee turnover also include recruiting and training expenses
(Eriksen, 2012). These expenses do not include only new rounds of recrui-
ting. More importantly, these new members must be instructed, trained and
integrated into the organization so that they can e"ciently contribute to firm
performance. However, of course, turnover is not a one-way street. Some em-
ployee turnover might actually be beneficial if companies use it to eliminate
poor performers. Moreover, employee inflow increases the company’s com-
petences and refreshes its knowledge base, especially in terms of innovation
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purposes (McKendrick et al., 2009; Eriksen, 2011). Although this e!ect cer-
tainly holds for mature firms, we claim that, during organizations’ early days,
the harm of high inflow rates, and thus high turnover, is potentially equal to
the aforementioned intuitively perceivable negative e!ects of employee outflow.
Obviously, young high-growth firms experience a predominantly high inflow of
new employees to achieve their growth. However, in accordance with Penrose’s
(1995) initial quote, high inflow clearly counteracts the necessity of employee
obtainment of su"cient experience with one another and with the firm. In
an organization with continuous high employee turnover that exists primarily
because of the frequent addition of new members, the potential to establish an
e"cient system is clearly hindered. If the system is meant to be e"cient and
able to create value beyond the sum of its individual parts, merely fine-tuning
of the employees’ repeated interactions is required. As we have previously
argued, this process takes time. However, this process is disrupted or even
restarted when too many new members are added to the organization. One
major di"culty of this process is that an e"cient system requires a stable, sha-
red understanding of the organizational form, routines and norms. If the ratio
of new to old employees becomes too large because of the continuous inflow
of new members, it becomes increasingly di"cult for the old members to pass
on organizational norms, for example, to the new employees. However, this
knowledge sharing is necessary for the e"cient integration of the new members.
Furthermore, the organization remains in a rather fluid state when it expe-
riences a high inflow of new members, and employees will dedicate less e!ort
to acquiring organization-specific skills in this instable environment (Hannan
and Freeman, 1984). If employees hesitate to invest and engage themselves
fully in a transient organizational form, despite a firm’s great potential, inef-
ficient production might result. We could even argue that remaining in this
fluid state without stable routines and structures constitutes nothing else but
a prolongation of the liability of newness. All in all, excessively high growth
leads to an ine"cient integration of new employees, and thus, the inability to
perform competitively in the market, thus the firm might stagnate or lose its
competitive advantage altogether (Penrose, 1995).
Building on the above arguments, we suggest that high initial employee
turnover has a persistent negative e!ect on firms’ long-term performance. We
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emphasize that in the context of young high-growth firms, this e!ect is not
predominantly driven by employee outflow and the subsequent loss of human
capital. Instead, we claim that the high initial inflow of new employees re-
presents the major obstacle to gazelles’ establishment of a stable and e"cient
system, which, in turn, negatively a!ects their long-term performance. There-
fore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3a: Higher initial employee turnover has a persistent negative
e!ect on firms’ long-term performance
Hypothesis 3b: Higher initial inflow of new employees has a persistent ne-
gative e!ect on firms’ long-term performance
Furthermore, we argue that if the presence of experienced old members
to pass on shared understanding, routines and norms constitutes one of the
crucial transmission channels for the e"cient integration of new members, it
follows that increasing employee tenure during the early years should have a
positive e!ect on firms’ long-term performance. In particular, higher tenure
renders the establishment of (e"cient) routines easier, given the possibility of
stable repeated interactions. Moreoever, higher tenure increases the capacity
to integrate new employees. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3c: Higher initial employee tenure has a persistent positive ef-
fect on firms’ long-term performance
These hypotheses and the preceding argumentation contribute to the pre-
vious line of arguments that despite the potential benefits of high employment
growth, such as economies of scale and the inflow of new knowledge, networks,
perspectives and ideas (Garnsey et al., 2006; McKendrick et al., 2009), initial
high employment growth and concurrent high employee turnover have negative
e!ects on firms’ long-term performance.
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2.3 Data and method
Data
We investigate the e!ects of initial high growth using the comprehensive Da-
nish panel dataset: the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (re-
ferred to by its Danish acronym, IDA). The IDA is maintained by Statistics
Denmark, and it is a linked employer-employee database that contains annual
observations on Danish firms and their employees for the years 1980 to 2007.
As, for example, industry classifications were gradually changing (and more
industries were added) until 1994, our sample only includes (active) start-ups
that began between 1994 and 2004. We exclude all firms from the public sec-
tor and the heavily regulated primary sector. In accordance with Dahl et al.
(2009), we define an active start-up as a new firm that employs a minimum of
one full-time-equivalent employee. Using this definition, we define the entry
year as the first year of observed activity. Similarly, firm exit is defined as two
successive years of no activity (zero employees).
A general critique of empirical analysis built on national firm panel datasets
such as the IDA is the inability to control for mergers and acquisitions, which
are instead coded as exits. This issue is perhaps of even greater concern when
investigating high-growth firms. Therefore, we apply a conservative strategy
of censoring firm exits if a firm’s largest plant (at the time of exit) is still active
the following year under a di!erent owner code (a di!erent company).
We hypothesize that an organization’s ability to establish initial organiza-
tional structures has long-term consequences for firm performance. Therefore,
we only include new entrants, i.e., new firms with no organizational history.
For this reason, we do not allow for re-entry. Extending back to 1980, we en-
sure that a firm’s identification number did not exist prior to the start-up date.
Furthermore, we ensure that the largest plant within each firm is not partly
preserved from the prior year. This process provides us a sample of 74,189
new entrants. Then, we exclude firms with more than 20 full-time-equivalent
employees in the first year because of doubts regarding whether these firms are
true start-ups.5 This step reduces the sample to 73,187 new entrants. Finally,
5We tested our results’ sensitivity to this factor by estimating the survival models, inclu-
ding all start-ups regardless of start-up size. This test did not alter our conclusions.
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our focus of analysis is the e!ects of initial employment growth on long-term
performance. We investigate whether di!erences in initial growth patterns can
explain di!erences in the performance of mature firms. To shed light on this re-
lationship, we analyze di!erences in firm performance from the firms’ fifth year
onwards. For this specification, we follow the OECD’s (2008) definition. When
firms have survived for five years or more, we argue that they have reached a
certain degree of maturity and are thus no longer considered gazelles. There-
fore, we further exclude firms from the sample that exit prior to the fifth year.
Using the same argument, we exclude observations that are censored before
the fifth year. The latter includes all firms that were established after 2001.
This method reduces the final sample to 15,007 start-ups from 1995 to 2001.
Estimations
In our analysis, we investigate how initial employment growth a!ects newly
founded firms’ long-term performance. Our analysis consists of three steps.
First, we investigate how initial growth a!ects a firm’s long-term chances of
survival. Organizational mortality is the favored measure of organizational
performance when investigating the e!ects of organizational change using an
organizational ecology model framework. Firm survival is the ultimate per-
formance variable and is comparable across firms, industries, and contexts
(Barnett and Carroll, 1995). Second, we estimate the e!ects of initial growth
on long-term employment growth. Garnsey et al. (2006), who discuss the at-
tributes of diverse growth measures, point to employment growth as the best
growth measure because of its provision of standardized and comparable data
on firm expansions. Employment growth is also the standard indicator in stu-
dies on firm growth patterns. Other obvious performance variables, such as
profit and sales, su!er from more limitations than employment growth. For
example, firm profit constitutes a manner of increasing firm valuation or avoi-
ding tax liabilities (Garnsey et al., 2006). Finally, we investigate the ultimate
e!ects of initial growth and initial employee turnover on employee turnover.
In all analyses, long-term performance is defined by a firm’s performance after
the fifth year, as outlined in the previous section.
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For the first part of our analysis, we utilize exponential regressions in ac-
celerated failure-time form (AFT)6:
ln(ti|xki,t) = !0 + !gln(gi,2) + !1x1i,t + ... + !kxki,t + "i,t, (2.1)
this estimation predicts time to failure, assuming that the baseline hazard, #i,
follows an exponential distribution with mean e!0 (Cleves et al., 2004).
For the second and third parts of our analysis, we follow Baron et al. (2001)
and use generalized estimation equation (GEE) panel regressions (Zenger et al.,
1988) to estimate the models of employment growth and employee turnover.
This method is appealing, as it accounts for within-group correlation. Unlike
a firm fixed e!ects approach, this approach allows us to include our key ex-
planatory variables of initial organizational characteristics and initial growth,
although they do not vary over time (Baron et al., 2001). We treat within-firm
correlation as autoregressive (AR1), and we report semi-robust standard errors
using the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance. This method requires
a minimum of two observations per firm and thus excludes firms that exit du-
ring the sixth year. To consider these firms when making the estimations, we
further include the fifth year’s observation by adding an additional observation
for all firms in the sample, as we estimate the models of employment growth and
employee turnover. To investigate the firms’ long-term employment growth,
we estimate the linear model:
gi,t = $ + !gln(gi,2) + !1x1i,t + ... + !kxki,t + "i,t, (2.2)
where gi,t is the annual growth in the number of full-time equivalents from year
t! 1 to t, relative to the average employment level within the two-year period
of t ! 1 to t (see equation 2.4). gi,t is provided in percentage form. Similarly,
we estimate the model of the employee turnover rate for firm i at time t:
Turnoveri,t = $ + !gln(gi,2) + !1x1i,t + ... + !kxki,t + "i,t (2.3)
6In addition, we estimated models of firm survival using the Weibull (AFT), the log-
logistic (AFT) and the Gompertz hazard model. Our results are robust over these various
specifications.
62
2.3. Data and method
We measure the employee turnover rate at time t as the total inflow and outflow
of employees during a given period, t ! 1 to t, relative to the average number
of employees during this period (see equation 2.9). Turnoveri,t is provided in
percentage form and ranges from 0 to 200.
Key explanatory variables
We utilize four explanatory variables to test our hypotheses: employment
growth, employee tenure, employee turnover rate, and employee inflow rate.
We measure these variables for the first two years following start-up and es-
timate their e!ects on firm survival, employment growth and the employee
turnover rate from the sixth year onwards.
we argue that the early years of an organization’s life are crucial to its long-
term performance. We define this period as the two years following start-up.
First, in line with the liability of newness hypothesis, the literature on new
firm survival demonstrates that the selection process is most distinct among
new and younger firms, and this group of firms exhibits low survival rates.
For example, as it is found in Chapter 5, a third of Danish start-ups (with
employees) do not survive the first two years. Similarly low survival rates are
reported in other countries and for di!erent industries (see, e.g., Audretsch
(1991); Mata and Portugal (1994); Taylor (1999)). Second, as we discus-
sed above, the important and persistent e!ects of an organization’s founding
context and its initial choices, such as its initial strategy and employment
model, are supported by the imprinting hypothesis. The imprinting litera-
ture most often refers to the founding context, which includes the external
conditions and founder characteristics prevailing at the time of start-up. We
extend this period to include the first two years after start-up, arguing that,
for example, the organizational routines and norms for solidifying and reali-
zing the firm’s initial strategy evolve during this period. Only referring to
the founding conditions would thus exclude the initial realization of the or-
ganizational blueprint, including the crucial phase of establishing the initial
set of procedures and processes, which have long-term consequences for the
organization’s performance. In her study of start-ups in the mini computer
industry, Romanelli (1989) finds that the majority of firms develop a stable
63
2. Heroes today - but what about tomorrow? Gazelles and their long-term performance
market strategy within the first two years. This finding provides us with confi-
dence that we chose a reasonable time frame for the initial growth spell, as
establishing a stable market strategy goes hand in hand with creating the first
set of processes, procedures and structures for realizing this aim. Although
one might claim that a longer initial phase (of potentially up to five years)
might constitute an equally reasonable choice, we argue that the initial two
years is the best match for our theoretical framework. Moreover, we test the
sensitivity of our results to this time period, expanding it to include the first
three, four and five years. We note that, restricting the initial phase to simply
two years does not have a decisive impact for our results.
In accordance with the above arguments, we suggest that the initial em-
ployment growth rate, the initial employee tenure, the initial employee turnover
rate, and the initial inflow of new employees reflect a firm’s initial growth pat-
tern and initial organizational context. We elaborate on this suggestion below.
First, Hypothesis 1 suggests that initial high growth has negative e!ects on a
firm’s long-term performance, as expanding business and high employee turn-
over postpone the formation of stable organizational structures and routines.
To estimate this e!ect, we include the initial two-year employment growth rate
in logged percentages. In accordance with Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), we
calculate the initial growth rate, gi,2, as the di!erence between the number of
full-time equivalents in the second year and the number of full-time equivalents
at start-up, relative to the average number of employees during the two years.
The latter partly accounts for the intuitive relation between size and growth,
in which growth rates decline with firm size:
gi,2 =
Ei,2 ! Ei,0
Xi
" 100 (2.4)
Xi =
Ei,2 + Ei,0
2
(2.5)
ln(gi,2) = ln(gi,2) if gi,2 > 0 (2.6)
ln(gi,2) = ln(| gi,2 |)(!1) if gi,2 < 0 (2.7)
ln(gi,2) = 0 if gi,2 = 0 (2.8)
We estimate the e!ect of ln(gi,2), controlling for both start-up size and the
number of employees at time t. As we argue above, we expect ln(gi,2) to have
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a negative e!ect on firm survival and employment growth.
Our second set of hypotheses (2a and 2b) develops the argument that higher
initial employment growth and the accompanying higher initial employee turn-
over increase long-term employee turnover. We measure these e!ects using the
initial growth rate, as well as initial employee turnover, during the first two
years (equations 2.4 and 2.9, respectively). The long-term e!ect is measured
from year five onwards. We measure employee turnover at time t as the total
inflow and outflow of employees during a given period, t!1 to t, in proportion
to the average number of employees during that period:
Turnoveri,t =
EINi,t + EOUTi,t
Xi,t
" 100 (2.9)
EINi,t =
!
n=0
(en,i,t #= en,i,t"1) (2.10)
EOUTi,t =
!
n=0
(en,i,t"1 #= en,i,t) (2.11)
Xi,t =
Ei,t"1 + Ei,t
2
, (2.12)
Employee inflow, EINi,t , is the sum of employees in the firm at time t that were
not employed in the firm the previous year, time t ! 1. Similarly, employee
outflow, EOUTi,t , is the sum of employees employed at time t ! 1 but not at
time t.
The final set of hypotheses relies on the association between initial high
employment growth and higher employee turnover. We argue that the accom-
panying initial high turnover has a negative e!ect on a firm’s long-term per-
formance (Hypothesis 3a). Moreover, we stated that this initial high turnover
is predominantly a sign of the high initial inflow of new members. Therefore,
in particular, the rapid initial inflow of new employees produces the e!ect on
performance (Hypothesis 3b). To investigate Hypothesis 3a, we estimate the
e!ect on firm performance from the average yearly turnover rate, Turnoveri,t,
from age 0 to 2, controlling for employee turnover at time t. Similarly, we test
Hypothesis 3b by estimating the e!ect on firm performance from the average
yearly inflow ratio from age 0 to 2 and controlling for the current inflow and
outflow of employees.
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In Hypothesis 3c, we argued that the negative e!ect of initial high em-
ployee turnover is driven by an excessively high ratio of new-to-old employees,
which makes it di"cult for old members to pass on, for example, organizatio-
nal norms. We argue that this issue might prolong the liability of newness,
implying a negative e!ect on long-term performance. To capture this e!ect,
we include the average employee tenure (years) two years after start-up.
Controls
In addition to our key explanatory variables, we further include a number of
controls when estimating firm performance. This section provides a description
of these variables. The literature on new firm survival stresses that the founder
or the founding team plays a significant role in the process of overcoming the
liability of newness. The founder plays a key role in outlining the initial stra-
tegy by defining the organization’s culture, implementing routines, and so on
(see, e.g., Phillips (2005)). As we argue above, the organizational blueprint is
indisputably key to high firm performance and is not easily altered, rendering
the founder’s initial imprint on the organization highly significant for long-term
performance. Previous studies point to several important founder characte-
ristics. One argument for the high variance in new firm performance is the
heterogeneity of founders’ human capital. Founders have varying endowments
of skills, knowledge and experiences, which influence their entrepreneurial abi-
lities (e.g., the ability to identify opportunities), and it is argued that greater
human capital improves production e"ciency. The founder also makes initial
strategic decisions based on his/her stock of human capital. Therefore, greater
human capital might lead to better strategic decisions and the implementa-
tion of better organizational routines, thus increasing the firm’s likelihood of
survival and growth (Brüderl et al., 1992). Entrepreneurs accumulate human
capital primarily through education and work experience, the latter being of
the greatest importance (Brüderl et al., 1992; Taylor, 1999). Our study fo-
cuses on firms that have already survived the initial turbulent years, as we
only include observations of firms after the fifth year. However, the e!ects on
firm survival and growth because of founder characteristics are often found to
persist even beyond these first di"cult years. Therefore, we include controls
for founders’ work experience and education.
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In the context of founders’ work experience, three points must be high-
lighted. First, it is argued that entrepreneurs often build on organizational
routines familiar to them, adapting the organizational features of their pre-
vious employer (Hannan and Freeman, 1986; Baron and Hannan, 2002; Phillips,
2005). This argument indicates that the parent firm plays a role in shaping the
new organization. Second, employment at a superior firm might increase the
founder’s social capital (better network relations) and human capital (through
better access to knowledge). Whether better is equivalent to larger in this
context is debatable. Although employment at larger (and more successful)
firms increases human capital, it might also lead to skill specialization. Søren-
sen and Phillips (2011) and Dahl et al. (2009) suggest that work experience
obtained in smaller parent firms is more valuable to founders. They argue that
employees of smaller firms are less specialized than employees of larger firms,
and thus, organizational structure and routines are more suitable for new and
often small firms. Third, pre-founding experience has been highlighted as one
of the key determinants of new firm survival. This e!ect is especially strong
when the founder(s) has pre-founding experience in the same industry. That
is, these start-ups are founded by former employees of incumbent firms in the
same industry and are often referred to as spin-o!s. Since Garvin (1983), many
studies have demonstrated that these spin-o!s tend to outperform other new
entrants (see, e.g., Klepper (2001), Phillips (2002) and Agarwal et al. (2004)).
Moreover, Dahl et al. (2009) note that Danish spin-o! have a higher likeli-
hood of survival after the fifth year than other young firms. To identify the
founder(s) of each new entrant, we imply the approach developed by Sørensen
(2007), with the modifications proposed in Chapter 3. This approach draws on
observations from both the IDA and the Entrepreneurship database. The latter
database contains information on the primary founders of all new businesses
in Denmark. The Entrepreneurship database is maintained by Statistics Den-
mark and can be merged with the IDA. Combining the two databases allows
us to identify more than one founder per firm. See Chapter 3 for a detailed
description of this approach.
Given the above arguments and previous empirical findings, our controls
for founder heterogeneity include the following: a spin-o! dummy (employed
at an incumbent firm in the same industry, same 4-digit SIC-code), founder
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age (years), an entrepreneurial experience dummy, a managerial experience
dummy and founder education (years). The dummy variables refer to the last
year’s observation prior to start-up. If the company has more than one founder,
we require that only one founder meet the dummy variable criteria. Moreover,
if a firm has more than one founder, the continuous variables refer to the
mean values of the founding team. To control for the influence of parent firm
performance, we include a dummy for parent firm size (50+ employees). In
addition to the covariates described above, we control for firm heterogeneity
in terms of the following: start-up size (full-time equivalents, logged), firm
size (full-time equivalents, logged), founding team size (no. of founders), legal
form (dummy for personal liability), and employee education (years). The
employee turnover models also control for employee tenure (years). To control
for industry- and region-specific factors, as well as various economic conditions,
we include the following: market concentration (Herfindahl index, normalized),
GDP growth (yearly real growth rate, pct.), firm age (8 dummies), industry
(41 dummies), entry year (8 dummies), and labor market region (77 dummies).
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1.
2.4 Results
Firm survival
Table 2.2 depicts our analysis of the negative e!ects of high initial growth and
employee turnover on firm survival. Estimations are based on 50,027 firm-year
observations from 1999 to 20067 for 15,007 unique firms within the age range
of 5 to 12 years.
Model 1, Table 2.2, reveals that firm sizet and founder capabilities (spin-
o!, entrepreneurial experience, age, and education) increase the expected time
until failure. When controlling for start-up size and firm sizet, the model finds
that employment growth during the first two years has a negative e!ect on sur-
vival time, which supports Hypothesis 1. We expect that the negative e!ect
of initial growth diminishes over time. Therefore, we introduce the interaction
7We do not include observations for 2007, as we cannot observe if firms exit this year;
i.e., we cannot observe whether firms were still active in 2008.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Description All (1994-2007) Firm age ! 5 (1999-2006)
No. of observations 277,790 50,027
No. of unique firms 73,084 15,007
No. of firm failures 36,687 4,197
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Ln(emp growth), age 0-2 2.20 2.83 2.40 2.74
Ln(inflow ratio), age 0-2 2.44 1.75 2.55 1.42
Tenure, age 0-2 (years) 1.26 0.60 1.28 0.58
Turnover ratio, age 0-2 35.53 29.37 37.59 27.10
No. founders at start-up 1.52 0.83 1.55 0.85
Employees at start-up 2.24 2.54 2.39 2.74
Founder age at start-up, yrs 41.11 8.69 42.83 7.62
Founder edu at start-up, yrs 12.70 2.13 12.74 2.02
Aget (years) 2.68 2.81 6.85 1.83
Full-time equivalentst 4.59 12.94 7.41 20.34
Employment growtht, pct. 9.10 49.79 2.36 46.65
Ln(inflow ratio)t 1.66 1.99 2.00 1.80
Ln(outflow ratio)t 1.49 1.83 2.09 1.80
Turnover ratiot 39.10 48.29 47.58 43.71
Emp tenure (years)t 1.47 1.76 3.52 2.09
Emp education (years)t 12.40 1.83 12.38 1.69
No. firms Share (pct.) No. firms Share (pct.)
Personal liability 34,088 46.64 6,408 42.70
Spin-o! 15,168 20.75 3,840 25.59
Entrepreneurial exp 24,431 33.43 5,167 34.43
Parent firm 50+ empl. 16,868 23.08 3,628 24.18
Managerial exp 14,644 20.04 4,043 26.94
Growth, age 0-2: 1. Thirdtile 2. Thirdtile 3. Thirdtile
No. firms (age 2)" 12,065 7,972 7,624
Surviving firms (age 5), pct." 48.30 58.82 58.91
Mean and standard deviation are based on 277,790 and 50,027 observations for the to-
tal population and the final sample, respectively.
"This sample only includes start-ups from 1994 to 2001.
term “Years after age 5 x ln(employment growth, age 0-2)” in Model 2, allo-
wing the e!ect of initial employment growth to decrease over time. However,
this variable is not significant in any of the survival models. This lack of signi-
ficance suggests that the e!ect of initial growth on survival does not vary over
time within our sample (age 5 to 12). This result provides strong support for
Hypothesis 1, indicating that initial higher employment growth has persistent
negative e!ects on firms’ long-term performance. Testing this claim further,
we also estimated Model 1, excluding firms younger than ten years of age (see
69
2. Heroes today - but what about tomorrow? Gazelles and their long-term performance
Table 2.2: Exponential survival models (1999-2006) - Accelerated failure-time form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(ft. equivalents), t 0.842"" 0.842"" 0.876"" 0.881"" 0.786"" 0.884""
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024)
Ln(Emp at start-up) -0.409"" -0.408"" -0.360"" -0.329"" -0.301"" -0.347""
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Ln(emp growth, age 0-2) -0.046"" -0.041"" -0.031"" -0.025" -0.014 -0.025"
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Clock5_ln(emp g., 0-2) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Emp turn ratio, t -0.006"" -0.005"" -0.006""
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Turn ratio, age 0-2 -0.004""
(0.001)
Ln(inflow ratio, age 0-2) -0.060""
(0.012)
Ln(inflow ratio), t 0.108""
(0.010)
Ln(outflow ratio), t -0.147""
(0.008)
Emp tenure, age 2 0.150""
(0.029)
No founders (initially) -0.053" -0.053" -0.043† -0.041† -0.041† -0.048"
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Emp education (yrs), t 0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.004 -0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Personal liability -0.111"" -0.111"" -0.109"" -0.110"" -0.080" -0.110""
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Founder age (yrs) 0.014"" 0.014"" 0.010"" 0.009"" 0.011"" 0.009""
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Founder edu (yrs) 0.028"" 0.028"" 0.026"" 0.027"" 0.024" 0.026"
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Spin-o! 0.159"" 0.159"" 0.140"" 0.134"" 0.148"" 0.137""
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Entrepreneurial exp. 0.114"" 0.114"" 0.091" 0.077" 0.096"" 0.088"
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Parent firm 50+ emp -0.064 -0.064 -0.067† -0.061 -0.060 -0.066†
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Managerial exp 0.017 0.017 0.010 -0.003 0.007 0.006
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Market Concent., t 4.812" 4.823" 4.801" 4.785" 4.577" 4.827"
(2.166) (2.165) (2.139) (2.166) (2.197) (2.157)
Constant 0.642"" 0.637"" 1.143"" 1.339"" 1.071"" 0.975""
(0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.238) (0.237) (0.237)
Log-likelihood -5840 -5840 -5665 -5647 -5643 -5652
Observations 50,027 50,027 50,027 50,027 50,027 50,027
Firms 15,007 15,007 15,007 15,007 15,007 15,007
Firm failures 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197
The models only include observations of firms if age ! 5. All regressions include un-
reported controls for GDP growth, Age (7 dummies), Entry (7 dummies), Industry
(40 dummies), and Region (76 dummies). Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
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Model 1, Table 2.5). The model finds that initial employment growth has a
negative e!ect on the expected survival time even after the tenth year. Thus,
within our sample, we can confirm the hypothesis that higher initial growth
has a persistent negative e!ect on firm performance.
In Model 3, Table 2.2, we further include the employee turnover ratiot.
When controlling for employee turnovert, Model 3 reveals that initial growth
has a negative e!ect on firm survival. A one percent increase in the initial
growth rate (age 0 to 2) decreases the expected survival time by 3.05 %.8
Furthermore, Model 3 shows that employee turnovert has a negative e!ect on
firm survival. This result might reflect the potential loss of human capital.
We suspect that the negative e!ect of employee turnover is caused by an (on
average) higher outflow than inflow of new employees in older firms. This
suspicion is supported by the literature on job creation (see, e.g, Davis et al.
(1997)). We investigate this issue in more detail in Model 6. Furthermore, we
might expect employee turnover to improve performance in mature firms, as
a continuing inflow of, for example, new knowledge and ideas are important
factors in development and growth.
In Model 4, Table 2.2, we introduce the variable “employee turnover ratio,
age 0-2” to test Hypothesis 3a. We expect that higher initial employee turnover
increases the long-term hazard of exit. Confirming this expectation, Model
4 shows that, when controlling for current employee turnover, higher initial
turnover decreases survival time after the fifth year. An increase in the initial
turnover ratio by one standard deviation, decreases the expected time to failure
by 10.27 %.
The investigation of employee turnover in the above models does not allow
us to di!erentiate between employee inflow and outflow. However, the negative
e!ect on survival could be driven by the latter, as employees “leave the sinking
ship” or leave because the firm downsizes before exiting (Almus, 2004). For
these reasons, Model 5 separates turnover into employee outflow and inflow. As
we would expect, Model 5 shows that employee outflowt has a negative e!ect
on firm survival and that employee inflowt has a positive e!ect, reflecting that
growing firms are more likely to survive and vice versa. Moreover, Model 5
8We calculate the percentage of change in time to failure as follows: 100 " (e!̂k"" # 1),
e.g., 100 " (e(!0.031"1) # 1) = #3.05%.
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finds that higher initial employee inflow has a negative e!ect on firm survival.
In accordance with Hypothesis 3b, this result suggests that there is a limit to
the relative number of new employees that a firm is able to integrate during
its initial years without jeopardizing (long-term) performance through disor-
ganization and loss of e"ciency. Similarly, we hypothesize that higher average
employee tenure after two years has a positive e!ect on long-term firm survival
(Hypothesis 3c). In support of our hypothesis, we find that an increase in
initial employee tenure by one standard deviation increases the expected time
to failure by 9.09 %.
Finally, in strong support of Hypothesis 1, initial employment growth’s
negative e!ect on firm survival remains significant in most models. However,
the e!ect is slightly reduced when controlling for initial employee tenure and
turnover. Moreover, the e!ect is no longer significant when we introduce the
initial inflow of new employees. These results indicate that these variables at
least partially explain initial high growth’s negative e!ects on firms’ long-term
performance.
Firm growth
To control the results of the above analysis, we further estimate employment
growth models (equation 2.4) using GEE regressions. Estimations are based
on 74,788 yearly observations from 1998 to 2007 for 15,007 unique firms (Table
2.3). The models only include firms that are active after the fifth year.
Changing our measure of firm performance (from survival to employment
growth), does not alter the previous conclusions. Thus, all models in Table
2.3 find that initial growth has a negative e!ect on firms’ employment growth
after the fifth year. This finding confirms Hypothesis 1, which suggests that
a lack of organizational stability in terms of employee composition during the
early years has persistent and negative e!ects on firms’ long-term performance.
Moreover, Table 2.3 shows that higher initial turnover and a higher initial
inflow of new employees have negative e!ects on surviving firms’ long-term
employment growth, in support of Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, respecti-
vely. Finally, we find that higher initial employee tenure increases employment
growth after the fifth year, in support of Hypothesis 3c.
In Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b we proposed that initial high growth
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Table 2.3: Employment growth rate (t # 1 to t), pct. (1998-2007) - GEE regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Emp at start-up -0.517"" -0.688"" -0.636"" -0.434"" -0.671""
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.041) (0.054)
Ft. equivalents, t-1 -0.005 -0.013 -0.007 -0.011 -0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Firm age, t -0.841"" -0.731"" -0.734"" -0.455"" -0.728""
(0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.070) (0.084)
Ln(emp growth, age 0-2) -0.699"" -0.925"" -0.816"" -0.685"" -0.821""
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.066) (0.077)
Clock_5 x ln(emp growth, 0-2) 0.053" 0.062"" 0.065"" 0.056"" 0.064""
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021)
Emp turn ratio, t 0.116"" 0.129"" 0.124""
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Turn ratio, age 0-2 -0.060""
(0.005)
ln(Inflow, age 0-2) -0.214""
(0.078)
Ln(inflow), t 10.929""
(0.111)
Ln(outflow), t -9.463""
(0.120)
Emp tenure, age 2 2.168""
(0.249)
Emp edu(years), t -0.532"" -0.318"" -0.382"" -0.236" -0.339""
(0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.096) (0.121)
Personal liability -0.434 -0.370 -0.491† 0.088 -0.415
(0.280) (0.280) (0.278) (0.217) (0.278)
Founder age (yrs) -0.115"" -0.022 -0.044"" -0.037"" -0.036"
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Founder edu (yrs) 0.477"" 0.484"" 0.488"" 0.169" 0.480""
(0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.069) (0.088)
Spin-o! -0.464† -0.279 -0.363 -0.407† -0.381
(0.278) (0.279) (0.278) (0.210) (0.278)
Entrepreneurial exp 0.187 0.536" 0.314 0.309 0.449†
(0.273) (0.271) (0.271) (0.211) (0.270)
Parent firm 50+ emp 0.748"" 0.563† 0.629" 0.439" 0.541†
(0.288) (0.289) (0.288) (0.216) (0.289)
Managerial exp 0.094 0.036 -0.096 -0.360† 0.004
(0.276) (0.275) (0.274) (0.211) (0.274)
Market Concentration, t 16.897 21.096 20.835 19.147 20.664
(14.433) (15.034) (15.034) (12.548) (15.023)
Constant 16.353"" 2.613 5.902† 7.324"" 0.255
(3.201) (3.220) (3.208) (2.803) (3.244)
chi2 863 1336 1393 11204 1367
Observations 74,788 74,788 74,788 74,788 74,788
Firms 15,007 15,007 15,007 15,007 15,007
The models only include observations of firms if age ! 5. All regressions include un-
reported controls for GDP growth, Year (9 dummies), Industry (40 dummies), and
Region (76 dummies). Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
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and employee turnover increase long-term employee turnover. This point is
important, as excessively high employee turnover might have negative e!ects on
firm performance. In support of this idea, Baron et al. (2001) demonstrate that
employee turnover has a negative e!ect on firms’ revenue growth. Moreover,
we find that higher employee turnovert decreases expected survival time (Table
2.2). Therefore, if these initial factors increase employee turnover after the fifth
year, the trade-o! between initial growth and firms’ long-term performance
might be further explained. We investigate this issue below.
Employee turnover
In Table 2.4, we estimate the employee turnover ratio (equation 2.9), using
GEE regression. Estimations are based on 74,788 firm-year observations from
1998 to 2007 for 15,007 unique firms. The models only include firms that are
active after the fifth year.
We argue that high initial employment growth might lead to hasty and po-
tentially mistaken hiring decisions, thus increasing long-term employee turn-
over. Moreover, employees who thrive in an innovative and vivid growth envi-
ronment are likely to leave the previous gazelle company if (or when) growth
rates decline and bureaucracy is initiated. Thus, Hypothesis 2a suggests that
higher initial employment growth eventually increases employee turnover. All
of the models in Table 2.4 show that initial growth has a positive e!ect on em-
ployee turnover after the fifth year, which strongly supports this hypothesis.
Model 1 finds that an increase in the initial employment growth rate by one
percent leads to an increase in the turnover ratio of 1.42 percentage points. In
all models, the e!ect decreases with time. An additional year decreases the
e!ect by -0.30 percentage points per percentage increase in initial employment
growth. This result suggests that the counterbalancing e!ect of time reverses
the positive e!ect of initial growth on employee turnover after 9.7 years (after
start-up). Therefore, the model only partially supports the hypothesis regar-
ding the persistent e!ects of initial growth on employee turnover.
In Models 2 to 4 in Table 2.4, we investigate Hypothesis 2b, which suggests
that higher initial employee turnover increases long-term turnover. In support
of this hypothesis, when controlling for initial employment growth, we find that
higher initial employee turnover ultimately increases employee turnover. Thus,
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Table 2.4: Employee turnover ratio (1998-2007) - GEE regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp at start-up 0.667"" 0.494"" 0.515"" 0.651""
(0.071) (0.067) (0.070) (0.070)
Firm age, t 4.933"" 4.597"" 4.757"" 4.830""
(0.136) (0.135) (0.137) (0.137)
Ft. equivalents, t-1 -0.047"" -0.061"" -0.052"" -0.050""
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Ln(emp growth, age 0-2) 1.421"" 1.033"" 0.952"" 1.302""
(0.095) (0.093) (0.102) (0.099)
Clock_5 x ln(emp growth, 0-2) -0.300"" -0.291"" -0.296"" -0.298""
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Turn ratio, age 0-2 0.190""
(0.008)
ln(Inflow, age 0-2) 2.137""
(0.157)
Emp tenure, age 2 -2.356""
(0.517)
Emp tenure (yrs), t -12.528"" -11.729"" -12.142"" -12.300""
(0.130) (0.136) (0.137) (0.138)
Emp education (yrs), t -0.515"" -0.361" -0.444"" -0.504""
(0.155) (0.153) (0.155) (0.155)
Personal liability -0.381 0.007 -0.671 -0.331
(0.420) (0.408) (0.418) (0.419)
Founder age (yrs) -0.212"" -0.151"" -0.177"" -0.201""
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Founder edu (yrs) -0.291" -0.271" -0.292" -0.280"
(0.114) (0.112) (0.114) (0.114)
Spin-o! -0.197 0.033 -0.174 -0.099
(0.408) (0.400) (0.407) (0.408)
Entrepreneurial exp. -0.787† -0.122 -0.516 -0.709†
(0.402) (0.395) (0.401) (0.402)
Parent firm 50+ emp 0.788† 0.568 0.706 0.816†
(0.433) (0.423) (0.432) (0.433)
Managerial exp -0.945" -0.452 -0.807† -0.886"
(0.417) (0.407) (0.414) (0.418)
Market Concent., t -21.309 -20.350 -21.638 -20.845
(19.959) (19.906) (19.958) (19.952)
GDP growth, t -0.470 -0.579 -0.509 -0.480
(0.639) (0.635) (0.638) (0.639)
Constant 82.611"" 70.129"" 76.007"" 84.902""
(3.142) (3.124) (3.148) (3.182)
Year (9 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Industry (40 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Region (76 dummies) yes yes yes yes
chi2 16410 19566 18226 16576
Observations 74,788 74,788 74,788 74,788
Firms 15,007 15,007 15,007 15,007
The models only include observations of firms if age ! 5.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
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Model 3 suggests that a one standard-deviation increase in initial turnover
increases the turnover ratio at time t by 5.15 percentage points. Furthermore,
we show that a higher initial inflow of new employees increases the long-term
turnover ratio (Model 3), whereas, conversely, higher initial employee tenure
ultimately leads to lower employee turnover (Model 4).
Discussion and additional tests
Although the above analyses strongly support our hypotheses, several aspects
are subject to criticism. Therefore, we conduct various additional tests in order
to address these queries and pursue alternative explanations for our findings.
First, in Figure 2.1, we showed that new firms with low or moderate em-
ployment growth ultimately outperform high-growth start-ups. However, one
might argue that this apparent trade-o! between initial high growth and long-
term performance is driven by di!erences in frailties among surviving firms,
and not by the negative e!ects of initial organizational instability caused by
high employment growth. If lower initial growth rates are associated with
higher selection pressure, this could explain our findings. If initial competitive
pressure is low, we should expect that the risk of firm failures over time will
follow a pattern of liability of adolescence or aging (Le Mens et al., 2011), as
well as higher growth rates for new firms. Conversely, low initial growth rates
might reflect a more competitive market, and, hence, higher selection pressure,
suggesting that fewer but relatively more competitive start-ups survive until
the fifth year. To address this concern, we first examine the five-year survival
rates for firms from each of the three categories (1. thirdtile to 3. thirdtile).
Table 2.1 shows the share of firms from each category that are included in our
final sample, as they did not exit before the fifth year. In accordance with the
above argument, we should expect the lowest survival rates for the first and
the second thirdtile and the highest survival rates for the high-growth entrants.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Table 2.1 shows that young firms within the
first thirdtile exhibits the lowest five-year survival rate. However, firms with
moderate and high growth (2. and 3. thirdtile, respectively) exhibit very si-
milar survival rates, indicating that the two categories face an equal initial
selection pressure. According to the above argument, this indication would
imply that more relatively weaker firms from these two categories are included
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in our sample, leading to equally higher exit risks after the fifth year. However,
contrary to this prediction, Figure 2.1 shows that firms with initial moderate
growth have a significantly higher survival rate than high-growth start-ups.
Moreover, this result is buttressed by the above survival analysis (Table 2.2).
We argue that this result implies that initial di!erences in the selection pres-
sure facing firms in the three categories cannot explain the trade-o! between
initial high growth and long-term performance.
The above analysis implicitly assumed that higher initial growth a!ects
survival time within the three categories equally. Model 2 and Model 3 in
Table 2.5 investigate this assumption further through the inclusion of dummy
variables for the three growth categories. First, Model 2 confirms that higher
initial employment growth decreases the expected time to failure when we
control for the three growth categories. Moreover, Model 2 finds a longer
expected survival time for firms in the second thirdtile than for firms in the first
thirdtile, all else being equal, whereas high-growth firms (3. thirdtile) exhibit
lower survival rates than firms in the first thirdtile. In Model 3, Table 2.5, we
include the interaction term between time (years after age 5) and the growth
categories, allowing a potential time-e!ect of initial growth to vary among the
three categories. The model repeats the trade-o! between excessively high
initial growth and long-term performance that we illustrated in Figure 2.1.
For the firms in the second thirdtile, the expected survival time is 1.19 times
the expected survival time for firms in the first thirdtile, whereas the expected
survival time is lower for firms in the third thirdtile than for the reference
group, all else being equal. However, by definition, the three groups di!er
in their initial growth rates. When considering the average initial growth
rates of each category (see Table 2.6), the aggregated e!ect of the second
thirdtile is (only) an average increase in the expected survival time of 2.46 %.
Correspondingly, the aggregated average e!ect on the expected survival time
for the third thirdtile is -39.56 %.
Second, we hypothesize that slower growing entrants might eventually out-
perform gazelle companies. In support of this possibility, we find strong evi-
dence that initial higher growth has a persistent negative e!ect on expected
survival time. However, employment growth implies a simultaneous increase
in firm size, which, conversely, exhibits positive e!ects on survival. We must
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Table 2.5: Exponential survival model (1999-2006) - Accelerated failure-time form
Firm age ! 10 (2) (3)
Ln(full-time equivalents), t 0.861"" 0.884"" 0.884""
(0.084) (0.025) (0.025)
Ln(Employees at start-up) -0.465"" -0.467"" -0.467""
(0.101) (0.032) (0.032)
Ln(total employment growth, age 0-2) -0.065"" -0.047"" -0.047""
(0.021) (0.014) (0.014)
2. Thirdtile, dummy 0.146† 0.176†
(0.078) (0.093)
3. Thirdtile, dummy -0.216" -0.218"
(0.086) (0.103)
No. yrs after age 5 x 1. Thirdtile 0.041†
(0.023)
No. yrs after age 5 x 2. Thirdtile 0.030
(0.023)
No. yrs after age 5 x 3. Thirdtile 0.041†
(0.025)
Number of founders (initially) 0.104 -0.043† -0.043†
(0.085) (0.024) (0.024)
Employee education (years), t -0.000 0.005 0.004
(0.043) (0.013) (0.013)
Company with personal liability -0.031 -0.116"" -0.116""
(0.137) (0.040) (0.040)
Founder age at start-up (years) -0.002 0.013"" 0.013""
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Founder education at start-up (years) -0.007 0.027" 0.027"
(0.037) (0.011) (0.011)
Spin-o! 0.127 0.161"" 0.161""
(0.140) (0.041) (0.041)
Entrepreneurial exp., dummy 0.203 0.102"" 0.102""
(0.133) (0.037) (0.037)
Parent firm had 50+ empl., dummy 0.167 -0.056 -0.056
(0.155) (0.040) (0.040)
Managerial experience, dummy -0.062 0.020 0.020
(0.133) (0.039) (0.039)
Market Concentration, t (norm.) 15.315 4.871" 4.884"
(28.684) (2.177) (2.179)
GDP growth, t -0.253 -0.005 -0.005
(0.218) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant 1.614 0.676"" 0.630""
(1.688) (0.235) (0.238)
Log-likelihood -333 -5808 -5808
Observations 5,423 50,027 50,027
Firms 2,844 15,007 15,007
Firm failures 351 4,197 4,197
Models 2 and 3 only include observations of firms if age ! 5. All regressions
include unreported controls for, Age (2 or 7 dummies), Entry (2 or 7 dummies),
Industry (40 dummies), and Region (76 dummies). Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
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Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics II (Firm age ! 5), standard deviations in parentheses
No. employees at start-up: 1-5 6-20
Ln(employment growth), age 0-2 2.43 1.83
(2.75) (3.12)
Full-time equivalents at start-up 1.67 9.63
(1.05) (3.74)
Full-time equivalents, age 5 5.13 19.47
(14.10) (28.04)
No. employees, age 5: 0-5 6-20 +20
Ln(employment growth), age 0-2 1.68 3.62 4.26
(2.83) (2.15) (1.66)
Full-time equivalents at start-up 1.63 3.64 6.61
(1.43) (3.39) (5.22)
Full-time equivalents, age 5 2.35 10.04 44.61
(1.35) (3.82) (59.04)
Industry: Service Trad. Manufact. High Tech
No. observations 43,546 2,763 3,718
No. firms 13,076 1,018 1,071
No. firm failures 3,727 229 241
Exit rate, pct 28.50 22.50 22.50
Ln(employment growth), age 0-2 2.21 2.75 2.99
(2.81) (2.72) (2.51)
Full-time equivalents at start-up 2.32 2.56 2.99
(2.67) (2.63) (3.30)
Full-time equivalents, age 5 5.84 10.27 10.05
(13.83) (21.71) (31.77)
Growth, age 0-2: 1. Thirdtile 2. Thirdtile 3. Thirdtile
Ln(emp growth), age 0-2 -0.88 3.91 4.74
(1.76) (0.44) (0.21)
Full-time equivalents at start-up 2.13 2.98 2.09
(2.52) (3.26) (2.20)
Full-time equivalents, age 5 2.64 5.68 12.08
(6.34) (6.98) (27.23)
consider this counterbalancing e!ect of firm size when proposing an eventual
aggregated lower performance for gazelles. Furthermore, one might hypothe-
size that the apparent trade-o! between initial high growth and firms’ long-
term performance is driven by small and stable organizations (low employment
growth and turnover). If their costs of remaining in business are small rela-
tive to larger organizations, these stable and low-growth firms might choose to
continue activities for a longer period of time, despite potential low e"ciency.
This possibility suggests an alternative scenario in which small firms’ relative
low costs of continuing business activities are mistaken for a negative e!ect
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of initial higher employment growth. To test this alternative explanation and
to consider the counter-balancing e!ect of firm size, we divide the firms into
three size categories: 0 to 5, 6 to 20 and more than 20 full-time equivalents
(see descriptive statistics in Table 2.6). Then, we estimate Model 1 in Table
2.2 separately for each firm sizet category. First, we estimate the e!ect of
initial higher growth for firms that employ 0 to 5 full-time equivalents when
they enter the estimation sample at age 5 (see Model 1, Table 2.7). As we
expected, the model shows that initial higher growth has a negative e!ect on
survival. When investigating the alternative explanation that small firms with
only minor costs of staying in business dominate our results, Models 2 and 3
exclude the smallest firms from the sample. Model 2 in Table 2.7 predicts the
e!ect of initial growth on survival for firms with 6 to 20 employees. The model
shows a greater negative e!ect for medium-sized firms than for the smallest
firms, which results in the rejection of the alternative explanation. Similarly,
Model 3 investigates the e!ect of initial growth for firms with more than 20
employees. The model does not find initial higher growth to have an e!ect on
survival for the largest firms. However, note that this category only includes
5 % of the population. The lower number of observations and, in particular,
firm failures, might explain the absent e!ect. Nevertheless, we can confirm
that the negative e!ect of initial high growth on long-term performance is si-
gnificant for the vast majority of firms in the population. In addition, Models
4 and 5 in Table 2.7 show that this result also holds if we instead categorize
firms by start-up size. Finally, within the existing empirical framework, we
cannot overlook the potential o!setting of the negative e!ect of initial high
growth by increase in firm size. Thus, we cannot provide conclusive evidence
that, on average, gazelles are eventually outperformed by slower growing en-
trants. However, based on this analysis, we can conclude that although more
employees increase survival, attaining a larger firm size through continuous
moderate growth is preferable to attain this size quickly through initial high
growth rates.
Third, recall that our sample includes start-ups emerging between 1994
and 2001. This period coincides with the rise and fall of many high-tech and
Internet-based companies. Therefore, we might suspect that the above results
are driven by such high-growth start-ups, which exited when the “dot-com
80
2.4. Results
Table 2.7: Exponential survival model (1999-2006) - Accelerated failure-time form
Employees, age 5 Employees, start-up
(0-5) (6-20) (21+) (1-5) (6-20)
Ln(emp), t 1.087"" 0.918"" 0.715"" 0.847"" 0.804""
(0.034) (0.060) (0.109) (0.028) (0.057)
Ln(Emp at start-up) -0.419"" -0.273"" 0.009 -0.351"" -0.625""
(0.037) (0.061) (0.113) (0.040) (0.170)
Ln(emp growth, age 0-2) -0.041"" -0.076"" 0.051 -0.042"" -0.069""
(0.007) (0.024) (0.052) (0.007) (0.019)
No of founders (age 0) -0.089"" 0.027 -0.041 -0.057" -0.045
(0.030) (0.047) (0.092) (0.027) (0.053)
Emp education (yrs), t 0.012 -0.019 0.167† 0.012 -0.022
(0.014) (0.039) (0.087) (0.013) (0.057)
Personal liability -0.131"" -0.035 -0.251 -0.094" -0.037
(0.043) (0.106) (0.315) (0.041) (0.167)
Founder age (yrs) 0.013"" 0.014" 0.039" 0.013"" 0.042""
(0.002) (0.006) (0.017) (0.002) (0.009)
Founder edu (yrs) 0.020† 0.038 0.061 0.022" 0.033
(0.012) (0.026) (0.051) (0.011) (0.043)
Spin-o! 0.169"" 0.081 0.097 0.180"" 0.089
(0.047) (0.088) (0.202) (0.043) (0.120)
Entrepreneurial exp 0.135"" 0.076 -0.610"" 0.126"" 0.210
(0.039) (0.107) (0.234) (0.038) (0.175)
Parent firm 50+ emp -0.026 -0.119 -0.339† -0.035 -0.242†
(0.046) (0.090) (0.190) (0.043) (0.128)
Managerial exp -0.005 0.117 -0.109 0.010 -0.046
(0.044) (0.093) (0.199) (0.041) (0.138)
Market Concent., t 0.062 -0.352 -3.596"" -0.177 -2.458†
(0.706) (1.198) (1.346) (0.640) (1.287)
GDP growth, t -0.014 0.055 -0.049 -0.002 0.002
(0.018) (0.040) (0.099) (0.016) (0.058)
Constant 0.883"" 0.334 -3.403" 0.812"" 0.558
(0.181) (0.511) (1.347) (0.171) (0.812)
Age (7 dummies) yes yes yes yes yes
Entry (7 dummies) yes yes yes yes yes
Industry (6 dummies) yes yes yes yes yes
Copenhagen (1 dummy) yes yes yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -4287 -1254 -224 -5437 -435
Observations 34,165 13,135 2,727 45,474 4,553
Firms 10,461 3,791 754 13,665 1,342
Failures 3,402 669 126 3,896 301
The models only include observations of firms if age ! 5.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
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era” ended. Testing this alternative explanation, we re-estimate all models,
excluding firms from the IT sector. However, we do not find that this alteration
changes the above conclusions.9
Fourth, we implicitly suggest that initial high growth and employee turn-
over have negative e!ects on firms’ long-term performance in all industries.
However, di!erent factors might have greater significance when explaining the
negative e!ects on performance across industries. For example, the lack of
investments in fixed capital might weigh highly, thus explaining the negative
e!ects of initial high growth in traditional manufacturing, whereas the lack
of e"cient organizational routines might be the dominant explanation in the
service industries. The Service industry is the dominant industry in Denmark,
accounting for approximately two-thirds of the GDP. This industry distribu-
tion is also reflected in our sample (see Table 2.6). This distribution suggests
that the above e!ects might be particularly pronounced in the Service indus-
try (although industry fixed e!ects were controlled for in our analysis). Thus,
it is not certain whether the above results present an accurate picture for all
industries. Testing this possibility, we estimate the firm failure models (Table
2.2) separately for the three industries: Service, High-Tech and Traditional
manufacturing.10
The industry distribution in our sample suggests that the Service industry
might dominate our results. In support of this possibility, we find that initial
tenure and initial turnover do not a!ect survival in the Traditional manufac-
turing and High-Tech industries, whereas the e!ects on the Service industry
echo the results in Table 2.2. Similarly, initial higher inflow of new employees
decreases the expected time to failure in the Service industry but is insigni-
ficant in the High-Tech industry. Conversely, initial employee inflow has a
positive e!ect on survival time for firms within the Traditional manufacturing
industry. Hypothesis 3 (a, b and c) is thus primarily supported in terms of
the Service industry. Finally, we find evidence that initial higher growth has
9The results are available upon request.
10Because of the smaller number of observations, we replace the labor market region dum-
mies with a dummy variable for the capital area when estimating the models for the Tradi-
tional manufacturing and the High-Tech industries. The results are available upon request.
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Table 2.8: Exponential survival model (1999-2006) - Accelerated failure-time form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(full-time equivalents), t 0.842"" 0.829"" 0.826"" 0.775""
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.033)
Ln(Employees at start-up) -0.409"" -0.397"" -0.393"" -0.339""
(0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.037)
Ln(total emp growth, age 0-2) -0.046""
(0.006)
Ln(total emp growth, age 0-3) -0.032""
(0.006)
Ln(total emp growth, age 0-4) -0.026""
(0.007)
Ln(total emp growth, age 0-5) -0.003
(0.008)
No of founders (age 0) -0.053" -0.061" -0.064"" -0.072""
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Employee education (years), t 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Company with personal liability -0.111"" -0.107"" -0.109"" -0.110""
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Founder age at start-up (yrs) 0.014"" 0.014"" 0.014"" 0.015""
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Founder edu at start-up (yrs) 0.028"" 0.027" 0.027" 0.028""
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Spin-o! 0.159"" 0.154"" 0.151"" 0.149""
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Entrepreneurial exp., dummy 0.114"" 0.122"" 0.122"" 0.126""
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Parent firm had 50+ empl., dummy -0.064 -0.066† -0.068† -0.070†
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Managerial experience, dummy 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.015
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Market Concentration, t (norm.) 4.812" 4.832" 4.920" 5.010"
(2.166) (2.164) (2.171) (2.168)
GDP growth, t -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant 0.642"" 0.625"" 0.605"" 0.565"
(0.234) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235)
Age (7 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Entry (7 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Industry (40 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Region (76 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -5840 -5854 -5859 -5867
Observations 50,027 50,027 50,027 50,027
Firms 15,007 15,007 15,007 15,007
Firm failures 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197
The models only include observations of firms if age ! 5.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
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negative e!ects on firms’ long-term performance within each of the three in-
dustries, which supports Hypothesis 1. However, the separate analysis reveals
that initial high growth has a greater negative e!ect on survival time for firms
in the High-Tech industry.
Fifth, as previously outlined, our results are not restricted to the choice to
define the initial phase as the first two years of an organization’s existence. One
might argue that measuring initial growth within the first three years (or more)
provides a better indicator of initial organizational setup than our current de-
finition. Testing our results’ sensitivity to the length of the initial growth
spell, we re-estimate Model 1 in Table 2.2, including the following variables:
ln(employment growth, 0-3), ln(employment growth, 0-4) and ln(employment
growth, 0-5) (see Table 2.8). When expanding the initial growth period, per-
formance gradually converges to the long-term state. Therefore, we expect
that the negative e!ect of initial high growth on expected survival time dimi-
nishes as we approach the cut-o! point (firm age $ 5 years). Therefore, Model
4 in Table 2.8 shows that the e!ect of initial high growth becomes insignifi-
cant when we extend the growth spell to include the fifth year after start-up.
However, Table 2.8 confirms that the above conclusions are not sensitive to
the length of the initial growth spell, as Models 3 and 4 show that initial high
growth has negative e!ects on firms’ long-term survival.
2.5 Conclusion and implications
Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in studies on high-growth
companies sparked by these firms’ disproportionate economic contributions,
particularly in terms of job creation. Therefore, the current financial crisis has
intensified the (already high) political interest in high-growth firms, especially
gazelle companies. This paper contributes to the literature on high-growth
firms by investigating a thus far underexplored aspect, the question of ga-
zelles’ long-term performance. We apply an organizational theory perspective
to explain the correlation between firms’ initial growth trajectory and their
long-term performance. Within this context, we contribute to the understan-
ding of how organizational blue-prints emerge and e!ect gazelles’ long-term
performance. Our analyses also emphasize the persistence with which initial
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factors make imprints in organizations, with long-term and, in many cases,
even life-long e!ects on performance.
Our analyses reveal that although gazelle companies begin a flying start,
they are not able to sustain this lead. Even worse, initial high growth has
persistent negative e!ects on firms’ long-term performance. First, we argue
that this e!ect occurs because initial high growth hampers the organizational
members’ establishment of solid and e"cient organizational routines. Second,
we claim that a hasty expansion is likely to lead to errors in hiring decisions
and thus to high turnover rates, resulting in frequent inflow and outflow as
part of the organization’s long-term employment scheme. Third, the necessity
of adjusting the organizational form according to inevitable changes in the in-
ternal or external environment implies further turnover among the employees
and marks a crucial disruption to the organization, which was presumably per-
fectly equipped to master the challenges of a high-growth environment. Basing
our analyses on the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (1994 to
2007), we confirm all hypotheses. Using survival analyses and generalized es-
timation equations panel regressions of employment growth, we demonstrate
that high initial growth rates lead to a decrease in long-term performance in
comparison with firms exhibiting initially moderate growth. Because higher
initial growth implies larger firms, and firm size is known to increase survival,
we cannot provide conclusive evidence that initially moderately growing firms
eventually outperform gazelles. However, the results are in favor of this notion.
Nevertheless, the evidence are conclusive in terms of the idea that attaining a
larger size through continuous moderate growth or, perhaps, a larger start-up
size or higher growth at a later stage, after e"cient routines are established,
are preferable paths to attaining this size quickly through initial high growth
rates. Moreover, we demonstrate that high initial growth implies persistent
higher employee turnover. Under the assumption that high employee turnover
is harmful to firm performance, this positive correlation between initial high
growth and long-term employee turnover might contribute to the explanation
of the trade-o! between initial growth and firms’ long-term performance.
The above results supported the argument that a lack of organizational
stability in terms of employee composition during gazelles’ early years facili-
tates the explanation of the trade-o! between initial high growth and long-term
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performance. However, our analysis further revealed that the inevitable higher
employee turnover in high-growth firms can only partially account for the ne-
gative long-term e!ects of initial high employment growth. Therefore, future
research should strive to continue uncovering the factors that drive the ne-
gative trade-o! between initial high growth and long-term performance. For
example, in immediate continuation of our theoretical framework, one might
derive the hypothesis that high variation in employment growth has the grea-
test destabilizing e!ect in comparison with, for example, a longer period of
high growth. Furthermore, the lines of arguments presented in this paper
can potentially be extended to high-growth incumbent firms. In other words,
we might expect high employment growth to have similar destabilizing e!ects
in mature firms as well, with potentially serious implications for their future
performance. Finally, we hypothesize that initial high growth hampers the
establishment of e"cient organizational structures and routines. Recall that
founder characteristics are argued to play a significant role in new firm per-
formance. In particular, spin-o! entrepreneurs are highlighted as a particular
successful type of entrant. One argument for spin-o!s’ superior performance
is their frequent adoption of the organizational form of the parent firm and
the utilization of organizational routines familiar to them. Moreover, spin-o!s
recruitment of former colleagues from the parent firm might further ease the
process of establishing an e"cient organization, as they can build on existing
relations, shared values, and routines. This possibility suggests that spin-o!s
might be more skilled at handling initial high growth. However, we leave these
thoughts as suggestions for future research.
Based on the above results, giving a second thought to the current political
tendency to prioritize the enablement and fostering of prosperous conditions
for the emergence and settlement of gazelles is worthwhile. Of course, the
short-term e!ects of high-growth start-ups with regard to job creation are
indisputable. However, we argue that to actively pursue such short-term eco-
nomic gains of high-growth start-ups is to risk the consequences of initial high
growth in terms of a higher tendency to eventually lose these jobs once again.
We claim that trimming political initiatives to specifically provide gazelles’
requirement might come at the cost of forgoing more sustainable jobs and po-
tentially hinder long-term expansion in terms of production e"ciency. As we
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have argued, production e"ciency requires routinized, stable and, most im-
portantly, surviving organizations. From an economic perspective, it is thus
dangerous to focus solely on short-term job creating machines with foreseeable
long-term disadvantages.
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Chapter 3
The e!ect of top-employee
migration and spin-o!s on
incumbent firms1
Abstract: Spin-o!s are know to be superior performers compared to other de
novo entrants. Spin-o!s are thus expected to accrue greater and more long-
term welfare e!ects than other start-ups, but if spin-o!s are founded on the
intellectual capital accumulated at their parent firms, they may be potentially
harmful to those firms. However, similar e!ects on the performance of parent
firms might be expected for top-employee migration to rival incumbent firms, or
even for top employees who migrate to non-competitive destinations. Using the
comprehensive Danish linked employer-employee database, we investigated how
top-employee migration to spin-o!, rival incumbent firms, and non-competitive
destinations a!ect parent firms’ hazard of exit, sales growth and employment
growth. We found negative performance e!ects from top-employee migration in-
dependent of where employees migrate. Although departures of top employees
to spin-o!s were found to have negative e!ects on parent-firm performance,
and this negative e!ect is greater than for the non-competitive departures, the
e!ect is not significantly di!erent from that of top employees who move to com-
peting incumbent firms. We studied this phenomenon using di!erent methods,
including matched models adjusting for parent-firm heterogeneity.
1Co-authored with Michael S. Dahl, Aalborg University.
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3.1 Introduction
Many industry studies have illustrated how employees who leave incumbent
firms to found their own firms in the same industry are remarkably more likely
to succeed compared with other de novo entrants (see Klepper (2009) for a
recent review). This form of entrepreneurship has been labeled spin-o!s.2
Although increasing attention is paid to these spin-o!s, little evidence of the
e!ects that spin-o!s have on the parent firms exists (Klepper, 2009). The
seminal work of Phillips (2002), a notable exception using data on Silicon
Valley law firms, shows that the hazard of exit of parent firms initially rises
when a highly ranked employee leaves to found a spin-o!. Similar results of
spin-o!s are found for the hazard of exit for Dutch accounting firms (Wezel
et al., 2006), US law firms (Campbell et al., 2012) and for the technological
performances of parent firms in the US hard drive industry (McKendrick et al.,
2009).
Across these three studies, parent firms experience lower performance when
employees found spin-o!s, at least initially. The question of whether this result
holds when controlling for the general migration of employees (e.g., to rival
incumbent firms) remains open, a factor for which only Phillips (2002) has data
to account for. In addition, these three studies are conducted on three specific
industries where it is more likely that spin-o!s are based on customer relations
from the parent firm, which is a convincing explanation for why spin-o!s are
harmful. In other industries, spin-o!s might not be as harmful, because the
overlap between spin-o!s and parent companies is smaller (Chatterji, 2009).
Moreover, McKendrick et al. (2009) indicates that the negative e!ect is only
temporary and that parent firms are likely to perform better after the spin-o!s
have departed, possibly because stronger firms spawn more spin-o!s.
Based on this evidence, we argue that it is still largely an open question
whether spin-o!s are harmful for parent firms and, if so, whether they are more
or less harmful than other types of top-employee migration. We build on prior
studies and focus on the e!ect of top-employee migration to three di!erent
2In the existing literature, the superior performance of spin-o!s almost exclusively refers
to their higher survival rates. In Chapter 5, we conduct an empirical study that compares
spin-o!s’ job creation to that of other entrant firms. This study concludes that spin-o!s are
more important to the job creation in the economy than other entrants.
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destinations: spin-o!s, competing incumbent firms, and non-competing firms.
The latter category serves as the baseline of our analysis. If top-employee
migration generally reduces the parent firms’ stocks of human capital and des-
tabilizes organizational routines, the e!ect on parent-firm performance might
be independent of the destination for the departure. This hypothesis suggests
that the departure of top employees to spin-o! entrepreneurship might not in-
duce additional negative e!ects on parent-firm performance. We used a unique
dataset to study the e!ects on 29,271 parent firms in a wide range of private-
sector industries in Denmark from 1993 to 2006. More specifically, we studied
the e!ect of top-employee migration on future survival, sales growth and em-
ployment growth of the parent firm. Top employees are defined as employees
placed among the top 25% wage-earners in the parent firm. Although several
explanations may exist for the mechanism behind a potentially harmful e!ect
on a parent firm, we highlighted these mechanisms and studied the direction
of e!ects.
The decision to migrate could be endogenous to past or expected future
performance of the parent firm. We accounted for this concern, at least partly,
by matching the parent firms to one another based on their observable charac-
teristics and performance history. This study design enabled us to study the
e!ect of top-employee migration in a more conservative setting. The matching
models estimated only the cases where parent firms have one or zero departing
top employees to isolate the e!ect of migration on subsequent performance.
Our study contributes to the literature that examines the consequences
and e!ects of spin-o!s and top-employee migration and knowledge spillovers
between rivals, incumbent firms and startups. Spin-o!s are expected to accrue
greater and more long-term welfare e!ects, due to their superior performances
compared with that of their peers, suggesting that industrial policy should
encourage spin-o! entrepreneurship (Klepper, 2009). In Chapter 5, we provide
evidence in favor of this notion. However, if there is a negative performance
e!ect from parenting spin-o!s, this strategy becomes more questionable and
requires more evidence on the e!ect on parent firms. The expectation of a
negative e!ect by parent firms may lead them to try to prevent or fight spin-o!s
(Carnahan et al., 2012), possibly through non-compete covenants, which have
been shown to decrease inter-firm mobility and entry into entrepreneurship
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(Stuart and Sorenson, 2003; Marx et al., 2009).
3.2 E!ects of top-employee migration on incumbent
firms
Spin-o! migration
New firms di!er greatly in terms of performance. Spin-o!s have often been
highlighted as a particularly successful type of entrant in specific industry stu-
dies (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) and in general (Dahl
and Reichstein, 2007b; Dahl et al., 2009). Explanations of the success of spin-
o!s typically argue that founders accumulate organizational and firm-specific
knowledge at their previous employers (the parent firms) that enables them to
outperform other entrants. This firm-specific knowledge could include know-
ledge about products, production, technologies, routines and structures, but
it may also include knowledge regarding strategy, markets and other processes
(Sørensen, 1999; Klepper, 2001; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Phillips, 2002;
Wezel et al., 2006) that might not directly conflict with the intellectual pro-
perty of parent firms (Cooper, 1985; Roberts, 1991; Shane, 2003). This capital
is well suited if the new firm is established in the same industry. The founder’s
experiences in that particular industry give her a head start compared with
her peers (Agarwal et al., 2004) and assist her in overcoming the liability of
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965).
Departing entrepreneurs might also take other resources with them to their
own business. Former colleagues might be o!ered positions in the new ven-
ture. The parent firm risks losing personnel and firm-specific knowledge simul-
taneously. By definition, spin-o!s are established in the same industry as the
parent firm, implying that they potentially compete directly with the parent
firm. Compared with other new rivals, spin-o!s could pose a greater competi-
tive threat because they are based on knowledge, organizational routines and
potentially also employees from the parent firm (Agarwal et al., 2004; Wezel
et al., 2006), which increases the potential similarity in products, technology
and markets or strategies and, thus the departure of an employee to a spin-o!
might increase the hazard of failure for parent firms. The negative e!ect on
the parent firm’s performance might increase in proportion to the overlap in
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products and markets between the parent firm and the spin-o! (Phillips, 2002;
Wezel et al., 2006).
The departure of employees to spin-o! entrepreneurship may decrease the
parent firms’ stock of human capital and increase competition, and it might
also disrupt organizational routines and increase the need for organizational
restructuring (Phillips, 2002; McKendrick et al., 2009). When an employee
leaves a firm to begin entrepreneurship, her departure and subsequent replace-
ment might trigger an organizational restructuring in the parent firm, a more
likely case the higher the rank of the employee and the more important she is
to the parent firm (McKendrick et al., 2009). Recent studies show that em-
ployees with longer educations, higher job performance and higher wages are
more likely to enter and succeed in entrepreneurship (Braguinsky and Ohyama,
2007; Groysberg et al., 2009; Elfenbein et al., 2010; Carnahan et al., 2012). If
spin-o!s are generally initiated by top employees, their departure might further
increase the need for organizational restructuring, leading to a decline in the
parent firms’ performance and a greater loss of human capital that is costly to
replace.
The preceding arguments suggest a negative e!ect on the parent firm’s
performance following a spin-o!. This drop in performance could stem from
the loss of human capital and organizational change triggered by the departure
of a top employee, potentially destabilizing the organization, due to missed
opportunites (Hannan and Freeman, 1977,9; McKendrick et al., 2009). In
addition, it could be an e!ect of the formation of a new competitor and the
loss of knowledge, resources and social relations. In either case, we expect
spin-o!s to have a negative e!ect on the performance of parent firms.
Top-employee migration in general
Although the preceding arguments suggest a negative performance e!ect from
parenting spin-o!s, we argue that these proposed e!ects from spin-o!s might
not di!er from the negative e!ects of other types of top-employee migration. In
this paper, we distinguish between three destinations for top-employee migra-
tion; top employees who depart to spin-o!s, competing incumbent firms, and
non-competing destinations. The possibility that a departure to spin-o! do not
impose an additional negativ e!ect on a parent firm’s performance compared
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to other types of top-employee migration, importantly, questions whether the
parent firms’ apparent greater resistance toward spin-o!s is rational or based
on a fallacy. We argue that the answer depends on the actual mechanisms dri-
ving the e!ects. In the following, we hypothesize that the determining factor
concerns whether the e!ects are mainly driven by (i) organizational desta-
bilization and loss of human capital, (ii) increased competition triggered by
loss of knowledge and loss of social capital (relationships) or (iii) loss of intel-
lectual capital (organizational routines) to rival companies, i.e., spin-o!s and
competing incumbent firms.
Loss of human capital and organizational disruption
By definition, a top employee possesses high stocks of human capital, making
her important or even indispensable to her employer. For that reason, losing a
top employee to a spin-o! implies a decrease in human capital and, potentially,
a negative performance e!ect. This drop in the parent firm’s stock of human
capital is unrelated, however, to the top employee’s post-departure occupation.
As a consequence, we should expect an equivalent performance drop following
any top employee’s departure. A similar argument can be made regarding the
proposed increased need for organizational change resulting from executive
migration (McKendrick et al., 2009). If either the loss of human capital or
organizational disruption drives the negative performance e!ects associated
with top employees leaving for spin-o!s, we should expect similar e!ects when
top employees depart to other destinations than spin-o! entrepreneurship.
Increased competition
The previous arguments build on the assumption that departing top employees
equally reduce the parent firm’s stock of human capital and trigger organizatio-
nal change. However, if departures for spin-o! also increase competitive pres-
sure, this finding might make spin-o!s even more harmful than other types
of top-employee migration. This increased competitive threat emerges from
the transfer of knowledge (e.g., idiosyncratic knowledge regarding products,
technologies and strategy) or the transfer of social relationships. The latter
could be harmful losses of clients and within-firm relationships (Corredoira and
Rosenkopf, 2010). This loss of social relations happens when top employees
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sustain customer relations upon departure. Although this might increase com-
petitive pressure on the firms that parent spin-o!s, the loss of social relation-
ships is also an obvious risk when top employees depart to rival incumbent
firms. The same argument thus also applies when a departing top employee
transfers intellectual capital from a parent firm to a rival incumbent firm. This
suggests that the proposed negative e!ects on parent-firm performance from
spin-o!s will be similar to the performance e!ects from top employees who
migrate to incumbent rivals.
In contrast, Wezel et al. (2006) argue that the loss and subsequent repli-
cation of parent firms’ routines induce more distinct competitive consequences
if top employees resign to work at a newly founded firm (spin-o!), as oppo-
sed to an incumbent rival. The reason for this finding is that new firms are
not yet locked into a particular organizational structure or a specific set of
routines. No pre-existing patterns restrain them from adapting or replicating
the best features of the routines of the parenting firms. Incumbent firms, on
the other hand, already have established organizational features that are not
readily altered or influenced by a new top employee (Schein, 1983; Dahl and
Reichstein, 2007b; Wezel et al., 2006). If spin-o!s are imitating the organiza-
tional structure of their parents, it implies greater similarity in products and
strategy and, hence, competition for the same markets. This result means that
they are competing for the same customers and resources, for example, funding
and employees. Such a loss of intellectual capital might, therefore, cause more
harm in the case of spin-o!s.
Although spin-o!s are established in the same industry as the parenting
firms, they may not engage in direct competition with them or win the same
resources. Cassiman and Ueda (2006) and Hellmann (2007) suggest that spin-
o!s exploit opportunities already rejected by the parent firms. As a result,
the overlap is likely to be small (Chatterji, 2009). This condition may open
the door for potential synergies and mutually beneficial cooperation between
parent firms and spin-o!s. If spin-o!s complement their parents, rather than
compete for the same markets, the parent firm’s performance might be posi-
tively impacted. Moreover, the potential positive e!ects to the industry from
agglomeration, selection and legitimation might also suggest additional po-
sitive e!ects from spin-o!s, if such positive industry e!ects would o!set the
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negative e!ects on the individual firm. We expect, however, that such positive
e!ects of employee mobility will benefit the industry or region more than the
individual firm (Baron et al., 2001).
In general, the departure of top employees is not solely associated with
losses to the parenting firms, for example, the loss of human capital. If these
are replaced, the new employees also imply a potential inflow of new knowledge
and social relations (Kaiser et al., 2008; Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010). This
finding is a part of the organizational restructuring that follows the resigna-
tion of top employees and potentially includes a re-evaluation of managerial
practices and a realignment of organizational structures or improved strategies.
Implementing these changes in the organization might be a lengthy and troub-
ling process. Nevertheless, we expect that any negative e!ects on parent-firm
performance following top-employee migration will decrease over time.
Although top employees’ departure into spin-o!s entrepreneurship might
potentially harm parent-firm performance, we argue that similar negative ef-
fects might be expected for top-employee migration in general, independent
on their post-departure occupation. If either loss of human capital or orga-
nizational disruption drives the negative e!ects on parent-firm performance,
the proposed negative e!ects from spin-o!s should not di!er from the e!ects
of other types of top-employee departure. However, if transfer of knowledge
and social capital from the parent to a potential competitor increase the com-
petitive threat facing the parent firm, both departure for spin-o!s and com-
peting incumbent firms cause more harm to the parent firm than departures
to entrepreneurship in remote industries, to non-rival incumbents, and other
non-competitive destinations. Furthermore, for spin-o! entrepreneurship, imi-
tation of the parent firm’s organizational structure might increase similarity
and competition, suggesting a relatively stronger negative e!ect on parent-firm
performance.
Finally, firm performance might be subject to opposite e!ects from the
departure of top employees, especially when top employees depart to spin-o!s.
This possibility includes the inflow of new knowledge and social relations if
the departing top employee is replaced. Potential synergies between spin-o!s
and parent firms and positive industry e!ects might also o!set the proposed
negative e!ects of spin-o!s and top-employee migration in general.
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In sum, the overall e!ects from top-employee migration in general, to spin-
o!s and to competitive incumbent firms depend on the relative e!ects from
loss of human capital, social relations, knowledge and resources and those of
organizational change and increased competition. The outcome is dependent
on the mechanisms driving the strongest e!ects on parent firm performance.
3.3 Method
Data
We analyzed the e!ects on parent firms’ performance following spin-o! and
other types of top-employee migration using a linked employer-employee da-
tabase from Denmark. The Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market
Research (referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA) contains information on
the economy from 1980 to 2007 and is maintained by Statistics Denmark. The
IDA contains demographic information on all individuals, plants and firms in
the Danish labor market. Its paneled structure enables tracing all observa-
tions annually. The complete system for social security numbers enables the
faithful combination of a large collection of government registries, which are
maintained closely, due to the extensive welfare system. This data is used
increasingly in the social sciences, for example, Albæk and Sørensen (1998),
Sørensen and Sorenson (2007), Sørensen (2007), Dahl and Sorenson (2010) and
Dahl (2011). For a thorough description of this database and its structure, see
Timmermans (2010).
In our sample, we included all active incumbent firms from 1993 to 2006.
Firms from the public sector and the heavily regulated primary sector were
excluded because other factors a!ect firm performance in those sectors. To be
considered active, a firm must employ a minimum of one full-time equivalent
employee. Using this definition, we determined firm age as the first observed
activity within an observation period starting in 1980. If a firm had less than
one full-time employee for two consecutive years, we considered the firm closed.
We allowed for a single year without activity, but we allowed no reentry. Sub-
sequent observations were dropped, providing a more conservative dataset of
196,839 incumbent firms.
We did not expect departures of all types of employees to have equal e!ects
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on the performance of firms. Blue-collar workers might not have a measurable
impact on a firm when they resign, and the migration of lower wage workers
might even increase firm performance (Carnahan et al., 2012). Therefore,
we restricted ourselves only to examine top employees, defined as full-time
employees with a salary equal to or above the 75th percentile of full-time
salaries in each firm.3 The legal individual owner(s) and founder(s) are top
employees regardless of their salary.
Parent firms are firms that lost one or more top employees during the period
of investigation. The preceding argument implies that only top employees have
the ability to a!ect parent-firm performance. In smaller firms, however, all
employees might cause such e!ects, independent of their salary. The latter
implication does not match the objective of this analysis, and parent firms are,
therefore, restricted to those firms that employ a minimum of ten full-time
equivalents at the time of resignation. In order for firms in the dataset to be
comparable, we only include firms that have ten full-time equivalents or more
in at least one out of two years from 1993 to 2007, reducing our sample to
29,271 firms.
Depending on their post-departure employment, we divided the departing
top employees into three categories: (i) spin-o! entrepreneurs, (ii) employees
at rival incumbent firms or (iii) non-competitive destinations, including entre-
preneurs in other industries, employees at non-rival incumbent firms, retirees,
students and even deaths as investigated in Chapter 4. A spin-o! is a new
business founded in an industry closely related to the industry of the parent
firm, i.e., designated by the same four-digit SIC-code. Along similar lines, a
departure to a rival incumbent firm is a departure to a firm within the same
four-digit SIC-code industry as the parent firm. Incumbent firms include firms
of all ages except start-ups (firms aged zero).
3We have tested the robustness of our results concerning this threshold and estimated
Model 1 to Model 14 using the 90th percentile. This does not alter our findings, indicating
that our results are robust to alternative definitions. These estimations are available upon
request.
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Identifying entrepreneurs and spin-o! departures
The Danish data allows for two methods to identify entrepreneurs. An addi-
tional database containing information on the primary founder of new Danish
businesses relying on board and registration information can be merged with
the IDA. This database contains only one founder for each business, however,
and we preferred to allow for a group of top employees founding a firm as a
team. As a result, we chose to rely on the IDA for the identification of entre-
preneurs and spin-o!s following Sørensen (2007). Statistics Denmark provides
annual information on the occupation of all individuals that we used to iden-
tify the entrepreneurs behind all businesses with personal liability including
self-employed individuals with or without employees.
However, the occupation variable does not identify the entrepreneurs be-
hind incorporated ventures. Using IDA, we further identified all newly founded
firms in Denmark from 1981-2007 in accordance with Sørensen (2007). Follow-
ing these criteria, entrepreneurial entry occurs when a firm appears as a new
employer. The first observation determines the start-up year, and we omitted
all subsequent observations and excluded firms from the public and primary
sectors. We identified the founder(s) from the pool of individuals employed in
the start-up year by, including (i) all employees present in a new firm if it has
three employees or less. For firms larger than this, the decision criteria include:
(ii) all individuals with the status of CEO or top manager or (iii) individuals
with an occupational code as wage earner on the highest level. We identified
as many as five founders based on this criterion (selection is based on highest
salary). (iv) We also included individuals listed with unspecified occupation
codes who might be the rightful founders, and we listed these individuals as
founders if they belonged to the top three highest paid employees, replacing
up to three individuals from category (iii). Finally, (v) if no one fulfilled the
preceding four criteria, we treated the three employees with the highest salary
as founders.
Explanatory variables
We followed the precedent of McKendrick et al. (2009) concerning most of the
explanatory variables of interest. Accordingly, we included a dummy variable
for spin-o!s that takes a value of one in all years after an incumbent firm has
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had its first spin-o!. If the last observation of the top employee at the parent
firm is in year t, then the spin-o! dummy takes the value one in this year and
all following years.
We also included a clock variable, counting the number of years since the
last spin-o! to analyze how the e!ect of spin-o!s evolves over time. For in-
stance, this clock variable takes on the value zero in year t, value one in year
t + 1 and value two in year t + 2. We reset the clock each time an incumbent
firm spawned a spin-o!. By definition, this variable refers to the number of
years since the incumbent has had a spin-o!. Theoretically, we expect spin-o!s
to have initial negative e!ects on parent-firm performance. A negative e!ect
from the spin-o! dummy variable will confirm this hypothesis, but we expect
this e!ect to diminish over time. If so, the spin-o! variable will show a positive
estimate in the regressions.
We accounted for the e!ect of departures of top employees in general and
top employees departing to rival incumbent firms. For each, we introduced
two equivalent variables: a dummy for departures and a clock variable for
the time since the most recent departure. The former e!ect accounts for the
departure of all top employees, i.e., including entry into spin-o! entrepreneur-
ship, departures to rival incumbent firms, and non-competitive destinations.4
We expected an initial negative e!ect on performance captured by our top-
employee departure dummy, but, eventually, incumbent firms should recover
from their loss, as indicated by a positive estimate on the clock-variable. If
spin-o!s have no additional e!ect on firm performance, when controlling for
the migration of top employees in general, the previous spin-o! variables will
be insignificant. The same holds for departures to rival incumbent firms.
Carnahan et al. (2012) hypothesize that, conditional to mobility, top em-
ployees are more likely to enter entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship o!ers a di-
rect link between individual performance and pay and attracts high-performers
seeking to improve their earnings (Carnahan et al., 2012; Elfenbein et al., 2010).
We tested this hypothesis on our dataset, and, conditional on mobility, we
4Notice that there is no overlap between the two variables “departure to spin-o! entre-
preneurship” and “departure to an incumbent rival firm”. Spin-o!s are only treated as newly
founded firms during the start-up year. The previous criteria identify the founders. Top-
employee migration to the spin-o! in years subsequent to the start-up year is treated as
departure to an incumbent rival firm.
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found that top employees departing for spin-o!s were more likely in the upper
percentile of the top 25% of wage earners in each firm.5 To contain additio-
nal adverse impacts from spin-o!s driven by the loss of above-average human
capital, we controlled for the departing top employee’s rank in the firm. We
gave top employees a wage score between zero and ten based on their relative
salary.
In general, entry rates are higher in entrepreneurial regimes where entry
barriers are low (Klepper, 1996; Agarwal et al., 2002). If motivated by the
prospect of improved earnings, top employees might depart for spin-o!s when
market concentration is low and economic profits are available. This might
result in a smaller negative performance e!ect from departures for spin-o!
compared to top employees’ departure to rival incumbents in more competi-
tive markets. Moreover, market concentration a!ects firm performance inde-
pendently of executive migration. We controlled for industry concentration,
measuring it using the normalized Herfindahl index (41 industries; see, e.g.,
Hall and Tideman (1967)).6
In addition to the covariates described previously, we included controls for
firm age (logged), size (number of full-time equivalents, logged), size group
(discrete variable, three categories; 10 to 19, 20 to 49, and 50+ employees,
after the number of full-time equivalents in the majority of years from 1993 to
2007), industry (dummy for each two digit SIC-code, 41 categories), legal form
(dummy for unlimited liability), wage level (average gross wage level of CEO,
5We tested the hypothesis using a negative binomial model (results are available upon
request). The dependent variable is the wage score as described below. We include 4,671,045
observations of top employees from 1993 to 2006, including 606,812 departures. We controlled
for age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience (logged), education (years),
gender (dummy for male) and children (dummy for children age 0 to 12). Moreover, we
controlled for firm characteristics including: industry (dummy for each two digit SIC-codes,
41 categories), legal form (dummy for unlimited liability), year dummies, labor market region
dummies (77 categories), size (number of full-time equivalents, logged), top employees (num-
ber of top employees, logged) and dispersion in compensation structure (di!erence between
the 75th and 100th percentile salary, logged). We found a small negative e!ect on wage
score from top employees departing in general. This indicates that relatively higher salary
reduces the likelihood of departure. Conditional on mobility, we found that top employees
departing for spin-o!s have a higher wage score. We also identified a small positive e!ect
from top employees departing for rivals.
6The Herfindahl index range from 1/N to 1. We normalized it to range from zero to one.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
None Before After
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Survival (1993-2006) Dev. Dev. Dev.
Age, years 7.66 6.47 7.45 5.70 11.86 7.00
Full-time equivalents, logged 2.47 0.43 2.43 0.58 3.25 1.00
Salary blue-collar, logged 12.46 0.28 12.41 0.29 12.42 0.24
Salary white-collar, logged 12.49 0.35 12.52 0.36 12.58 0.34
Salary CEO, logged 12.69 0.56 12.68 0.56 12.88 0.61
Real GDP growth, pct 2.50 1.23 2.74 1.32 2.26 1.16
Wage score, all top emp dep 0 0 5.49 2.33
Wage score, departure to spin-o! 0 0 6.26 2.81
Wage score, departure to rival 0 0 5.54 2.57
Time since last top emp dep 0 0 1.61 1.43
Time since last spin-o! dep 0 0 0.28 1.22
Time since last rival inc dep 0 0 1.29 2.03
Top emp turn, share of top emp 0 0 25.35
Emp turnover, share of ft. emp 14.10 18.16 23.77
Personal liability, pct. 19.50 15.57 12.36
No. of observations 12,385 28,951 173,146
No. of unique firms 3,438 9,609 25,833
No. of firm failures 2,077 0 11,482
No. of top emp, total 43,173 92,350 2,868,700
No. of top emp, per firm 3.49 3.19 16.57
Top emp departures, total 0 0 418,403
Top emp departures, per firm 0 0 2.42
Top emp to spin-o!, total 0 0 3,995
Top emp to rival inc, total 0 0 94,447
Categories: None : No top employees depart within the observation period. Before :
Observations before one or more top employees depart. After : Observations after
one or more top employees have departed.
white collar and blue collar workers, respectively (all logged)),7 year dummies,
GDP growth (yearly growth rate, percent) and labor market region dummies
(77 categories). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present descriptive statistics.
Estimations
We used three performance measures: firm failure, growth in sales and growth
in employment. We investigated the e!ects of top-employee migration on the
7Missing values (given that not all firms have employees in all categories) were replaced
with the industry average.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
None Before After
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Survival (1993-2006) Dev. Dev. Dev.
Sales growth (1995-2005)
Mean salest, logged 9.23
"" 10.11""
Mean salest+1, logged 9.35"" 10.14""
Wage score, all departures 0 0 5.44 2.35
Wage score, departure to spin-o! 0 0 6.19 2.82
Wage score, departure to rival inc 0 0 5.49 2.60
No. of observations 7,638 21,452 117,831
No. of unique firms 1,599 7,770 19,816
Employment growth (1993-2007)
Full-time equivalentst, logged 2.33
"" 3.10""
Full-time equivalentst+1, logged 2.47
"" 3.14""
Wage score, all departures 0 0 5.46 2.34
Wage score, departure to spin-o! 0 0 6.23 2.81
Wage score, departure to rival inc 0 0 5.52 2.59
No. of observations 12,845 43,897 171,407
No. of unique firms 2,537 14,946 24,689
Categories: None : No top employees depart within the observation period. Before :
Observations before one or more top employees depart. After : Observations after
one or more top employees have departed. T-test for ln(size): mean(none) vs.
mean(before+after). Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
survival of the parent firms using the exponential survival model (accelerated
failure-time form). Accordingly, we estimated time to failure (ti), assuming
that the baseline hazard, #i = e("!1x1i,t+...+!kxki,t)ti , follows an exponential
distribution (Cleves et al., 2004):
ln(ti) = !1x1i,t + ... + !kxki,t + "i,t (3.1)
We studied the e!ects on sales and employment following the approach
used in Sørensen (1999), and we expressed growth as a function of firm size
(S) and a number of covariates (x), where size is total sales or total number
of full-equivalent employees:
ln(Si,t+1) = $ ln(Si,t) + !0 + !1x1i,t + ... + !kxki,t + "i,t+1 (3.2)
Following McKendrick et al. (2009), we estimated population-averaged e!ects
using Generalized Estimation Equation (GEE) regressions, which account for
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within-group correlation in panel data (Zenger et al., 1988). The minimum
requirement of the model is two subsequent observations, i.e., single-firm ob-
servations were excluded from the estimations. Correlation within firms was
treated as autoregressive (AR1). Using the Huber/White/Sandwich estima-
tor of variance, the estimation produces semi-robust standard errors. The
dependent variable is continuous (assumed to be normally distributed). The
GEE Panel regression uses ln(sales)t+1 and ln(full-time equivalent)t+1 as de-
pendent variables, respectively. Both sets of models include the lagged value
of the dependent variable as given in Equation 4.2. Data limitations restrict
the observation period to 1995 to 2005, when estimating ln(sales)t+1. Except
for the size and age variables, both models of firm growth include the same set
of covariates as the firm survival model.
3.4 Results
Firm survival
Table 3.3 presents results from exponential survival models estimating the
e!ect from spin-o!s and other types of top-employee migration on ln(time to
failure). The estimations are based on 214,482 firm-years from 1993 to 2006
for 29,271 unique incumbent firms. All models include size group, industry,
region and year dummy variables and unreported controls for GDP growth.
Model 1 presents the e!ects of general top-employee departure on survival.
Having at least one top-employee departure from the firm has a significant,
negative impact on survival, but the e!ect wears o! over time. Losing a top
employee decreases the expected time to failure by 38.9%, and each subsequent
year increases the survival time by 5.2%, while a higher wage score has a
negative e!ect. This means that it is generally negative to lose top employees
independent of their destination. In general, large and incorporated firms have
greater survivals. We also found that firms in less competitive industries and
firms with higher wage levels for white-collar workers and CEOs have greater
chances of survival.
Model 2 examines the e!ect of top employees departing to become spin-
o!s, i.e., to enter the same 4-digit SIC industry as entrepreneurs. This also has
a negative e!ect on the incumbent firm’s survival. Similarly, Model 3 shows
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Table 3.3: Exponential survival model (1993-2006) – accelerated failure-time form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(full-time equivalent)t 0.543
"" 0.514"" 0.520"" 0.541""
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Company with personal liability -0.766"" -0.747"" -0.745"" -0.760""
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Ln(average gross income blue-collar) -0.061 -0.048 -0.059 -0.068†
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Ln(average gross income white-collar) 0.078"" 0.079"" 0.080"" 0.079""
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Ln(average gross income CEO) 0.266"" 0.263"" 0.263"" 0.265""
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Market concentration (0-1) 1.007† 1.086† 1.056† 1.001†
(0.606) (0.604) (0.602) (0.604)
Wage score (0-10) -0.027"" -0.061"" -0.053"" -0.027""
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dummy: top-employee departure -0.492"" -0.399""
(0.035) (0.036)
Clock: top-employee departure 0.051"" 0.040""
(0.006) (0.006)
Dummy: Spin-o! -0.090" -0.029
(0.040) (0.040)
Clock: Spin-o! 0.012 0.006
(0.010) (0.010)
Dummy: Rival incumbent -0.286"" -0.206""
(0.021) (0.022)
Clock: Rival incumbent 0.036"" 0.024""
(0.005) (0.006)
Constant -1.753"" -1.992"" -1.812"" -1.659""
(0.567) (0.573) (0.569) (0.566)
Size group (two dummies) yes yes yes yes
Industry (40 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Region (76 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes
GDP Growth yes yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -21937 -22025 -21954 -21901
Observations 214,482 214,482 214,482 214,482
Firms 29,271 29,271 29,271 29,271
Events (firm failure) 13,559 13,559 13,559 13,559
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
a negative e!ect if a firm loses a top employee to an incumbent firm in the
same 4-digit SIC industry. As seen for top employees in general, the latter
e!ect is reduced over time. In our final model, we tested the e!ect of these two
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types of top-employee migration in the same model. Thus, we examined the
e!ect of these while controlling for the other type and the general departure
of top employees (Model 4). We found that after controlling for the general
departures of top employees and departures to rival incumbent firms, the e!ect
of spin-o!s is insignificant and indicates that they do not a!ect the survival
of the parent firms. In contrast, top employees departing for incumbent rivals
have a significant and negative e!ect on survival. Top employees migrating to
incumbent rivals reduce the time to failure by an additional 18.6% compared
to top-employee migration in general. This result suggests that top employees
who resign to work for rival incumbent firms have relatively larger negative ef-
fects on firm performance compared with top employees who depart for spin-o!
entrepreneurship, the latter being no more harmful than top-employee migra-
tion to non-competing firms. These results question the competitive threat
facing the parent firm from departure to spin-o! entrepreneurship.
Firm growth
Table 3.4 presents results from the GEE panel regressions estimating the e!ect
from spin-o! and other types of top-employee migration on ln(sales)t+1. The
estimations are based on 146,921 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2005
using 22,004 firms. All models include size group, industry, region and year
dummy variables, as well as unreported controls for GDP growth.
Overall, the estimates of migration on sales in the following year support the
findings from the survival models. We found that departing top employees have
a negative and significant e!ect on sales independent of where they are active
afterwards (see Model 5), an e!ect that decreases over time. Top employees
who leave as spin-o! entrepreneurs also have a significant and negative e!ect on
the sales of their parent firms (see Model 6), again an e!ect that significantly
diminishes over time. We also found that top employees leaving for incumbent
rivals have a significant and negative e!ect, reducing over time, on the sales
of the parent firms (see Model 7). Adding these three types of top-employee
migration to the same model (Model 8) indicated that top employees departing
for spin-o!s and incumbent rivals have negative e!ects on the sales of the parent
firm after controlling for the general departure of top employees. Departure
for spin-o!s and rival incumbent firms reduce sales by an additional 1.6% and
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Table 3.4: GEE panel regression of ln(sales)t+1 (1995-2005)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(sales)t 0.864
"" 0.858"" 0.861"" 0.865""
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(Age) -0.043"" -0.047"" -0.046"" -0.042""
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Personal liability -0.021"" -0.016"" -0.015"" -0.020""
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(income blue-collar) 0.031"" 0.039"" 0.035"" 0.028""
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln(income white-collar) 0.050"" 0.051"" 0.050"" 0.050""
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(income CEO) 0.029"" 0.028"" 0.028"" 0.029""
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Market concentration (0-1) 0.382"" 0.391"" 0.386"" 0.381""
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124)
Wage score (0-10) -0.004"" -0.011"" -0.010"" -0.004""
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy: Top emp depart -0.097"" -0.086""
(0.004) (0.004)
Clock: Top emp depart 0.005"" 0.004""
(0.001) (0.001)
Dummy: Spin-o! -0.026"" -0.016"
(0.007) (0.007)
Clock: Spin-o! 0.004"" 0.003"
(0.002) (0.001)
Dummy: Rival incumbent -0.042"" -0.027""
(0.003) (0.003)
Clock: Rival incumbent 0.005"" 0.003""
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.135 0.061 0.106 0.156
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Size group (2 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Industry (40 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Region (76 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes
GDP Growth yes yes yes yes
Number of groups 22,004 22,004 22,004 22,004
Observations 146,921 146,921 146,921 146,921
Wald Chi-Squared 722104 698489 701780 723201
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
2.7%, respectively. These e!ects do not di!er significantly, indicating a similar
increase in the competitive pressure from departures to both spin-o!s and
incumbent competitors.
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Aggregating the e!ects from general migration, spin-o! and wage score (the
average is 6.19 and 5.54 for spin-o!s and incumbent rivals, respectively), we
found that having a top employee departing for spin-o! reduces sales by 12.7%.
Similarly, departure for incumbent rivals reduces sales by 13.5%, but executive
migration in general only reduces sales by 10.8%. The e!ects diminish by 0.4%
per year for all departures and an additional 0.3% per year for both spin-o!s
and incumbent rivals. The latter suggests a relatively faster recovery when
top employees resign for spin-o!s or rival incumbent firms. In the last year
of the observation period (after 13 years), the model indicates a reduction in
parent firms’ sales of 5.6%, 3.6% and 4.6% for general migration, spin-o!s and
incumbent rivals, respectively.
We tested these findings against another dependent variable: ln(full-time
equivalents) in the year after the departure of one or more top employees.
Table 3.5 presents the results from the GEE Panel regression estimating the
e!ect from spin-o! and executive migration on ln(full-time equivalents)t+1.
The estimations are based on 228,149 firm-year observations from 1993 until
2006 using 27,226 unique firms. All models include size group, industry, region
and year dummy variables and unreported controls for GDP growth. The
regressions on firm growth are almost identical to the previous findings (see
Models 9 to 12). We found that top employees founding spin-o!s have a
negative and significant impact on the future employment growth of the parent
firm. At the same time, departures of top employees to incumbent rivals and
other destinations have negative and significant e!ects, as well. All three e!ects
significantly declined over time.
When we investigate the e!ect of executive migration on firm sales or em-
ployment growth, our estimates may be subject to a selection bias, as firms exit
the population. We might experience this selection problem for exiting firms
that would have been among the lowest performing firms in the population,
potentially due to migration of top employees. Selection-corrected growth mo-
dels can provide a control for this potential selection bias. In our sample, the
likelihood of observing a given firm in the sample is equivalent to the likelihood
of that firm having survived. Building on Hall (1987), the sales (or employ-
ment) growth rate from time t ! 1 to t might be an appropriate instrument
variable. However, while this variable is significant in models of firm survival,
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Table 3.5: GEE panel regression of ln(full-time equivalents)t+1 (1993-2006)
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Ln(full-time equivalents)t 0.772
"" 0.762"" 0.767"" 0.775""
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(Age) -0.039"" -0.042"" -0.041"" -0.039""
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Personal liability -0.011"" -0.007" -0.005† -0.009""
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(income blue-collar) -0.031"" -0.029"" -0.031"" -0.033""
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(income white-collar) 0.018"" 0.018"" 0.018"" 0.018""
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(income CEO) 0.024"" 0.024"" 0.023"" 0.024""
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Market concentration (0-1) 0.182" 0.184" 0.179" 0.179"
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Wage score (0-10) -0.006"" -0.013"" -0.012"" -0.006""
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy: Top emp depart -0.089"" -0.074""
(0.003) (0.003)
Clock: Top emp depart 0.003"" 0.001"
(0.001) (0.001)
Dummy: Spin-o! -0.034"" -0.025""
(0.007) (0.007)
Clock: Spin-o! 0.006"" 0.005""
(0.002) (0.002)
Dummy: Rival incumbent -0.053"" -0.042""
(0.003) (0.003)
Clock: Rival incumbent 0.005"" 0.004""
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.608"" 0.587"" 0.607"" 0.619""
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
Size group (2 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Industry (40 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Region (76 dummies) yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes
GDP Growth yes yes yes yes
Number of groups 27,226 27,226 27,226 27,226
Observations 228,149 228,149 228,149 228,149
Wald Chi-Squared 459452 420238 423211 470839
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
it is also significant in the sales (and employment) growth models. The latter
indicates that this instrument is correlated with the error term in the explana-
tory equation, violating one of the requirements for using instrument variable
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methods, potentially resulting in inconsistent estimates of the selection models.
For that reason we leave out the selection-corrected models. Note, however,
that we expect a positive selection bias because selection is associated with
higher performance. This potential positive selection bias suggests that a top
employee’s departure could be even more harmful to parent-firm performance
than our models in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 predict.
Endogeneity
Our results illustrate a negative e!ect of losing top employees in general, to
spin-o!s and to rival incumbent firms. The e!ects of losing top employees may
occur because parent firms di!er from other firms or the top employees may
leave declining firms or firms with dark futures ahead of them, a hypothesis
coined the sinking ship hypothesis. For spin-o!s, however, this hypothesis goes
against the majority of literature, which typically finds that the most suc-
cessful parent firms also have the largest number of spin-o!s (Klepper, 2007;
McKendrick et al., 2009). Employees at successful firms are more exposed to
unexploited (or underexploited) opportunities (Agarwal et al., 2004), and wor-
king at a successful firm might be a stamp of approval and enable the spin-o!
entrepreneur to raise capital and attract the most talented employees (Dahl
and Reichstein, 2007a). Franco and Filson (2006) even suggests that potential
entrepreneurs might accept a lower wage for “apprenticeship” at a successful
parent firm, pointing to more spin-o!s in the firms that have had the highest
growth rates in the past years.
In general, high growth might increase the need for organizational restruc-
turing. If organizational changes alter an organization’s blueprint, it might
increase employee turnover (Baron et al., 2001). Top employees might be in
a more favorable position to find alternative employment (or receive more job
o!ers) when employed by more successful firms, suggesting that parent-firm
performance is associated with higher rates of top-employee migration. On
the other hand, economic theory suggests that wage di!erence allocates la-
bor among firms. More productive firms can pay higher salaries and thus
attract the most talented employees. If parent firms are more successful, we
would expect them to compensate top employees financially to prevent their
departure. However, other studies that use the Danish database have found a
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strong positive e!ect on employee salary from changing employers (e.g., Dahl
and Klepper (2008) and Dahl et al. (2009)), indicating that employees (in Den-
mark) are forced to find a new employer to earn a high salary increase (Bingley
and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2003), rejecting this hypothesis.
Endogeneity might also be associated with top-employee heterogeneity, if
top employees departing for spin-o!s and incumbent rivals di!er from other
top employees. As argued previously, high performers might seek to improve
earnings through migration, for example, into spin-o! entrepreneurship. This
indicates that the stronger negative e!ects on firm performance from spin-o!s
and incumbent rivals could be driven by higher human capital among these
top employees. We tested these hypotheses below.
First, we estimated negative binomial regressions for the number of top em-
ployees departing in each of the three categories. We controlled for the employ-
ment growth in the past three periods before the departure of top employees.
Additional controls included GDP growth, wage levels, limited liability and
size (logged) and dummy variables for size, industry, region and year.8 We
found that growing firms have a larger migration of top employees in general
and to rival incumbent firms and spin-o!s. One standard deviation increase in
employment growth one year prior to departure increases the number of top
employees departing to spin-o!s and incumbent rivals by 0.1 and 0.03, respec-
tively. The same holds for large firms and in years with greater GDP growth
in the economy. Overall, these results disprove the sinking ship hypothesis.
Second, to test the e!ect of potential endogeneity on our results, we sup-
plemented the preceding analysis with a matching approach to ensure that
firms (and top employees) are completely comparable in the point of origin
(the year of top employees’ departure). Using nearest neighbor matching, we
matched firms on their ex ante performance, including employment (logged),
sales (logged) or survival (estimated) as our dependent variables. Table 3.6
illustrates our approach. We estimated two sets of matched models to adjust
for parent-firm heterogeneity and top-employee heterogeneity, respectively. To
adjust for parent firm-heterogeneity, we matched firms on size group (three
categories), industry (41 categories), firm age and the average gross salary for
8Estimations are available upon request.
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blue collar workers, white collar workers and CEOs, respectively. These va-
riables all refer to the last observation before departure, time t ! 2 (see Table
3.6). To adjust for top-employee heterogeneity we matched top employees on
wage score (0-10), tenure, education (years) and age and we matched firms on
size group (three categories) and firm age.
Table 3.6: Matching approach
Time Firm Yeart ln(sales)t+1 ln(sales)t!1 Departing Years since
ID top employee last departure
t " 8 5 1994 80 1 0
t " 7 5 1995 60 1 1
t " 6 5 1996 25 80 0 1
t " 5 5 1997 10 60 1 2
t " 4 5 1998 20 25 0 1
t " 3 5 1999 30 10 0 2
t " 2 5 1999 10 20 1 3
t " 1 5 2000 25 30 0 1
t 5 2001 15 10 0 2
t + 1 5 2002 10 25 0 3
We applied a conservative design without allowing for collective or repea-
ted migration. First, we restricted the sample to those firms experiencing only
a single departure within a five-year window, meaning that no other top em-
ployees were allowed resignation two years prior and two years after this event
(see Table 3.6). The firms satisfying these criteria were matched with a sample
of firms that experienced no top-employee departures within a five-year win-
dow. Referring to the latter as “controls”, we matched the two groups based
on performance and firm characteristics at time t ! 2 in every case. We then
compared the performance of the “treated” and “controls” at time t, two years
after a potential departure. We matched each “treated” with the two nearest
“controls”.9 Table 3.7 describes the categorization into di!erent treatment and
control groups.
We estimated the e!ect of migration comparing employment (logged) and
sales (logged) and estimated the mean survival time for each firm by re-using
the specification from Model 4 in Table 3.3. Estimating the e!ect on survival,
we used both a five-year-window and a three-year-window, but when using
9Using a single-match approach might rely on too little information. On the other hand,
using too many matches incurs a risk of incorporating dissimilar observations (Abadie et al.,
2001). For these reasons, we used two matches as a standard.
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Table 3.7: Categories in Table 3.8
0) Treatment: One top employee departs.
Control: No top-employee departures within the five-year-window.
1) Treatment: One top employee departs to spin-o! entrepreneurship.
Control: One top employee departs for other reasons
(excluding departures to an incumbent rival).
2) Treatment: One top employee departs to an incumbent rival.
Control: One top employee departs for other reasons
(excluding departures into spin-o! entrepreneurship).
3) Treatment: One top employee departs to spin-o! entrepreneurship.
Control: One top employee departs to an incumbent rival.
the five-year-window, the sample was conditional on survival because we only
included firms that survived until time t. This is the case for both the “treated”
and the “controls”. Thus, we compared the estimated mean survival time at
time t. Matching firms from the treatment group with the control group,
we only matched on their expected survival at time t ! 2. Using the three-
year-window, we also compared the estimated mean survival time at time t.
However, if a firm exited on or prior to time t, we replaced the dependent
variable value with -1 and 0 for firms exiting at time t ! 1 and t, respectively.
Using the three-year-window, we included all matching variables (e.g., firm
size, age and industry).
Following the preceding order, we first investigated the e!ect of general exe-
cutive migration to provide the baseline e!ect. Next, we estimated the e!ect
of spin-o! by matching firms with one top employee departing for spin-o! with
other single top-employee departures (see Table 3.7). Following a similar pro-
cedure, we estimated the e!ect of departure to an incumbent rival. Finally, the
matching approach permits a direct test for di!erences in e!ects from depar-
ture for spin-o!s and incumbent rivals. Investigating the e!ect on employment
(logged), sales (logged) and survival (three-year-window), we estimated two
sets of matched models accounting for firm heterogeneity and top-employee
heterogeneity, respectively. When estimating the e!ect on survival (five-year-
window), we only included one set of matched models because we only matched
firms on their expected survival at the time of top employee departure.
First, we adjusted for firm heterogeneity, matching solely on firm characte-
ristics. We estimated the e!ect of one top employee departing independently
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of the post-departure occupation and no longer found a significant e!ect on
employment growth from migration in general (see Table 3.8). However, the
negative e!ects on sales and survival remain significant. We then matched
departures to spin-o! with migration in general, not including departures to
rival incumbent firms, and found a negative e!ect on both employment and
sales. On average, losing a top employee to spin-o! entrepreneurship decreased
employment by 6% and decreased sales by nearly 20%, relative to departures
to non-competitive destinations. Table 3.8 further indicates a negative but
barely significant e!ect on survival. The models for departure to incumbent
rivals also confirmed our previous findings, but the e!ect on employment and
sales were smaller than for spin-o!s. On the other hand, we found a stronger
negative e!ect on survival from departure to an incumbent rival. When we ad-
justed for top-employee heterogeneity and matched primarily on top-employee
characteristics, we found similar results.
The preceding findings suggest a larger e!ect from spin-o! on employment
and sales relative to incumbent rivals. Conversely, these findings indicate that
departure to competitive incumbent firms has a greater e!ect on parent firms’
survival than spin-o!s. Matching spin-o!s and incumbent rivals, however,
we found no clear evidence that the e!ects on parent-firm performance di!er
between departures for spin-o!s and incumbent rivals, but some evidence did
indicate that spin-o!s are more harmful to parent firms’ sales.
Overall, the matched models support our previous findings, but it is im-
portant to emphasize that this analysis is not directly comparable with the
former (see Tables 3.3-3.5). Because the matching approach requires one de-
parture (or none) within a five year period, the estimates are biased toward
the smaller firms in the population. For this reason, the previous analysis is
necessary to obtain a more accurate picture of how top-employee migration
a!ects parent-firm performance. The matching approach should therefore be
treated as a supplement to the previous analysis and as a control of potential
endogeneity.
The endogeneity problem can be regarded as an omitted variable bias. Our
dependent variables might be related to unobservables before the resignation,
for example, strategic decisions and innovations. We cannot observe all relevant
information and have not identified suitable instrument variables. Nor can we
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Table 3.8: Matched models
Ln(ft equivalents)t Ln(sales)t Mean survivalt†† Mean survivalt
(5-year-window) (3-year-window)
One top employee departs vs. no top employees depart
Estimate 0.0064 -0.0400"" -2.6322"" -0.9526""
(0.0058) (0.009) (0.1229) 0.1388)
# Observations 24,334 19,644 24,334 60,157
# Treatments 4,067 3,334 4,067 13,273
# Controls 20,267 16,310 20,267 46,884
A: Departure into spin-o! entrepreneurship
Estimate -0.0614" -0.1983"" -0.3637 -0.8323†
(0.0275) (0.0632) (0.4956) (0.4881)
# Observations 3,123 2,572 3,123 10,215
# Treatments 104 80 104 319
# Controls 3,019 2,492 3,019 9,896
B: Departure into spin-o! entrepreneurship
Estimate -0.0519† -0.1663"" - -0.5513
(0.0269) (0.0609) - (0.4970)
# Observations 3,123 2,572 - 10,215
# Treatments 104 80 - 319
# Controls 3,019 2,492 - 9,896
A: Departure to a rival incumbent firm
Estimate -0.0256" -0.0613"" -0.9707"" -0.9228""
(0.0275) (0.0195) (0.1816) (0.1821)
# Observations 3,963 3,254 3,963 12,954
# Treatments 944 762 944 3,058
# Controls 3,019 2,492 3,019 9,896
B: Departure to a rival incumbent firm
Estimate -0.028"" -0.0626"" - -0.573""
(0.0098) (0.0184) - (0.1767)
# Observations 3,963 3,254 - 12,954
# Treatments 944 762 - 3,058
# Controls 3,019 2,492 - 9,896
A: Departure to spin-o! entrepreneurship (vs. rival incumbent)
Estimate -0.018 -0.1037† 0.3566 0.2788
(0.0287) (0.0587) (0.4379) (0.4529)
# Observations 1,048 842 1,048 3,377
# Treatments 104 80 104 319
# Controls 944 762 944 3,058
B: Departure to spin-o! entrepreneurship (vs. rival incumbent)
Estimate -0.0284 -0.0811 - 0.1159
(0.0282) (0.0623) - (0.4638)
# Observations 1,048 842 - 3,377
# Treatments 104 80 - 319
# Controls 944 762 - 3,058
A) Adjusting for firm heterogeneity. Matching variables include: Ln(size)t!2 or survivalt!2 estimate,
Size group (3 categories), Firm Age, Industry (2-digit, 41 categories) and Average gross salaryt!2
for blue collar workers, white collar workers and CEOs, respectively.
B) Adjusting for top employee heterogeneity. Matching variables include: Ln(size)t!2, (3 categories),
Size group Firm Age, Wage Score (1-10), Tenure (yrs), Education (yrs) and Employee Age.
††: Single matching variable is survivalt!2 estimate.
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%. Standard errors in parentheses.
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be certain of the degree of selection of these unobservables, but Altonji et al.
(2005) o!ers a method demonstrating the sensitivity of our results by assessing
both the direction and magnitude of this bias. Combined with the estimated
e!ects of our key-variables (the departure of top employees in general and to
spin-o!s and incumbent rivals), it establishes that the e!ect is within a defined
range when controlling for bias (see Altonji et al. (2005) for details on the model
and the underlying assumptions). Establishing whether our conclusions stands
the test of whether our estimates remain negative when we correct for the bias
was our primary concern followed by a desire to assess the magnitude of the
bias and the endogeneity problem.10 We found that the bias is positive for
the three types of top-employee migration. We subtracted the estimated bias
from the coe"cient estimate to obtain the range, probably including the true
e!ect. Numerically, the e!ect is larger than or equal to the coe"cient estimate,
confirming that the omitted variable bias underestimates the e!ects. Moreover,
this approach estimates that the bias is relatively small and indicates that
endogeneity is less of an issue. The negative e!ect will increase (the numerical
value) with less than one percentage point in all cases. For the most exposed
type, departure to an incumbent rival, this corresponds to an increase in the
e!ect on parents’ sales and employment of 6.9% and 14.3%, respectively.11
The previous tests indicate that omitted variable bias has a minor im-
pact on our results. In the following section, we introduce a final control for
the implications of endogeneity. If our previous findings are subject to severe
endogeneity, applying a matching approach should significantly a!ect the mag-
nitude of our estimates. To assess the implications of the matching approach,
we re-estimated Model 5 to 7 and Model 9 to 11, but we only include firms
from the corresponding matched model (recall that the matched models are
biased toward the smaller firms in the population). The matching approach
found no significant e!ect on employment growth from the departure of any
10We isolated the bias from our three key-variables (dummy variables for the departure
of one or more top employees in general, to spin-o!s and to incumbent rivals) in turn. This
method did not allow us to estimate bias in the joint models (Model 8 and Model 12). We
investigated the endogeneity in Model 5 to 7 and Model 9 to 11. To isolate the bias from
the key-variable in question, the models exclude the clock-variable and wage score.
11Estimations are available upon request.
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top employee. Nevertheless, the re-estimation of Model 5 illustrated a signifi-
cant negative e!ect on employment. This indicated endogeneity in our reduced
sample, as matching eliminated the e!ect, but this is an isolated case. For the
remaining cases, the matched models depicted similar or even stronger e!ects,
supporting previous findings.12
3.5 Discussion
We investigated how top employees’ departures for spin-o!s, incumbent ri-
vals, and non-competitive destinations a!ect the survival, sales growth and
employment growth of parent firms. When a top employee resigns, we expect
a harmful reduction in the parent firm’s stock of human capital, and the event
might destabilize organizational routines and trigger organizational change.
For these reasons, migration of top employees is expected to a!ect parent-firm
performance negatively, independently of their reason for departure. Suppor-
ting this, we found a negative performance e!ect from departure in general,
but we found additional e!ects on parent-firm performance from departure to
spin-o! and incumbent rivals after controlling for general departure of top em-
ployees. These findings support the argument that transfer of human capital
and social capital from the parent to a competing firm is more harmful than
top-employee migration in general because it increases competitive pressure on
the parent firm.
We hypothesized that the competitive threat, and thus the negative per-
formance e!ect, could be even greater for departure to spin-o!. Unlike in-
cumbent firms, spin-o!s replicate the organizational structures of their pa-
rents, increasing similarity and competition between spin-o!s and their parent
firms. However, our results do not support this hypothesis; rather, they indi-
cate that departure to rival incumbent firms might have larger negative e!ects
on parent-firm survival than departure to spin-o! entrepreneurship. However,
our analysis shows no clear evidence of this result because the result di!ers
across dependent variables. Our findings support the apparent resistance of
12Estimations are available upon request.
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incumbent firms to the general departure of top employees, especially depar-
tures to competitive firms, but our findings do not support greater resistance
toward spin-o!s. Incumbent firms should focus on general strategies to re-
tain employees and not specifically on preventing spin-o! entrepreneurship by
employees.
We used di!erent methods to account for endogeneity associated with both
firm and top-employee heterogeneity. Whether the endogeneity problem is as-
sociated with the sinking ship hypothesis or the opposite, it constitutes a
potential risk that can never be completely eliminated, but the preceding tests
indicate that endogeneity is associated with positive e!ects on firm perfor-
mance in this study because better firms apparently have more spin-o!s and
higher migration of top-level employees. This result suggests that our fin-
dings are conservative. The magnitude of the negative e!ects from general
top-employee migration and migration to spin-o!s and incumbent rivals are
probably underestimated, thereby supporting our conclusions. Moreover, we
expect that stronger and healthier firms are less sensitive to negative impacts,
such as loss of human capital and organizational disruptions and should be
quicker to rebound and regain strength. This result scales down the overall
economic implications of top employees’ entry into, for example, spin-o! en-
trepreneurship.
We have shown that top employees’ departing for spin-o!s or competitive
incumbent firms have larger negative e!ects on parent-firm performance than
other types of top-employee migration. Moreover, we have argued that the loss
of social relations may drive this result, but these network e!ects do not apply
equally to all industries. We expect the e!ect from the loss of relationships is
especially strong within certain consultancy industries, for example, accoun-
ting or law firms, as investigated in Wezel et al. (2006) and Phillips (2002),
respectively. These are industries in which decisions on business relations are
more closely related to single individuals than to whole companies. Investiga-
ting this in more detail, we have estimated the matched models (adjusted for
firm heterogeneity) excluding all but the consultancy industries.13 We found
13Limited by the level of detail in the data, we only included industries in which we believe
that network-e!ects play a significant role. This list could include industries in which the
majority of activities match our definition of consultancy. We argue that this is the case
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that the e!ect on survival from top-employee migration is larger within the
consultancy industry, but no e!ects on employment and sales appeared within
the industry.14 The previous arguments suggest that top employees’ depar-
ture to rival incumbent firms and spin-o!s, in particular, are relatively more
harmful within in the consultancy industry. Supporting this hypothesis, we
determined that departures for spin-o!s and incumbent rivals have an above-
average adverse impact on parent-firm survival, but no significant e!ects with
respect to employment and sales.15
Overall, our analysis depicts similar e!ects from departure to spin-o!s and
incumbent rivals. An equally harmful transfer of knowledge and loss of social
relations might explain this finding. On the other hand, we found that spin-
o!s, conditional on mobility, are more likely to be in the upper percentile of top
employees, indicating superior human capital. This suggests that the similar
e!ects from top employees’ departure to incumbent rivals and spin-o!s might
rely on di!erent explanations. The latter might depend on a significant reduc-
tion in the stock of parents’ human capital, while the transfer of knowledge
and loss of social relations drives the negative e!ect for migration to rivals.
Finding no answer, our investigation leaves that question for future research.
We do not distinguish between single and collective migration. Following
Wezel et al. (2006), the replication of organizational routines is more likely to
succeed and, thereby, compose a threat to the parenting firm when organizatio-
nal members leave as a group. Furthermore, collective migration is more likely
to trigger organizational change in the parent firm compared with departure of
a single employee. Future research should address how the departure of teams
and groups of employees to same destination might multiply these e!ects.
for law firms, accounting firms and technical consultancies. Alternatively, the definition
might also include financial institutions and insurance companies, but we excluded these
and questioned the degree to which customers’ preferences relate to single individuals. We
argue that customers, particularly large business clients, are less likely to respond to top-
employee turnover by changing their bank connections, as compared with that in a technical
consultancy for example.
14Matching departures from consultancy with departures from other industries, however,
we found a strong e!ect on sales. In other words, departure from consultancy reduces parent
firms’ sales by 39% relative to migration within other industries and strongly supports the
hypothesis.
15The estimations are available upon request.
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As described previously, our study indicates that the departure of top em-
ployees to incumbent rivals and spin-o!s has negative e!ects on parent-firm
performance, but we do not investigate how other characteristics of the recei-
ving firm (the firm to which the top employee departs) a!ect the parent firm’s
performance. We expect that greater similarity between the parent and the
receiver will increase the competitive fallout, for example, if the two firms are
established in the same environment (institutionally, geographically, socioeco-
nomically and historically), thereby increasing the likelihood of competition
for the same resources (Sørensen, 1999; Wezel et al., 2006). Greater similarity
might also increase the receiving firm’s absorptive capacity (Corredoira and
Rosenkopf, 2010). Furthermore, because they have more resources, larger rival
firms might be better at exploiting the inflow of human and social capital from
the new employee and increase its market shares at the expense of the parent
firm. This hypothesis might explain why we, as previously discussed, find in-
dications that departures to rival incumbent firms could have larger negative
e!ects on parent-firm survival than departures to spin-o! entrepreneurship, as
start-ups are generally smaller than incumbent firms. For these reasons, la-
ter studies should undertake a more exhaustive analysis and investigate under
which circumstances top-employee migration is most harmful for parent firms.
As opposed to previous studies on spin-o! and top-employee migration,
which delimit themselves by industry and geography, we have investigated the
phenomenon more generally. However, the question still remains of whether
these findings apply equally to all industries. Although factors such as social
and intellectual capital have significant parts to play within some industries,
they are less crucial in others. We have already taken a first step by investi-
gating consultancy industries, and future research should strive to outline in
more detail which industries and under which circumstances spin-o! contri-
butes significantly to parent-firm performance. This includes an investigation
of spin-o! by lower ranked employees and investigation of small firms (fewer
than ten employees).
We have illustrated a negative e!ect on firm performance from all types
of top-employee migration. We partly explain this finding as a loss of human
capital. This negative performance e!ect increases with greater human capi-
tal and might discourage firms from investing in their top employees’ human
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capital, especially if they expect high employee turnover. Moreover, we expect
that idiosyncratic human capital will increase with the length of top employees’
tenure, indicating a larger e!ect on parent-firm performance when employees
leave after a longer period of employment. In many ways, the Danish labor
market resembles that of the U.S. Compared with many other European coun-
tries, the employers costs of firing employees are low, and annual rates of job
creation and turnover resemble the labor market in the U.S. (Dahl and Klep-
per, 2008; Sørensen and Sorenson, 2007). This suggests that the e!ects on
parent-firm performance from top-employee turnover might be larger in other
European countries but similar in the U.S.
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Chapter 4
Who loses a leader without
losing ground?
Unexpected death in top management teams
and firm performance
Abstract: Executive migration might cause a detrimental human capi-
tal loss with great replacement costs or trigger a disruptive shock within an
organization. Events such as top management turnover often reduce future
performance. The question addressed in this paper is thus whether such poten-
tial disruptive change to the top management team is an inevitable risk that
is equally harmful to all organizations or whether, and why, some organiza-
tions can better absorb the expected negative impact of this shock. I address
these questions by exploiting the exogenous variation in firm performance from
unexpected deaths in top management teams. I investigate which firm charac-
teristics mitigate the negative e!ects of this exogenous shock by estimating firm
survival and sales growth models. I find that greater organizational capabilities
and increasing organizational stability and routinization through continuity in
the top management team mitigate the negative e!ects, leading to higher post-
death performance. Conversely, I find that increasing stability in the employee
composition, reflected by higher employee tenure, increases organizational vul-
nerability to this disruptive shock.
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4.1 Introduction
Being at the head of firm strategy and being responsible for firm e"ciency and
employee achievements, top managers can be crucial to firm performance. The
impact of top management turnover, especially CEO turnover, is thus “cri-
tically important and yet unique and separate from turnover at other levels”
(Kesner and Sebora, 1994, p. 329). First, top management turnover is parti-
cularly detrimental because managers’ organization-specific human capital is
higher. The top management team (TMT) tasks are often non-routine and
idiosyncratic, making potential replacements more di"cult and costly (Kesner
and Sebora, 1994). Second, top management turnover might trigger a disrup-
tive shock for the firm, temporarily incapacitating organizational structures
and routines (Carroll, 1984; Johnson et al., 1985; Haveman, 1993; Kesner and
Sebora, 1994; Shen and Canella, 2002). This shock disrupts the internal func-
tioning of the organization, as the departing top manager leaves gaps in the
organizational structure. This alteration of organizational structures a!ects
decision-making processes in the firm, and at best, involves implementing new
and e"cient organizational routines. This process takes time, during which or-
ganizational performance is less e"cient. Moreover, the alternate top manager
might di!er from his/her predecessor in competencies, management style, stra-
tegic focus and prioritization (Shen and Canella, 2002). This di!erence might
further complicate and prolong the process, as both routines and organizatio-
nal norms are challenged. In addition, the indirect missed opportunity costs
during this restructuring period might further enhance the negative e!ect of
top management turnover (Hannan et al., 2007). All together, this leaves the
post-shock organizations less e"cient than before and thereby further hampe-
ring post-turnover performance.
Accepting the premise that top management turnover triggers a disruptive
organizational shock and reduces the firm’s human capital stock, we might ex-
pect firms to engage in TMT retention strategies when economically feasible.
Nevertheless, provided a firm survives, TMT turnover eventually becomes in-
evitable. The question put forth in this paper is therefore whether potential
disruptive TMT changes are risks that firms must simply (passively) accept or
whether some firms cope better with such organizational shocks than others.
The latter suggests that firms could perhaps equip themselves to reduce the
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shock-e!ect of “losing a leader”.
Intuitively, organizations that develop flexible routines and adaptive capa-
cities are better prepared to cope with organizational disruptions such as top
management turnover. Conversely, organizational inertia might circumscribe
an organization’s willingness and ability to act and adapt or limit its ability
to perceive the need to do so, resulting in negative e!ects on the firm’s post-
turnover performance. Following the above arguments, if TMT continuity (i.e.,
lack of turnover) manifests organizational inertia, this inertia might imply a
greater human capital loss during top management turnover, further hampe-
ring post-turnover performance. This suggests that older, highly routinized
and inert organizations are more vulnerable to the organizational disruption
of losing a leader. This paper, however, suggests an alternative hypothesis, ar-
guing that firms characterized by organizational stability are, on average, more
resistant to disruptive changes to the TMT and have a less negative shock to
subsequent performance.
While more inert and routinized organizations might be slower or unable to
adjust to changing environments, they might also have more e"cient produc-
tion than highly flexible organizations. This increased e"ciency is partially due
to their e"ciently routinized behaviour, including better activity coordination
and a more e"cient resource exploitation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen
and Bacdayan, 1994; Becker, 2004). Moreover, flexibility and adaptability im-
ply that the firm employs excess resources and therefore has relatively higher
production costs (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). For these reasons, stronger
and more e"cient organizations’ might be better equipped to handle disrup-
tive events. This further implies greater competitiveness and organizational
capabilities (Le Mens et al., 2011). The latter might serve as a bu!er for dis-
ruptive organizational shocks, preventing fatal outcomes. Another argument
why organizational stability reduces the negative shock-e!ect builds on these
organizations’ presumed stronger structural inertias, i.e., greater resistance
and less flexibility to organizational change. Because stronger inertial forces
work against and hinder potentially detrimental organizational changes from
occurring, the consequences of losing a top manager might be less severe with
smaller organizational changes and performance e!ects.
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The above portrays heterogeneous organizations, suggesting di!erent res-
ponses to and di!erent performance e!ects of losing a top manager. However,
both organizational characteristics and the top management turnover type af-
fect the performance outcome (Shen and Canella, 2002). The preceding points
implicitly assumes that top management turnover implies an organizational
loss with negative e!ects on performance. However, firms sometimes decide
to terminate members of the TMT. Firms might initiate these TMT changes
to improve performance or to signify change to external shareholders, often
called the ritual scapegoating theory (Kesner and Sebora, 1994). This theory
suggests that poor performance increases the likelihood of TMT turnover (He
et al., 2011). Conversely, TMT turnover might not occur following a firm’s ini-
tiative. Top managers might strive for new and exciting challenges and a higher
salary, pursuing career-promoting opportunities outside the firm. Moreover,
managers with extraordinary abilities, presumably employed in better perfor-
ming firms, are more likely to be headhunted, indicating a positive correlation
between TMT turnover and firm performance or perhaps post-turnover per-
formance (Hayes and Schaefer, 1999). Nevertheless, whether a firm loses a top
manager because he/she leaves for a new job, retires, falls ill, or is fired, there
is a potential detrimental human capital loss1, and it might trigger a disrup-
tive organizational shock, which negatively a!ects organizational performance.
The consequences to the firms’ subsequent performance, however, di!er. The
evidence on the impact of top management turnover on firm performance is
thus somewhat inconclusive (Carroll, 1984; Bonnier and Bruner, 1989; Have-
man, 1993; Shen and Canella, 2002; Chang et al., 2010; He and Sommer, 2011;
He et al., 2011).2
A general critique of the studies that investigate performance-e!ects from
top management turnover is their inability to conclusively determine causality
between the event and the firm’s post-event performance. Top management
turnovers rarely happen randomly. The endogeneity problem of a possible cor-
relation with firm performance makes it increasingly di"cult to separate these
e!ects, predict the consequences of top management turnover, and investigate
1Though presumably higher, when a top manager is “raided” by another firm rather than
fired.
2See Kesner and Sebora (1994) for a review of this literature.
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which firms are better at overcoming this potential loss and organizational
disruption. I address this problem by exploiting the exogenous variation in
firm performance following 699 unexpected deaths in top management teams.
Using a comprehensive dataset, containing yearly observations of all Danish
firms from 1993 to 2006, I investigate which firm characteristics mitigate the
disruptive organizational shock of losing a leader and increase post-death per-
formance. These events, I argue, are randomly assigned and therefore uncor-
related with the firms’ prior performance (Bennedsen et al., 2006). Moreover,
as unexpected deaths draw randomly from the distribution of top managers,
these top managers’ abilities should reflect the population average (Hayes and
Schaefer, 1999).
Few studies apply a similar methodology, exploiting the exogenous event
of unexpected executive deaths to estimate the significance of top managers,
CEOs, independent directors, and founders to firm performance (Johnson
et al., 1985; Hayes and Schaefer, 1999; Bennedsen et al., 2006; Hvide, 2009;
Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). These studies generally confirm a negative relation
between losing a top manager and post-death performance. While these stu-
dies focus on the value of di!erences in managerial ability and establishing the
consequences of executive turnover, I apply an organizational theory perspec-
tive, investigating which firm characteristics influence post-death performance.
I address the question of which firms are better prepared to handle the dis-
ruptive organizational shock of losing a leader and what can organizations do
to better equip themselves to manage this shock with fewer e!ects on perfor-
mance.
I find that organizations that increase organizational stability through
TMT continuity (i.e., increasing TMT tenure), are better prepared to cope
with top management turnover and the simultaneous organizational shock.
Increasing TMT tenure results in a less disruptive e!ect on the organization
and better post-shock performance. Moreover, matched models, controlling
for endogeneity caused by the correlation between TMT tenure and firm per-
formance, support this conclusion. I find evidence that higher ex ante death
performance increases the organizations’ organizational capability stock, lea-
ding to a smaller negative e!ect on post-death performance. Conversely, I find
that longer employee tenure enhances the negative e!ects on firm performance
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from losing a leader. I thus conclude that firms can, to some extent, build
organizations that are better equipped to handle and resist the negative shock
of top management unexpected death. Moreover, I argue that these results
might also apply to other types of (internal) exogenous organizational disrup-
tions. The results emphasize the important role of top management stability
in establishing e"cient and routinized organizations that are better equipped
to handle disruptive organizational shocks. This finding suggests increasing
focus on top management retention strategies, e.g., employee shares, terms of
notice or non-competition agreements.
4.2 The e!ects of top managers’ unexpected deaths
Extensive organizational changes punctuate and reset the process of establi-
shing e"cient organizational routines (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). Al-
tering established organizational action patterns destabilizes the organization
and negatively a!ects organizational performance because of subsequent lower
productivity. While this is not a permanent state, realigning the organization,
re-establishing e"cient patterns of activity, and adapting to the new context
take time. This process is often called “resetting the liability of newness clock”,
comparing the post-disruption situation with the conditions and challenges
that face new firms and increase their potential to fail. Conditional on survi-
val, an organization can rebuild its internal processes (Amburgey et al., 1993).
An unexpected death in the top management team might be an example of
such a destabilizing activity. It alters the decision-making process and task
division within the firm, incapacitating organizational structures and routines
and leaving the organization in a state of perturbation.
Top management unexpected death also implies a human capital loss. The
negative performance-e!ect of losing a leader increases with human capital,
particularly firm-specific human capital (Johnson et al., 1985; Eriksen, 2011).
Because top managers often perform non-routine and idiosyncratic tasks, their
organization-specific human capital is higher than that of other employees.
First, this implies a relative greater drop in the firm’s human capital stock.
Second, the idiosyncratic character of their work makes the process of fin-
ding a suitable replacement di"cult and long-lasting. This di"culty implies
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high recruiting and selection costs, especially those associated with training
and learning organization-specific skills (Johnson et al., 1985; Eriksen, 2011).
Top management unexpected death is thus particularly detrimental to firm
performance. The alternate top manager might also have di!erent competen-
cies (e.g., technical, academic and managerial skills) than his/her predecessor.
He/she might have a di!erent managerial style, focus and prioritization, for
example, di!erent prioritization regarding fields of work and divisions due to
personal commitment and areas of interests. These di!erences might further
prolong and complicate the restructuring phase, thus reducing e"ciency and
performance. Moreover, a shift in focus, a lack of decision-making authority,
and committing resources to the restructuring process might lead to missed
business opportunities (Hannan et al., 2007).
After developing organization-specific skills, a potential successor might
renew and strengthen the firm’s competencies. He/she might bring new know-
ledge, perspectives, ideas, and social capital (networks) to the firm, potentially
increasing firm e"ciency and competitiveness (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996;
McKendrick et al., 2009; Eriksen, 2011). These improvements suggest that the
expected negative e!ect of top management death might reverse over time.
While organizational changes might be disruptive and negatively a!ect firm
performance, they are sometimes imperative. Baron and Hannan (2002) show
that changing an organization’s blueprint appears to be most disruptive when
implemented by the original CEO. They further propose that this reflects the
nature of the implicit contract between employees and management (Baron and
Hannan (2002), p. 22). This suggests that top management turnover might
sometimes provide an opportunity to change core organizational features with
less disruptive e!ects. Supporting this theory, Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996)
argue that firms might exploit top management changes as an adaption me-
chanism in turbulent environments.
Top management unexpected death causes a drop in the organization’s
firm-specific human capital stock and triggers a disruptive organizational shock.
This shock leaves the post-shock organizations less e"cient than before, and
the organizational shock of losing a leader results in a (temporary) decline in
firm performance. The question is not, I argue, whether this disruptive organi-
zational shock has an immediate negative e!ect on performance. The relevant
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question is instead the decline’s size and duration. When do firms manage
to escape this downturn, if ever, and how does this vary with di!erent firm
characteristics?
In the following sections, I develop hypotheses about which firm characte-
ristics potentially enhance and mitigate the shock-e!ect. In addition to these
internal factors, other external factors might a!ect the post-death performance.
By asking whether firms can “prepare themselves for losing a leader”, this paper
solely examines internal factors and does not investigate the e!ect of the firms’
environmental contexts on performance. However, I discuss the significance of
external factors to the paper’s conclusions in a later section.
Organizational stability
Unstable environments require that organizations develop the capacity to adapt
by employing excess resources. In a more stable environment, however, this
implies lower e"ciency and thus lower competitiveness (Hannan and Freeman,
1977). Selection therefore favors organizational stability and reliability in a
stable context (Carroll, 1983; Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 1984;
Baron et al., 2001; Hannan et al., 2007). Intuitively, however, flexibility and
adaptability might better equip organizations for exogenous and sudden or-
ganizational disruptions. Moreover, organizational inertia might circumscribe
the organization’s willingness and ability to act and adapt or limit its ability to
perceive the need for change, as phrased by Tushman and Rosenkopf: “It (iner-
tia) anchors the organization to its past, even in the face of turbulent contexts”
(Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996), p. 942). Contrary to this view, this paper
hypothesizes that (past) organizational stability might reduce the expected ne-
gative shock-e!ect from top management unexpected death. Stable (i.e., inert)
organizations are, on average, more resistant to top management unexpected
death and show less negative shock to subsequent performance.
Assuming a stable context, the above paragraph argues that organizatio-
nal stability and stronger inertia increase firm e"ciency. This includes the
formal organizational structure and routines, as well as organizational norms
or culture (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). E"ciently routinizing activity pat-
terns is essential, as it implies better coordination of organizational actions,
i.e., more e"ciently exploiting and integrating the organization’s knowledge
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and resources. Finally, organizational members in instable organizational en-
vironments who lack the willingness to try to engage themselves in acqui-
ring organization-specific skills that are necessary to establish e"cient routines
might reinforce the previously described disadvantage of organizational instabi-
lity (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). However, developing e"cient routines takes
time. The process of developing these routines includes developing social trust
relationships among employees, management and external parties. Moreover,
e"cient routines evolve from learning-by-doing experience and stable repeated
interactions among organizational members. Building on its experience, the
organization establishes and continuously improves its organizational routines.
Increasingly coherent and e"cient routines thus evolve gradually over time
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996;
Sorenson and Sørensen, 2001; Hannan et al., 2006). These arguments sug-
gest that organizational e"ciency is higher in older firms, with all else being
equal. Moreover, assuming that stronger firms with more e"cient routines are
less vulnerable to disruptive organizational shocks, the negative e!ect of top
management unexpected death might decrease with firm age.
Organizational ecologists, studying the e!ects of fundamental organiza-
tional change, build on the premise that organizations are subject to strong
inertial forces. Increasing inertia implies decreasing the speed at which or-
ganizational structures can change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Following
the above arguments, continually enhancing organizational routines according
to organizational stability reinforces organizational inertia. As a result, these
organizations become inherently resistant to change. This suggests that orga-
nizations with stronger inertia are more resilient to disruptive organizational
shocks, with less negative e!ects on subsequent performance. First, Baron and
Hannan (2002) and Hannan et al. (2006) argue that CEO turnover tends to af-
fect subsequent performance because top management turnover often coincides
with changing the organizational blueprint. A negative e!ect of TMT turn-
over (or top management unexpected death) might be contingent on the event
triggering substantial organizational change, thus altering established processes
and organizational norms. However, if organizational inertia is strong, building
on multiple periods of refining e"cient and deeply rooted routines, these rou-
tines are not easily altered. When a changing context calling for reorientation
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collides with strong internal forces that pull the organization in opposite direc-
tions, the prevailing outcome for strong inertia might be retaining the status
qou. Stronger inertia may thus limit the expected negative e!ects from losing a
leader. Because structural inertia increases with time, older firms might expe-
riences a relatively smaller drop in post-death performance, with all else being
equal. This smaller change in performance, however, is due to inertial forces
working against and preventing potentially detrimental subsequent organiza-
tional changes from occurring, rather than a smaller disruptive shock to the
organization per se. Supporting this, Amburgey et al. (1993) show that the
net e!ect on firm performance from organizational disruptions decrease with
age, though organizational vulnerability to disruptions increases with firm age,
because organizational inertia decreases the likelihood of change (Amburgey
et al., 1993).
H1: The negative shock-e!ect of top management unexpected death de-
creases with firm age.
In addition to the above arguments, firm age increases both employee te-
nure and the likelihood of insider turnover; the latter is replacement by an
employee from within the firm. Because insider turnover is associated with
less post-turnover organizational change and thus less disruptive e!ects on
post-turnover performance, this adds further support to Hypothesis 1 (Kesner
and Sebora, 1994; Shen and Canella, 2002). Moreover, because firms deve-
lop e"cient routines and learn from experiences, older firms might be better
equipped for top management unexpected death, as they are more likely to
have previously experienced non-routine top management turnover.
Organizational capabilities and ex ante performance
Building on Le Mens et al. (2011)’s development of Levinthal (1991)’s organiza-
tional evolution model, this section argues that the organization’s endowment
of organizational capabilities determines its resistance to the disruptive shock
of top management unexpected death. Organizational capabilities represent
the firm’s stock of financial (e.g., an ample cash reserve) and non-financial
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(e.g., a good reputation) resources, which a!ects its potential to fail (Levin-
thal, 1991; Le Mens et al., 2011). Organizational capabilities may increase
or decrease over time, depending on the organization’s relative performance
and a random component. The organization’s initial endowment and previous
resource inflows and outflows determine its current capability stock. The or-
ganization fails when its endowment is fully depleted. Hence, past evolution of
capabilities, and not just the current flow, determines a firm’s potential to fail
and its resistance to disruptive organizational shocks (Le Mens et al., 2011).
It takes time to establish solid and e"cient organizational routines, build
a good reputation, and establish a network to external partners. In addi-
tion, the learning e!ect implies that productivity and knowledge of customer
preferences increase over time. All else being equal, this suggests that organi-
zational capabilities increase with time, adding further support to Hypothesis
1. Whether this actually implies that the focal organization’s potential to fail
decreases with age depends on its fitness (appeal) relative to other producers
in the market. If organizational capabilities do not exceed the industry fitness
threshold, the firm will experience a net resource outflow, decreasing the stock
of organizational capabilities. When relative fitness is high, resources flow from
the target audience to the organization, and vice versa (Le Mens et al., 2011).3
This organizational evolution model o!ers three hypotheses. First, it sup-
ports the main hypothesis of this paper. Punctuating established organizatio-
nal routines implies a resource outflow. Hence, the current organizational ca-
pability stock is contingent on past performance and shocks. The latter might
include events like executive turnover. Both past and current organizational
stability might better equip organizations for disruptive shocks because their
organizational capability endowments are higher. Second, all else being equal,
organizational capabilities and immunity to disruptive organizational shocks
increase with firm age, supporting Hypothesis 1. The expected negative shock
from top management unexpected death is less likely to completely deplete the
organizational capability endowment, making it less likely that this event leads
to failure in older firms. Finally, following similar arguments, higher post-event
performance might further diminish the shock-e!ect. I therefore hypothesize
3For simplicity, the model assumes that resources controlled by the target audience is
constant over time.
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the following:
H2: Higher ex ante-event performance reduces the negative shock-e!ect of
top managers’ unexpected deaths.
Continuity in the top management team
The above arguments univocally suggest that organizational stability is an im-
portant factor in determining how top management unexpected death a!ects
firm performance. One argument is that stability might imply more routini-
zed and potentially more e"cient organizational action patterns. Moreover,
it might increase organizational capabilities. In Hypothesis 1, I operationalize
this as stability reflected by firm age. In addition, this section argues that
this also includes stability in the top management team. An additional ob-
jective organizational stability measure in this paper, considering the data at
hand, is TMT tenure or past TMT turnover. The potential significance of the
TMT composition is especially interesting because it, as opposed to firm age,
suggests that organizations may prepare themselves to handle the disruptive
organizational shock from top management unexpected death.
The paper relies on the premise that top management unexpected death is
detrimental to firm performance. This negative e!ect primarily occurs because
the event disrupts organizational routines, leaving the post-shock organization
less e"cient. Other types of top management turnover might have similar
destabilizing e!ects. Organizations with recent changes in the TMT are weak-
ened, with all else being equal, and might therefore be ill-prepared to handle
the disruptive shock of losing a leader. Supporting this, Meyer (1975) shows
that management continuity is a concomitant of organizational stability and
organizational structure predictability in finance departments. Therefore, we
might expect that higher TMT tenure decreases the negative e!ect of losing
a leader because it reflects past TMT stability. Furthermore, the above ar-
guments indicate that organizational capability endowments are decisive for
the performance-e!ect of top management unexpected death. Because past
organizational shocks, including top management turnover, a!ects the current
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organizational capability stock, TMT stability and continuity increase organi-
zational capabilities. This argument again suggests that higher TMT tenure
might mitigate the shock-e!ect, leading to higher performance.
Adding support to a potential mitigating e!ect of TMT tenure on post-
death performance, I build on previous arguments, suggesting that higher TMT
tenure might result in smaller subsequent organizational changes with fewer
negative e!ects on subsequent firm performance. If the e!ect of top mana-
gement unexpected death depends on whether the event triggers substantial
organizational change (Baron and Hannan, 2002; Hannan et al., 2006), then
his/her subsequent replacement is important (Shen and Canella, 2002). Po-
tential disruptive e!ects triggered by organizational change initiated by the
successor might depend on the power balance between the successor and the
organization, particularly incumbent top managers. For now, I refrain from
discussing other potentially counterbalancing e!ects from this aspect of TMT
turnover (e.g., concurrent human capital inflow), though I return to this dis-
cussion below.
Developing this argument, at least two matters need consideration. First,
the CEO and/or board of directors might use top management turnover to
change core features of the organization. Second, potential successors di!er in
their desire to signal a change of track. As suggested above, top management
turnover might facilitate the organizational change process (Shen and Canella,
2002). However, when an unexpected death triggers top management turnover,
it is an unplanned and non-routine event. Such an opportunity for strategic
reorientation happens by accident and is not easily considered. Moreover, one
might argue that when there is a strong desire for facilitating reorientation
through top management turnover, it would have been initiated earlier, i.e.,
before top management unexpected death. Considering a potential successor’s
incentive to engage in or signal a new direction (e.g., management style or stra-
tegic focus), previous studies show that the type of successor matters (Shen
and Canella, 2002; Perry et al., 2011; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). “New lea-
ders are under some pressure to demonstrate their e"cacy and worthiness, and
they typically cannot do this by simply maintaining the status quo” (Quigley
and Hambrick (2012), p. 836-837). Internal contenders and outsiders are likely
to chart di!erent courses than followers, who have less cause to demonstrate
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their worth through a shift in management style or by restructuring the orga-
nization or introducing new strategies or markets (Shen and Canella, 2002). In
this context, it is interesting to see which organizations allow for such greater
strategic and organizational change. Quigley and Hambrick (2012) find that
CEO succession leads to smaller post-succession performance changes when
the predecessor stays with the company as chairman of the board. They argue
that this occurs because the predecessor directly or indirectly restricts the
actions of his/her successor. This restricts the successors opportunities to in-
fluence firm performance (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012). Following similar
arguments, incumbent top managers may play a similar role following top ma-
nagement unexpected death. When more and stronger (i.e., longer tenure) top
managers comprise the incumbent TMT, there may be a greater capacity to
withstand the pressure from a potential successor’s eagerness to shake-up the
organization. Moreover, such a TMT constitution might further reinforce the
internal reluctance to organizational change, and it might reduce the likeli-
hood that the organization chooses to bring new members into the TMT who
intend to challenge established routines. This possibility further supports the
proposition that organizational stability, especially when a!ected through a
strong and continuous TMT, diminishes the negative shock-e!ect from losing
a leader. I therefore hypothesize the following:
H3: Higher TMT tenure reduces the negative shock-e!ect of top managers’
unexpected deaths, leading to higher post-death performance.
Employee vulnerability to change
Building on Hypothesis 3, one might extend the above arguments to include
other employees. Employee outflow implies a human capital loss, and excessive
employee turnover potentially destabilizes organizational structures and rou-
tines (Baron et al. (2001), Eriksen (2011), Eriksen (2012)). Moreover, high-
tenured employees increase the organization’s ability to e"ciently integrate
new members, passing on organizational norms and routines (see Chapter 2).
Employee turnover might therefore decrease performance. Because employees
with higher tenure are less likely to leave the firm, higher employee tenure
might add to organizational stability and reduce the negative e!ect of top
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management death. However, I suggest an alternative hypothesis.
While increasing TMT tenure might increase post-death stability (Hypo-
thesis 3), I argue that increasing employee tenure has the opposite e!ect. Fol-
lowing the structural inertia argument, employees who have been with the
organization for years might be more negatively a!ected by the organizational
shock than new employees (Baron et al., 2001). As explained above, top ma-
nagement unexpected death might lead to changes in organizational structures
and routines. The event might alter the political base or power status within
the organization, thus reallocating tasks and responsibilities. This implies that
employees might interpret the organizational shock of top management unex-
pected death and the subsequent structural changes as a violation of their
psychological contract with the firm. The psychological contract refers to em-
ployees’ “beliefs or perceptions regarding promises and acceptance” (Robinson
and Rousseau (1994), p. 246). It is the implicit or explicit contract between
the employer and employee regarding mutual obligations and future returns,
for example, loyalty in return for job security or hard work in return for a high
potential for promotion (Robinson and Rousseau, 1994). Robinson and Rous-
seau (1994) find that psychological contract violations are negatively associated
with job satisfaction and increase the likelihood of employee turnover. They
further argue that contract violations impact employees di!erently, depending
on the employees’ career motives. High-tenured employees are more likely to
aim for a long-term commitment and value the employment relationship itself
more than employees who consider their current jobs stepping stones to better
jobs at other firms. Contract violations thus impact the former employee ca-
tegory more negatively (Robinson and Rousseau, 1994). Even when contract
violations are unintentionally or spurred by unanticipated events, employees
might still perceive them as breaches of faith (Morrison and Robinson, 1997).
Moreover, turbulent situations might lead to greater vigilance and uncertainty
about the firms ability or willingness to fulfill the psychological contract (Mor-
rison and Robinson, 1997). These situations likely reveal contract violations
that would otherwise not have invoked employees’ attention. I thus expect that
increasing employee tenure leads to a greater drop in employee productivity
and/or higher employee outflow following top management unexpected death.
I therefore hypothesize the following:
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H4: Employee tenure increases the negative performance e!ect of top ma-
nagement unexpected death.
Conversely, average employee tenure reflects the organization’s past per-
formance. Recent employment growth implies an inflow of new employees,
reducing the average employee tenure. While a drop in the average employee
tenure might decrease performance due to less organizational stability and
e"ciency, high growth, however, suggests accumulating organizational capabi-
lities. Following the arguments of Hypothesis 2, low or negative growth might
further explain a potential negative e!ect on post-death performance from
higher employee tenure. To supplement Hypothesis 4, separating the employee
tenure e!ect from the previous performance and organizational capabilities, I
also hypothesize the following:
H5: A greater number of high-tenured employees increase the negative e!ect
of top management unexpected death.
Increasing employee tenure may enhance the negative e!ect of top mana-
gement unexpected deaths, independent of the firms’ previous growth rates,
i.e., recent employee inflow. The intuition of Hypothesis 5 continues with the
previous argument. The “old guards”, with more organization-specific human
capital and stronger organizational commitment, might be more reluctant to
accept organizational change. These “old guards” are more vulnerable to orga-
nizational shocks, and potentially more likely to leave the company in response
to top management unexpected death. A greater number of high-tenured em-
ployees should thus increase the negative e!ect of top management unexpected
death.
One might oppose to Hypothesis 5 (and 4), arguing that high-tenured em-
ployees increase organizational stability and performance. First, however, I
expect that these “old guards” are more vulnerable to organizational shocks
and potentially more likely to leave the company in response to the unex-
pected death of a top manager. Moreover, because TMT stability largely
carries/determines stability in organizational structures, the negative e!ect of
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employee tenure, I argue, is stronger. I suggest that TMT tenure, rather than
higher employee tenure, equips the organization for the disruptive organizatio-
nal shock of losing a leader.
4.3 Method
Data
I investigate the e!ect on firm performance from top managers’ unexpected
deaths using the Danish Database for Labor Market Research (IDA). Statis-
tics Denmark maintains the IDA. It is constructed for research purposes and
combines o"cial registers from the Danish government. It contains detailed in-
formation on all Danish firms (e.g., accounting figures and industry) and their
employees (e.g., salary and education). The IDA is a longitudinal database
and has annual information from 1980 to 2007. Moreover, Statistics Denmark
provides information on the date of death for all individuals. This informa-
tion can be linked to the IDA. Due to gradual changes in key variables until
1993, 1993 is the first year of my investigation period. Moreover, accounting
variables are not introduced until 1995, further restricting the investigation
period for the sales growth analysis.4 Previous studies using the IDA include
Sørensen (2007), Nanda and Sørensen (2010) and Dahl (2011).
Investigating firm performance, I only include privately held firms with 10
or more full-time equivalents in most years from 1993 to 2007. Moreover, I
exclude public firms and the heavily regulated primary sector. To determine
firm exit, I accept a single year without activity5. If a firm is not active
for two successive years, I consider the firm closed. I do not accept re-entry,
thus dropping subsequent observations from the data. I determine firm age,
counting from the first year of activity in the database. I do not observe the
firms before 1980. I thus cannot predict the exact age of firms that were already
active in 1980. I control for this issue in the survival models.
The IDA provides identification codes for both the plant and the employer
4Chapter 1 provides a detailed description of this database, its applications, strengths,
and weaknesses.
5Less than one full-time equivalent.
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levels (ownership). I base my definition on the latter to investigate firm per-
formance. A single firm (employer/owner) may contain multiple plants. One
implication related to firm exit and top managers’ unexpected deaths is that
an organization’s activities may continue after the event under a di!erent ow-
ner and, technically, under a di!erent firm. To control for this, I impose an
additional restriction of zero activity in the largest firm in the subsequent year,
i.e., less than one full-time equivalent. If the largest plant is still active one
year after its exit, I censor the firm failure observation. This censoring pre-
vents changes in ownership from overestimating the e!ect of top managers’
unexpected deaths on firm survival.
Statistics Denmark provides information on the date of death for all deaths
in the labor force. I identify top managers using their occupational codes in
the IDA.6 Table 4.1 shows that the average number of top managers in firms
without top management unexpected death is 1.77, corresponding to approxi-
mately one top manager per 24 employees. Firms that experience top mana-
gement unexpected death are generally larger and have, on average, 9.54 top
managers, corresponding to approximately 28 employees per top manager. I
expect the significance of single individuals, and thus the e!ect of top mana-
gement unexpected death, to di!er with firm size, including the number of
employees and top managers in each firm. I control for this in the empirical
analysis.
I use a very restrictive definition to identify unexpected deaths. First,
I only include individuals younger than 70 (but older than 18). Second, I
exclude individuals who have received any sickness benefits during their final
year. Third, to control for a top manager being a"liated with the most recently
observed employer at the time of death, I only include individuals with ”death”
stated as their employment status for the following year. The latter is not
possible for 2007, as employment status for 2008 is not available. This restricts
the observation period to 2006. Finally, I only allow for a single event (top
management unexpected death) per firm. Multiple unexpected deaths within
a single year are, however, possible and treated as one event. If a second
unexpected death occurs in the TMT, subsequent observations are dropped.
6In the database, the occupational code for “top manager” and “CEO” is the same and
both are included in my definition.
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This leaves a sample of 699 unexpected deaths in TMTs from 1993 to 2006.
Estimations
I estimate the performance of firms where a TMT member dies and compare it
with the performance of firms that do not experience unexpected TMT deaths.
I interpret di!erences in performance after controlling for firm heterogeneity
as being due to the disruptive organizational event of losing a leader. First, I
investigate the e!ect on firm survival, using the piece-wise exponential duration
model (Equation 4.1), which handles left- and right-censored observations. I
estimate the exponential model for accelerating failure time form. The model
predicts the time to failure, assuming that the baseline hazard, #i, follows an
exponential distribution with mean e!0 (Cleves et al., 2004).
ln(ti|xk,i) = !0 + !gln(gi,2) + !1x1i,t + ... + !kxki,t + "i,t, (4.1)
From an organizational ecology perspective, survival is the favored firm
performance measure (Haveman, 1993; Barnett and Carroll, 1995). The above
arguments add further support to this performance measure, suggesting that
a shock to the organization might make a crucial dent in its organizational
capability endowment, reducing it below the critical threshold, after which the
firm’s organizational capability stock continues to gradually decline. Even-
tually, the firm’s endowment is completely depleted and it exits. However,
considering the average size of the firms in the event-group (see Tables 4.1
and 4.2) and the suggested close relation between organizational capabilities
and firm size, the likelihood of firms actually exiting due to top managers’
unexpected deaths might be low. While I argue that this shock, on average,
negatively a!ects performance, I do not argue that the event of a top mana-
ger’s unexpected death has profound fatal consequences for most firms. I also
do not argue that these e!ects are persistent over time. On the contrary, I
expect that while the negative e!ects of this shock might be long-lasting and
some firms might never recover, most firms will eventually bounce back. If
this prediction is correct, the key question becomes which firm characteristics
can increase the likelihood and speed of the latter? While survival might be
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the preferred performance measure, it might not be possible to capture the
firm characteristics that help absorb the shock-e!ect within a survival model
framework. This might be due to the relatively low number of events or limi-
ted observation period or because the expected negative e!ect is only transient
and most firms eventually bounce back.
For the above reasons, I use sales growth as the primary performance va-
riable when investigating the e!ect of top managers’ unexpected deaths on
firm performance. One advantage of sales growth over survival time is that it
can capture transient performance shocks that may not necessarily result in
firm exit. Even if this shock eventually leads to failure, one would expect a
continuing sales decline to come before a complete withdrawal from the mar-
ket (Almus, 2004). A negative e!ect on firm survival from this shock should
be reflected in sales growth and expected survival time estimations. However,
sales growth estimations are less restricted by a short observation period.
I estimate sales growth models using the approach from Sørensen (1999).
Growth is a function of firm size (sales), S, and covariates, x (Equation 4.2).
I estimate the model using firm fixed e!ects, as I assume that unobserved but
fixed firm characteristics a!ect firm performance (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
ln(Si,t+1) = $ ln(Si,t) + !1x1i,t + ... + !kxki,t + "i,t+1 (4.2)
Explanatory variables
I include a dummy variable for top managers’ unexpected deaths, TM death.
This variable takes a value of one in all years after the event. I also include a
clock variable, Time since TM deatht, to analyze how the shock-e!ect evolves
over time. This clock variable counts the number of years since the event.
Initially, it takes the value zero in year t, the value one in year t + 1, the value
two in year t + 2, and it continues to grow similarly. While I only have annual
observations on firm performance (e.g., sales, employment and survival), I know
the exact date of death. Depending on how quickly the firms’ respond to and
recover from the shock, the e!ect on firm performance might be sensitive to the
accuracy with which the event is dated. Controlling for this, I add (1! (month
of death/12)) to Time since TM deatht. If the top manager dies in January
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(month 1), Time since TM death is 1.92 in year t + 1. Equivalently, if he/she
dies in December, the clock variable is 1 in year t + 1. For surviving firms, I
expect the e!ect on sales growth from a top manager’s unexpected death to
decrease over time. However, if the shock eventually leads to firm failure, the
expected negative e!ect on sales growth should be persistent and increase over
time.
I include interactions terms with TM death to estimate the significance of
di!erent firm characteristics (see e.g., Brambor et al. (2006)). All interaction
terms correspond to firm and employee characteristics in the year of the event.
This approach thus identifies factors that might better equip firms for such
unanticipated events and reduce the shock-e!ect. First, I include the inter-
action term between TM death and Firm age, logged to test Hypothesis 1.
Similarly, I investigate the significance of the focal firm’s ex ante performance,
including the interaction term between TM death and ex ante-event perfor-
mance (Hypothesis 2). While I cannot observe sales before 1995, I observe
employment from 1993 and onwards. I therefore include the firm’s average
employment growth rate for the three years before the event, Emp growth, t-3
to t, to reflect previous performance. If observations about a firm’s previous
three-year employment level are not available (e.g., if the company is under
three years old), I include the employment growth rate for the previous one or
two years.
To test Hypothesis 3, I estimate the interaction e!ects between TM death
and TMT tenure. The latter is the number of years that the top manager has
been employed at the firm. If I observe more than one top manger in the firm,
TMT tenure is the average for the top management team. If I do not identify
any top managers, TMT tenure is zero. Finally, I investigate the significance
of the employee composition at the time of death, including interactions terms
between TM death and Employee tenure and High-ten emp (Hypotheses 4 and
5). The latter is the number of employees in each firm with tenure equal to or
greater than the industry mean.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics (1995-2006)
No Before After
TM dies TM death TM death
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Number Dev. Number Dev. Number Dev.
Employees, t 42.24 (152.11) 271.21 (1074.04) 199.62 (624.58)
Ln(employees), t 3.10 (0.92) 4.05 (1.45) 4.00 (1.43)
No. TMs, t 1.77 (6.57) 9.54 (39.43) 8.03 (24.54)
Ln(no. TMs), t 0.39 (0.68) 1.20 (1.20) 1.10 (1.20)
No. workplaces, t 1.59 (4.54) 4.95 (22.80) 3.24 (7.55)
Ln(workplaces), t 0.19 (0.50) 0.55 (0.99) 0.54 (0.85)
Firm age, t 10.69 (7.40) 12.54 (6.66) 16.55 (6.56)
Ln(firm age), t 2.00 (1.01) 2.29 (0.84) 2.69 (0.57)
Ln(TMT salary), t 13.23 (0.38) 13.24 (0.39) 13.25 (0.37)
TMT tenure, t (yrs) 5.00 (6.32) 7.26 (5.66) 6.51 (6.04)
Emp growth, t-3 to t 8.75 (26.38) 5.26 (16.77) -0.34 (13.37)
Employee tenure, t 4.43 (2.71) 4.72 (2.45) 5.41 (2.63)
Ln(High-ten emp), t 1.82 (1.20) 2.88 (1.63) 2.93 (1.52)
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 compares firm size and growth rates before and after top mana-
gement (TM) unexpected death, only including the observations used in the
sales growth models, as in Table 4.4. I divide the firms into three categories:
1) firms that do not experience TM unexpected death, 2) firms that have not
yet experienced TM death but will do so, and 3) firms that have experienced
TM death. I shall refer to the latter two as the treatment group.
The number of top managers increases with firm size, and the number of
top managers proportionally increases the likelihood of TM unexpected death.
The firms in the treatment group are thus, on average, expected to be signi-
ficantly larger than firms in the control group. However, the TM unexpected
death event is random, and TM unexpected death is not correlated with firm
performance.7 Supporting this, Table 4.2 shows that sales growth does not
di!er significantly between the treatment and control groups before the event.
However, post-event sales growth is significantly lower than ex ante-event sales
7I test this calculating the correlations between TM death and employment growtht,
employment growtht!3!t, and sales growtht. Correlations are not significantly di!erent
from zero.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of treatment and control groups (1995-2006)
No Before After
TM dies TM death TM death
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Number Dev. Number Dev. Number Dev.
Sales growth, % 3.94 (35.69) 3.29 (29.95) -0.92"" (33.34)
Sales, deflated 65,939"" (284,391) 467,076 (1,958,411) 505,250 (3,555,999)
No. of TMs 1.77"" (6.57) 9.54 (39.43) 8.03† (24.54)
Observations 138,277 2,695 2,431
Firms 26,269 671 623
Column 1 + 2: T-test of H0: Mean(No death) - Mean(Before death)=0, Ha: di! < 0
Column 2 + 3: T-test of H0: Mean(Before death) - Mean(After death)=0, Ha: di! > 0
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1%
growth, indicating a negative e!ect on firm performance from this shock.
Survival
Table 4.3 investigates the e!ect of top management unexpected death on firm
survival. Estimations are based on 205,429 firm-year observations from 1994
to 2006 for 27,825 unique incumbent firms. As suggested above, the disruptive
shock of losing a leader potentially increases the hazard of exit, for example,
if the shock pushes organizational capabilities below the industry threshold
and thereafter gradually depletes the endowment. However, considering the
limited observation period and relatively large firms in the treatment group,
we might not observe this e!ect. Moreover, it is not evident that the shock
has fatal consequences for firms. I instead argue that the shock is temporary
and that most firms eventually bounce back.
The models in Table 4.3 confirm that top management unexpected death
decreases the expected time to failure. This negative e!ect tends to decrease
over time. Furthermore, the models indicate that TMT tenure and past per-
formance, Emp growtht"3 to t, increase current performance (Models 1 and 3
in Table 4.3).
In the treatment group, only 110 firms exit within the observation period.
While the models estimate a negative e!ect on firm survival from top mana-
gement unexpected death, the number of events is apparently insu"cient to
investigate how these firms di!er from others in the treatment group. Hence,
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Table 4.3: Firm survival, 1994-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TM death -0.439" -0.807"" -0.419"" -0.577"" -0.515† -0.476"
(0.171) (0.279) (0.161) (0.217) (0.271) (0.216)
Time after death, t 0.083" 0.081† 0.059 0.070† 0.065† 0.069
(0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044)
TMT tenure, t (yrs) 0.047"" 0.047"" 0.049"" 0.049"" 0.049"" 0.022""
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Emp tenure, t (yrs) -0.004 -0.003 0.014"" 0.014"" 0.014"" -0.089""
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
TM d_Ln(firm age) 0.167
(0.107)
Emp growth, t-3 to t 0.010"" 0.010"" 0.010""
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TM d_pre growth 0.009
(0.008)
TM death_TMT ten 0.019
(0.018)
TM death_Emp ten 0.020
(0.042)
Ln(high-ten emp), t 0.805""
(0.020)
TM d_Ln(high-ten) 0.024
(0.072)
Constant 1.164"" 1.164"" 1.411"" 1.418"" 1.418"" 2.669""
(0.443) (0.443) (0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.446)
Log-likelihood -14881 -14880 -14467 -14467 -14468 -13789
Observations 205,429 205,429 205,429 205,429 205,429 205,429
Firms 27,825 27,825 27,825 27,825 27,825 27,825
Failures 6,979 6,979 6,979 6,979 6,979 6,979
Notes. All regressions are piece-wise exponential survival models in accelerated
failure-time form, predicting the number of years until failure, logged. All regres-
sions include unreported controls for firm age (25 dummies), TMT salaryt (logged),
and firm size (size group (2 dummies), employeest (logged), top managerst (logged),
and work placest (logged)). Full tables are available upon request. Clustered stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses.
† p< 0.10; " p< 0.05; "" 0.01
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the models do not confirm (or reject) any of the hypotheses. All interaction
e!ects are thus insignificant.
Sales growth
To investigate how the shock-e!ect of top management unexpected death dif-
fers with firm characteristics, I estimate firm fixed e!ects models of Ln(sales)t+1
(see Equation 4.2). Estimations are based on 143,403 firm-year observations
from 1995 to 2006 for 23,538 unique incumbent firms. Table 4.4 presents the
results.
Overall, the models indicate that firm age and TMT tenure positively af-
fects sales, while employee tenure has a negative e!ect. Model 1 confirms a
negative e!ect from top management unexpected death on firm performance.
This e!ect increases with time. At first, the latter might seem unexpected;
however, considering the negative e!ect on survival from top management
unexpected death, it is not. While some firms do bounce back from this shock,
others do not. The e!ect on survival is not expected to be immediate. As
argued above, we should expect to see declining sales during the years between
the event and failure. These firms with declining sales due to top management
unexpected death might exit after 2006.8 It was therefore somewhat expected
that the e!ect on sales growth from top management unexpected death in-
creases over time. However, this finding does not necessarily imply that most
firms never recover from this shock.
Model 2, presented in Table 4.4, tests Hypothesis 1, suggesting that the ef-
fect of top management unexpected death decreases with firm age. The model
does not support the hypothesis, as the coe"cient estimate of the interaction
term with firm age is insignificant. There is no mitigating e!ect from firm age
at the time of death. However, estimates may be subject to a selection bias,
as firms exit the population. The above survival analysis showed that top ma-
nagement unexpected death is associated with an increasing hazard of failure.
Moreover, Model 2 in Table 4.3, indicates that firm age mitigates the negative
e!ect on survival from top management unexpected death. However, the signi-
ficance of this estimate is weak (p<0.12), exceeding the maximum significance
8Recall that only 110 firms from the treatment group exit within the observation period.
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Table 4.4: Sales growth, 1995-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TM death -0.038" 0.030 -0.051"" -0.091"" 0.082" 0.184""
(0.019) (0.057) (0.019) (0.032) (0.038) (0.037)
Time after death, t -0.012"" -0.012"" -0.014"" -0.013"" -0.014"" -0.011""
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(firm age), t 0.027"" 0.027"" 0.066"" 0.066"" 0.066"" 0.016""
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
TMT tenure, t (yrs) 0.001† 0.001† 0.001† 0.001† 0.001† -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employee ten, t (yrs) -0.008"" -0.008"" -0.006"" -0.006"" -0.006"" -0.017""
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TM d_Ln(firm age) -0.028
(0.022)
Emp growth, t-3 to t 0.002"" 0.002"" 0.002""
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TM d_pre growth 0.003"
(0.001)
TM death_TMT ten 0.006†
(0.003)
TM death_Emp ten -0.025""
(0.007)
Ln(high-ten emp), t 0.071""
(0.003)
TM d_Ln(high-ten) -0.071""
(0.010)
Constant 6.493"" 6.494"" 6.388"" 6.384"" 6.388"" 6.619""
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Log-likelihood -65506 -65505 -65147 -65149 -65143 -65090
Observations 143,403 143,403 143,403 143,403 143,403 143,403
Firms 23,538 23,538 23,538 23,538 23,538 23,538
Notes. All regressions are fixed e!ects models. The dependent variable is ln(sales)t+1,
and I estimate sales growth, controlling for ln(sales)t. All regressions include unrepor-
ted controls for firm size (salest (logged), employeest (logged), top managerst (logged),
work placest (logged)) and TMT salaryt (logged). Full tables are available upon request.
† p< 0.10; " p< 0.05; "" 0.01. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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level accepted in this paper (p<0.10). Nevertheless, if younger firms are more
likely to exit the population, potentially due to top management unexpected
death, this might explain the lacking significance of the interaction term in
Model 2 in table 4.4. One way to account for this potential selection bias is
to estimate selection-corrected sales growth models. However, as I have pre-
viously discussed in Chapter 3, the database does not provide any appropriate
instrument variables for this task. I thus cannot account for potential selection
bias in the sales growth model.
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 2, including the average employment growth rate
from time t to t ! 3 and the interaction term between TM death and the
average employment growth rate from the three years before top management
unexpected death. The model finds that past employment growth at time t has
a positive e!ect on firm sales. It also finds a positive e!ect from the interaction
term, suggesting that higher ex ante performance reduces the negative e!ect
of top management unexpected death. This finding supports the hypothesis
that organizations with greater organizational capabilities are better prepared
to handle disruptive organizational shocks.
Models 4 and 5 in Table 4.4 investigate the e!ects of TMT and employee
tenure, respectively. Because TMT tenure is potentially associated with the
firm’s previous performance and employee tenure is negatively correlated with
recent employment growth, the models control for past performance, including
the three-year moving employment growth average. Controlling for past per-
formance, the models suggests that both the employee and TMT composition
significantly a!ect how firm performance responds to the disruptive shock of
top management unexpected death. In Model 4, I test Hypothesis 3, suggesting
that TMT tenure reduces the shock-e!ect. The model supports the hypothesis,
showing positive e!ects on sales from the interaction term between top ma-
nagement death and TMT tenure in the death-year; however, its significance
is weak. I further estimate the e!ect of the TMT’s top management expe-
rience with the firm.9 The model (not reported here) shows a much stronger
9Recall that the key variable TMT tenure is tenure with the firm and not tenure with
the TMT.
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e!ect from this variable than TMT tenure, significantly increasing the magni-
tude of the e!ect.10 Moreover, the model shows stronger significance for this
interaction term (p<0.05), supporting the mitigating e!ects of TMT tenure.
Second, Model 5 finds that employee tenure in the death-year enhances the
negative e!ect of top management unexpected death. This finding suggests
that the shock has a greater (negative) impact on tenured employees than on
new employees. One explanation is that the former are more reluctant to ac-
cept radical organizational changes, potentially leading to higher post-event
employee turnover. This explanation supports Hypothesis 4. Following similar
arguments, Hypothesis 5 suggests that more high-tenured employees increase
the negative top management unexpected death e!ect. While a greater num-
ber of high-tenured employees generally have a positive impact on firm sales
(Model 6), increasing the number of high-tenured employees exacerbates the
negative e!ect of top management unexpected death, thus supporting Hypo-
thesis 5. The coe"cient estimates of TM death in Models 5 and 6 change and
indicate a positive e!ect from top management unexpected death. However,
including interaction terms in the models changes the interpretation of the
included variables. The TM death estimate is the e!ect of TM death when
employee tenure is zero (Brambor et al., 2006). The aggregated e!ect of em-
ployee tenure and top management unexpected death is thus actually negative
if employee tenure equals the population average of 4.72 years. This finding
also illustrates a strong interdependency between the employee composition
and the performance e!ect of top management unexpected death.
Finally, recall that Model 4 in Table 4.4 controls for past performance,
including the three-year moving employment growth average. For the treat-
ment group, however, this might imply an endogeneity problem, as post-death
employment growth is potentially correlated with top management unexpec-
ted death. I thus re-estimated Model 4 to include the three-year employment
growth rate from the death-year.11 This growth rate corresponds to the inter-
action term between top management unexpected death and past performance,
i.e., the interaction term from model 3. Controlling for death-year employment
10Results are available upon request.
11Results are available upon request.
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growth does not alter previous conclusions. The model also shows stronger sig-
nificance for the interaction term (p<0.01), emphasizing the important role of
TMT stability in overcoming disruptive organizational shocks.
Separate analysis for the treatment group
The above analysis successfully identified several factors that might help absorb
the shock-e!ect of top management unexpected death, indicating that these
firms will experience a relatively smaller negative e!ect on their post-event
performance. One interesting conclusion from the above analysis is that TMT
stability reduces the e!ect of losing a leader, as reflected by a mitigating e!ect
from TMT tenure. However, one might argue that the potential stabilizing
e!ect of this factor is contingent on the context, for example, the industry
and firm’s past performance. The latter is particularly interesting because of
the potential correlation between TMT tenure and past performance. TMT
tenure apparently increases performance, though performance may increase
TMT tenure.12 The above analysis shows that the shock-e!ect di!ers according
to the firms’ performance before the event (Model 3, Table 4.4). The conclusion
that TMT tenure and stability both increase performance and allow the firms to
better handle disruptive shocks might not apply equally to all firms regardless
of their past performance. Investigating this further, I estimate additional
firm-fixed e!ects models of Ln(sales)t+1 excluding all firms but the treatment
group.
I divide the treatment group into three categories using their performance
until the event (three-year employment growth rate). Categorizing the firms,
I base the cut-o! points on the employment growth distribution for the treat-
ment group. The first category, “Negative growth”, has an average growth rate
equal to or lower than -2.67% per year, corresponding to the 25th percentile.
The second category, “Low growth”, ranges from -2.67% to 6.67%, and the
third category, “High growth”, has growth rates equal to or exceeding 6.67%,
corresponding to the 75th percentile. This approach allows for direct testing
of how top management unexpected death a!ects firm performance contingent
12The above estimations partly account for this, controlling for past performance, including
both the three-year moving average, and performance up until the event. In addition, I use
firm fixed e!ects and additional controls for firm heterogeneity.
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on the firms’ performance level until the event. I also test how the hypotheses
vary with di!erent performance levels at the time of death. Estimations are
based on 1,280 firm year-observations for categories 1 and 3 and 2,566 firm-
year observations for category 2. The reduced number of observations restricts
me from including the previous controls. Table 4.5 and 4.6 show the results.
Table 4.6 investigates the e!ect of TMT and employee tenure. The models
in Part 1 confirm the mitigating e!ect of TMT tenure, but only for “High-
growth” companies. The models in Part 2 find that employee tenure in the
death year reduces the shock-e!ect for firms in the third category. The above
results suggest that retaining organizational stability when growing is impor-
tant, as it reduces the vulnerability to exogenous shocks.
Part 1 in Table 4.5 indicates that top management unexpected death si-
gnificantly a!ects firm performance in only the two end categories. This e!ect
increases with time, supporting previous results. Part 2 in Table 4.5, which
controls for firm age at the event time, shows negative e!ects from the shock
in all three categories. The models show a mitigating e!ect from firm age, but
only for stronger firms (the second and third categories), partly supporting
Hypothesis 1.
Finally, the lower number of degrees of freedom in this analysis makes it
subject to greater uncertainty. In particular, one should exercise caution when
making conclusions based on a lack of significance. Nevertheless, the models
paint an interesting picture, indicating that while top management unexpected
death might have (lasting) negative e!ects on post-event performance in all ca-
tegories, increased stability only benefit stronger firms, assuming that stability
increases with age. Moreover, only the strongest firms can equip themselves
for such exogenous disruptive events through increased organizational stability.
Conversely, most models indicate a greater negative e!ect of top management
unexpected death for the strongest firms. This finding suggests that exogenous
organizational shocks might be more disruptive to successful and well-run firms.
However, the potential limited e!ect of this exogenous shock in less successful
firms might illustrate that, while organizational stability may increase per-
formance and strengthen the firms so that they can better handle disruptive
shock, changes are sometimes imperative. Organizational inertia, conversely,
might hamper progress and adjustment, thus preventing organizations from
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Table 4.5: Sales growth, 1995-2006
Part 1 Negative growth Low growth High growth
Ln(sales), t 0.678"" 0.481"" 0.502""
(0.024) (0.018) (0.023)
TM Death -0.151† -0.035 -0.083"
(0.085) (0.031) (0.040)
Time since TM death, t -0.037† -0.002 -0.025""
(0.020) (0.007) (0.008)
Ln(firm age), t 0.091 0.014 0.253""
(0.094) (0.039) (0.049)
TMT tenure, t (yrs) 0.000 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
Constant 3.435"" 5.715"" 5.156""
(0.329) (0.209) (0.251)
Observations 1,280 2,566 1,280
Log-likelihood -1478 -1458 -599
Part 2 Negative growth Low growth High growth
Ln(sales), t 0.677"" 0.481"" 0.495""
(0.024) (0.018) (0.023)
TM Death 0.081 -0.232† -0.337""
(0.234) (0.119) (0.116)
Time since TM death, t -0.034† -0.004 -0.029""
(0.020) (0.007) (0.008)
Ln(firm age), t 0.051 0.043 0.315""
(0.101) (0.043) (0.056)
TMT tenure, t (yrs) 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
TM death_Ln(firm age), d-year -0.092 0.074† 0.104"
(0.087) (0.043) (0.044)
Constant 3.531"" 5.660"" 5.117""
(0.341) (0.211) (0.251)
Observations 1,280 2,566 1,280
Log-likelihood -1477 -1456 -596
Notes. All regressions are fixed e!ects models. The dependent variable is ln(sales)t+1.
Firms are categorized by the their yearly employment growth rate three years prior
to the event. The cut-o! points -2.67 and 6.67 correspond to the 25th and 75th per-
centile, respectively.
Negative growth $ -2.67 %; Low growth -2.67 % to 6.67 %; High growth ! 6.67 %.
† p< 0.10; " p< 0.05; "" 0.01. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
165
4. Who loses a leader without losing ground? Unexpected death in top management teams and firm performance
Table 4.6: Sales growth, 1995-2006
Part 1 Negative growth Low growth High growth
Ln(sales), t 0.678"" 0.481"" 0.503""
(0.024) (0.018) (0.023)
TM Death -0.239 -0.085 -0.190""
(0.148) (0.055) (0.059)
Time since TM death, t -0.037† -0.002 -0.026""
(0.020) (0.007) (0.008)
Ln(firm age), t 0.095 0.017 0.267""
(0.094) (0.040) (0.050)
TMT tenure, t (yrs) 0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
TM death_TMT ten, d-year 0.010 0.005 0.017"
(0.013) (0.005) (0.007)
Constant 3.422"" 5.707"" 5.117""
(0.330) (0.209) (0.251)
Observations 1,280 2,566 1,280
Log-likelihood -1478 -1457 -596
Part 2 Negative growth Low growth High growth
Ln(sales), t 0.676"" 0.480"" 0.453""
(0.024) (0.018) (0.024)
TM Death 0.081 -0.018 -0.220""
(0.188) (0.065) (0.076)
Time since TM death, t -0.037† -0.001 -0.004
(0.020) (0.007) (0.009)
Ln(firm age), t 0.069 0.026 0.303""
(0.098) (0.041) (0.049)
TMT tenure, t (yrs) -0.000 0.003 0.004
(0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
Employee tenure, t (yrs) 0.005 -0.012 -0.097""
(0.021) (0.009) (0.013)
TM death_Emp ten, d-year -0.040 -0.002 0.049"
(0.029) (0.011) (0.020)
Constant 3.490"" 5.752"" 5.924""
(0.340) (0.211) (0.267)
Observations 1280 2566 1280
Log-likelihood -1477 -1457 -565
Notes. All regressions are fixed e!ects models. The dependent variable is ln(sales)t+1.
Firms are categorized by the their yearly employment growth rate three years prior
to the event. The cut-o! points -2.67 and 6.67 correspond to the 25th and 75th per-
centile, respectively.
Negative growth $ -2.67 %; Low growth -2.67 % to 6.67 %; High growth ! 6.67 %.
† p< 0.10; " p< 0.05; "" 0.01. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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taking the necessary steps toward change.
Endogeneity
The empirical analysis exploits exogenous variation in firm performance to
investigate which firm characteristics influence post-shock performance. How-
ever, as noted above, the conclusions might still be subject to endogeneity
issues due to the potential correlation between TMT tenure and firm perfor-
mance. TMT tenure might increase performance, but performance might also
increase TMT tenure. To test the conclusions’ sensitivity to this potential
endogeneity, I supplement the above analysis with a matching approach. I
estimate the average e!ect on Ln(sales)t+1 from di!erent TMT tenure levels
at time t ! 1 (i.e., the final observation before death), using nearest neighbor
matching with bias adjustment (Abadie et al., 2004). I match firms using two
di!erent previous performance variables (Ln(sales)t"2 and employment growth
up until top management death, three-year average) and industry. Table 4.7
illustrates the matching approach, and Table 4.8 presents the results. Esti-
mations are based on 336 observations, including 23 to 297 treatments (TMT
tenure levels) and 39 to 313 controls. Individual observations can be used more
than once (Abadie et al., 2004).
Table 4.7: Matching approach
Time Firm Yeart ln(sales)t ln(sales)t+1 ln(sales)t!2 TM Yrs after
ID death TM death
t " 5 5 1995 10.2 10.4 0 0
t " 4 5 1996 10.4 10.5 0 0
t " 3 5 1997 10.5 11.2 10.2 0 0
t " 2 5 1998 11.2 10.8 10.4 0 0
t " 1 5 1999 10.8 10.0 10.5 1 0
t 5 2001 10.0 10.2 10.8 1 1
t + 1 5 2002 10.2 10.0 0 2
Table 4.8 shows the average e!ect of TMT tenure % 1 year, % 2 years, and
values up to 15 years.13 All models in Table 4.8 support the above conclusions,
indicating a negative e!ect on post-event performance from lower TMT tenure
13Maximum TMT tenure in the population is 21 years. However, due to the low number of
observations at the end levels of the TMT tenure distribution, I restrict the set of estimations
to TMT tenure $ 15 years.
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Table 4.8: Average treatment e!ects for Ln(sales)t+1, nearest neighbor matching
Treatment:
TMT tent!1 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 # 8
Estimate -0.155 -0.519 -0.577† -0.429† -0.259 -0.195 -0.167 -0.128
(0.257) (0.433) (0.348) (0.249) (0.171) (0.149) (0.147) (0.137)
# Obs 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
# Treatments 23 46 65 86 105 135 156 186
# Controls 313 290 271 254 231 201 180 150
# Matches 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Treatment:
TMT tent!1 # 9 # 10 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 14 # 15
Estimate -0.064 -0.043 -0.039 -0.031 -0.009 -0.018 -0.005
(0.125) (0.126) (0.132) (0.138) (0.146) (0.166) (0.180)
# Obs 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
# Treatments 204 223 238 255 272 287 297
# Controls 132 113 98 81 64 49 39
# Matches 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Matching variables: Ln(sales)t!2, Pre emp growtht!1, Industry (41 categories).
Bias-adjusted variables: Ln(sales)t!2, Pre emp growtht!1, Industry (41 categories).
† p< 0.10; " p< 0.05; "" 0.01. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
levels. However, the negative e!ect is only significant in two models (TMT
tenures % 3 and % 4). Accounting for endogeneity, this analysis nevertheless
supports the above conclusion that TMT tenure and organizational stability
improve post-event performance over lower TMT tenure levels.
4.5 Discussion
Unexpected death in the top management team triggers a disruptive shock in a
firm. This event implies a sudden drop in the firm’s human capital stock, and it
temporarily incapacitates organizational structures and routines. This study
confirms a negative e!ect on firms’ post-shock performance. The questions
examined in this paper are, first, whether firms’ can prepare for such disrup-
tive events and which firm characteristics reduce or eliminate this shock-e!ect.
An immediate answer to the latter might be flexibility and adaptability; or-
ganizations that develop flexible routines and an adaptive capacity and have
experience with organizational change might be better equipped for unexpec-
ted organizational disruptions. The opposites are thus highly routinized and
inert organizations. Because organizational inertias might circumscribe the
firms’ willingness and ability to act and adapt to the new situation, there
may be greater and potentially fatal e!ects on the organizations’ post-shock
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performance. However, my findings support an alternative hypothesis.
First, I find that TMT tenure reduces the negative e!ect of top manage-
ment unexpected death, thus increasing post-event performance. Applying an
organization ecology theory perspective, I explain this finding, arguing that in-
creasing TMT tenure reflects greater organizational stability. I argue that the
mitigating e!ect of TMT tenure on top management unexpected death is due
to the following: i) stronger organizational routines and increased e"ciency,
and/or ii) greater organizational inertia, thus decreasing post-event organiza-
tional changes. These findings suggest that top management stability plays a
great role for e"cient and routinized organizational behaviour, highly influen-
cing overall organizational stability and thus the ability to resist disruptive
organizational shocks. However, the data does not allow me to conclusively
determine which of the above mechanisms play the greater role in driving this
e!ect.
Second, the analysis reveals that both TMT and employee composition af-
fect post-shock performance. I hypothesize that tenured employees are more
vulnerable to organizational disruptions, leading to greater frustrations and un-
certainty among this employee group. Long-tenured employees are thus more
negatively a!ected by top management unexpected death than new employees,
leading to a greater drop in their post-shock productivity. I also hypothesize
that this might lead to increasing employee turnover. In support of these hy-
potheses, I find that increasing the average employee tenure or the number
of long-tenured employees enhances the negative e!ect on post-shock perfor-
mance. This finding illustrates that the organizational members, particularly
employees, drive the disruptive e!ect on organizational routines and smooth-
functioning of the organization. This finding also suggests that organizational
stability through TMT continuity, rather than increasing stability within the
employee composition, may better equip organizations for exogenous organiza-
tional disruptions. Finally, the analysis supports the hypothesis that a greater
organizational capability stock decreases the negative performance e!ect of top
management unexpected death.
The above results indicate that firms, to some extent, can build organiza-
tions that are better prepared to handle and resist the negative shock-e!ect of
top management unexpected death. First, I find that TMT tenure reduces the
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shock-e!ect. However, striving to increase TMT tenure might be a two-edged
strategy. If TMT stability and continuity strengthen the organizational ability
to resist the disruptive organizational shock, it might seem a reasonable as-
sumption that increasing TMT tenure exposes the company to organizational
disruptions, including executive migration, succession or death. Supporting
this argument, recall that top management human capital is increasingly firm-
specific. Moreover, human capital, particularly firm-specific human capital,
increases with tenure, potentially enhancing the expected negative e!ect of
top management turnover (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Kesner and Sebora,
1994; Eriksen, 2011). If organizations prepare themselves for losing a leader
by increasing TMT tenure, they might actually put themselves at greater risk.
This hypothesis is crucial, as it questions TMT stability as an appropriate
method for preparing the organization for disruptive organizational shocks.
However, I argue that increasing top management tenure is not necessarily
associated with greater vulnerability to disruptive shocks from the TMT, buil-
ding on the organizational ecology and institutionalization (or routinization)
literature (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Conger, 1999). The top managers’ va-
lues and strategic decisions might transfer to organizational culture and rou-
tines concurrent with his/her increasing tenure. When e"ciently embedded in
organizational routines, the organization might be able to continue the same
activity pattern and strive for the same goals, independent of individual ac-
tors. Following similar lines of reasoning, TMT stability might transfer to the
organization. In addition to the above regressions (which focus on the top
management team), I investigate this hypothesis, estimating the significance
of the deceased top manager’s characteristics. I find that the negative e!ect of
the unexpected death decreases with the deceased top manager’s tenure with
the firm, thus supporting this argument.14
Above, I make the perhaps counterintuitive proposition that the disrup-
tive e!ect of top management tenure might decrease with the deceased top
manager’s tenure at the firm. The previous discussion on top management
turnover might o!er another explanation to support this. New top managers
might have greater incentives to initiate organizational changes, for example,
14Results are available upon request.
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a di!erent management style, introducing new strategies and markets, and re-
structuring the organization, thus signaling a di!erent and improved course.
As argued above, establishing new e"cient organizational routines takes time.
However, if the initiator leaves the organization (e.g., migrates, retires, dies)
before such routines are e"ciently integrated or a new culture is truly embed-
ded into the organization, he/she might leave the organization in transition at
a somewhat chaotic state, potentially leaving the organization with no clear
guidelines for the collective purpose, organizational structures or norms to use.
Furthermore, the disruptive e!ect of top management unexpected death might
be smaller if the deceased top manager has longer tenure, despite potentially
greater firm-specific human capital.
The above discussion also links to the literature on charismatic leaders
(e.g., Nadler and Tushman (1990) and Conger (1999)). This paper does not
question that personal charisma is associated with a greater e!ect on firm
performance from top management unexpected death. With the loss of a
charismatic leader, successful (smooth and trouble-free) turnover is often not
feasible and is potentially worsened when the charismatic leader has not ap-
pointed a successor. However, following the above argument, this negative
e!ect might be mitigated if the organization is imbued with the deceased top
manager’s charisma (Bryman, 1993). Furthermore, I recognize that the e!ect
of top managers’ unexpected deaths di!er with their firm-specific values. I
partly account for this by controlling for TMT salary and tenure. However,
other managerial characteristics, including charisma, brand value and networ-
king skills, are non-observable. Similarly, while occupational codes allow me
to identify the TMT, I do not know the division for which each manager is
responsible. Furthermore, I do not know the broader role each manager has in
the organization, for example, if he/she is a role model to other managers and
whether he/she dictates the management style or is the main innovator in the
organization. The significance of di!erent managerial styles, capabilities, and
personal attributes might have di!erent e!ects within heterogeneous organiza-
tions; the performance-e!ects of losing a leader are likely to di!er with firm
characteristics such as size and the number of top managers in the TMT. How-
ever, performance might also di!er with other non-observable characteristics.
The data at hand restricts me from investigating this possibility empirically
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and in more detail; thus, I shall leave these questions for further research. Be-
cause top management unexpected death draws randomly from the population
of top managers and firms, I argue that these unobservable factors do not a!ect
the empirical results.
While this study focuses on observable firm characteristics at the time
of the exogenous event, I emphasize that the subsequent actions of hetero-
geneous firms also play an important role. Firms have di!erent capabilities
and strategies for handling this organizational disruption, including di!erent
replacement strategies. Moreover, these di!erences influence the performance
e!ects of top management unexpected death. As argued above, a potential
successor might apply a reversing e!ect on post-shock performance. He/she
might renew and strengthen the firm’s competences, potentially increasing the
long-term post-shock performance. Conversely, as illustrated above, top mana-
gement turnover is a potentially long and troublesome process. Furthermore,
di!erent successors have di!erent incentives to initiate (potential disruptive)
organizational change, so the type of successor matters to post-shock perfor-
mance (Shen and Canella, 2002; Perry et al., 2011; Quigley and Hambrick,
2012). For example, Shen and Canella (2002) argue that outsiders and in-
ternal contenders are more likely to make significant organizational changes,
while followers would continue the course of his/her predecessor. The replace-
ment choice might be influenced by the number of qualified candidates in the
labor market, particularly within the firm. This strategy is influenced by the
firms’ previous performance, and the board of directors’, the CEO’s, and other
parties’ willingness to adopt and request new ways. Firms might use follower
succession to reduce organizational disruptions after top management succes-
sion. However, the situation sometimes calls for di!erent perspectives and
strategic changes. When performance is low, the replacement strategy might
aim for someone to chart a di!erent course (Shen and Canella, 2002). While
acknowledging the potential reversing e!ects of a subsequent replacement and
the significance of di!erent firms’ actions and strategies after top management
unexpected death, I leave this topic for future research.15
15The IDA database provides some variables that might shed light on some of these ques-
tions. However, as this discussion illustrates, investigating a potential replacement e!ect with
the data at hand, is subject to potential endogeneity problems, even when it is triggered by
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A key issue concerning whether or when the above results apply is the
question of how industry di!erences come into play, for example, stable vs.
instable industries and market concentration. Recall that organizational eco-
logists argue that selection favors stable and more e"cient organizations when
the context is stable, while more flexible and adaptive organizations perform
better in unstable environments. Operating in an instable environment, i.e,
placing demands on organizational adaptability and flexibility by employing ex-
cess resources, might improve organizational ability to adapt to sudden changes
in TMT composition. The proposition that TMT tenure increases stability and
reduces the negative shock-e!ect and appertaining response time might not
apply to instable environments. This might occur if inertia, as Tushman and
Rosenkopf (1996) phrase it, “anchors the organization to its past” (Tushman
and Rosenkopf (1996), p. 942), restricting it from initiating or even perceiving
the necessary course of action to adapt to the new context. Similarly, Le Mens
et al. (2011) suggest that companies with stronger inertia might experience a
gradual organizational capability depletion, lacking behind competitors in the
market, because inertia stands in the way of crucial organizational change and
improvement. The population of competing firms (against which relative per-
formance is evaluated), however, is not subject to similar problems, as other
organizations with strong inertia are leaving the industry, i.e., failing, and are
being replaced by new and more flexible organizations (Le Mens et al., 2011).
Conversely, if environmental instability prevails for long periods of time, one
might argue that companies adjust accordingly and develop organizational rou-
tines suitable for this context, for example, developing procedures for handling
increased competition, shifting technologies and markets (Nelson and Winter,
1982). I see no obvious reasons why TMT continuity should prevent such rou-
tinized adaptability from continuing after top management unexpected death.
Contradicting the above arguments, stable organizations might also be better
prepared to handle top management unexpected death in both instable and
highly competitive industries. Based on this discussion, it is not obvious how
external factors such as industry stability and competition a!ect and poten-
tially negate the results. It is not evident whether increasing TMT stability and
an exogenous event.
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continuity prepare firms to better deal with disruptive organizational shocks or
whether this only applies to some subpopulations, for example, within stable
industries.
This study investigates the significance of di!erent firm characteristics on
the performance e!ect of one specific organizational shock, top management
unexpected death. However, I argue that the firm characteristics, which this
study identifies as those that help firms prepare for this disruptive event, also
apply to other organizational shocks. I suspect that this is particularly true
for other internal shocks, such as executive or top employee migration. Some
external shocks (e.g., demand shocks), conversely, might call for reorganization
and focus shift. Stable e"cient organizational routines, particularly inertia,
might stand in the way of accomplishing such necessary organizational changes
or perceiving the need to do so. Similarly, the paper’s conclusions are not
directly transferable to deliberate organizational changes, for example, changes
initiated to improve performance. This is especially true if greater resistance
to change, i.e., stronger inertia, drives the above results. These propositions
might even lead to reverse e!ects on post-change performance. I leave this
question for future research to investigate.
Finally, the main conclusion from this study implies that organizations can
benefit from increasing their focus on top management retention strategies.
These strategies might include the terms of notice, non-competition agreements
or employee shares. This study also has political implications, as the law
restricts using some of these strategies. If top management retention increases
e"ciency and strengthens organizations’ resilience to unexpected disruptive
shocks, it could be politically desirable to expand the use of, for example,
non-competition agreements.
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Chapter 5
Spin-o! growth and job
creation: Evidence on
Denmark1
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Behavior and Organizations. Edited by Guido Buenstorf
Abstract: Employment growth is often the primary motivation behind en-
trepreneurial and industrial policy. But, new firms are known to di!er greatly
in performance. Not all firms survive for long and fewer achieve high growth
rates. Numerous studies have found that spin-o!s, which are firms that are
founded by employees from incumbent firms in the same industry, outlive other
entrants. Survival of new firms is a requisite for a long-term contribution to
employment. But does longer survival also mean increased employment growth
for spin-o!s as well? Or does a trade-o! between growth and survival exist, as
found for older firms? Exploring a comprehensive dataset covering all entrants
in the Danish economy from 1995 to 2004, this paper investigates how spin-o!
job creation di!ers from that of other entrants in terms of growth rates, varia-
tion and sustainability. We find that spin-o!s are not only surviving longer, as
the existing literature suggests, they are also a more homogeneous group, show
increased stability in growth patterns and they are relatively more important
for job creation in the economy.
1Co-authored with Michael S. Dahl, Aalborg University.
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5.1 Introduction
It is well established that entrepreneurial spin-o!s are distinct performers in
several industries. Firms founded by former employees from incumbent firms
in the same industry tend to outperform other new entrants and sometimes
even incumbent firms as well (see Klepper (2001a; 2009) for reviews of this
literature). This fact has sparked considerable interest among politicians and
civil servants, since future industrial and entrepreneurial policy might gain by
looking more closely at this. Most of the existing studies focus on the life cycle
of single industries and on survival as a key performance indicator. Spin-o!s
have been found to be key entrants at specific stages of the life cycles, but are
spin-o!s universally the best entrants? To answer this question, we need to
add studies of firms from a variety of industries, across di!erent stages of the
life cycle and with other performance measures as well. Dahl and Reichstein
(2007a) and Dahl et al. (2009) have established that spin-o!s are relatively
more successful entrants across industries in terms of survival. The question
is more open when it comes to other performance measures.
This paper adds to this discussion by studying in greater detail the perfor-
mance di!erences between spin-o!s and other entrants in terms of employment
growth and job creation. We use a comprehensive dataset covering all entrants
in the Danish economy from 1995 to 2004. We find that spin-o!s are not only
surviving longer, as the existing literature suggests, but they are also relatively
more important for job creation in the economy.
One of the reasons for the increasing attention to entrepreneurship is the
expectation that new and younger firms are the driving force behind econo-
mic growth and job creation. Policy makers promote them to provide future
employment and prosperity, and their industrial policy is often focused on in-
creasing the number of start-ups. If spin-o!s are a particularly successful type
of entrant in terms of job creation and generation of prosperity, it might be a
particularly interesting type of entry to promote in industrial policy.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the relative perfor-
mance of spin-o!s presenting selected literature from organizational ecology
and human and social capital theory. Based on this discussion, we develop our
hypotheses on spin-o! employment growth. In the next section, we describe
the dataset and selection of firms. We introduce notation and measures of
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growth rates, job creation and job destruction. In the following section, we
test our hypotheses and present the results, and also illustrate the impact of
spin-o! entrepreneurship on overall employment. Finally, we summarize major
results and discuss implications of our findings.
5.2 Employment growth of de novo entrants
A great number of studies have illustrated how spin-o!s are more likely to
survive compared to other de novo entrants. This has been demonstrated
for a number of di!erent industries from Silicon Valley law firms to the De-
troit automobile industry (Klepper, 2001b; Phillips, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2004;
Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper, 2007). Assuming identical rates of em-
ployee turnover, increased likelihood of survival implies a proportional increase
in job security for spin-o! employees. Furthermore, it indicates more homo-
geneous growth rates for firms that survive longer. These characteristics also
describe the job creation among relatively older firms (Davis et al., 1997). In
this paper, we argue that stability and homogeneity are also features of the job
creation of spin-o!s. However, there is not the same trade-o! between growth
and stability that these studies observe with older firms.
We build our hypotheses departing from the liability of newness argument
presented by Stinchcombe (1965). He explains the liability of newness based on
three central factors. First, there must be internal distribution of roles among
the employees. The roles need to be not only distributed but also defined.
A vague distribution of roles might give rise to problems and ine"ciencies as
division of tasks and responsibility might be unclear. Distribution of roles is
partly based on history and experiences. It takes time and might require some
trial-and-error which can be costly.
Second, new firms have not yet established a social structure for communi-
cation. Thus, the communication in new firms might resemble communication
among strangers. It takes time to establish social relations and relationships of
trust among the employees and the employees and management when there is
no basis of communication; this also complicates knowledge sharing. In sum,
communication might be more complicated in younger firms compared to older
firms.
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Finally, lack of reliance is not only a potential internal problem regarding
employees, it also includes customers, investors and suppliers. As was the case
internally in the organization, it also takes time to establish stable relations
to these external parties. In opposition to older firms, new and young firms
do not yet have a reputation for reliability. Older firms potentially have a
number of regular customers who are familiar with the products and services
of the firms and, perhaps, not willing to substitute what they are already
conversant with, in order to win minor cost savings which, possibly, could be
achieved by changing to a new but unknown supplier. Likewise, the investors
are interested in the firms’ ability to produce, service customers and run a cost-
e!ective business, but new firms have not yet had the opportunity to prove
their worth (Hager et al., 2004).
Along similar lines, Brüderl and Schüssler (1990) develop the theory of lia-
bility of smallness by introducing the term “liability of adolescence”, suggesting
that the hazard of exit is not necessarily at its highest at the time of start-up.
Instead, the likelihood of exit increases in the first period, peaks in the middle,
and then gradually decreases with firm age. The argument for this U-shaped
hazard rate, as opposed to the monotonously decreasing risk suggested by the
liability of newness, is that new firms often have an initial capital to draw on
and the firm does not exit until it has exhausted its initial resources. The
more initial resources, the longer the firm is capable of surviving (Brüderl and
Schüssler, 1990).
Several studies have demonstrated a positive correlation between start-
up size and new firm survival (see e.g., Freeman et al. (1983); Brüderl et al.
(1992); Dahl and Reichstein (2007a)). Economies of scale, systematic research
and development and access to capital and qualified labor are explanations of
the liability of smallness (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Agarwal et al., 2002;
Dahl and Reichstein, 2007a). However, while the likelihood of survival on the
one hand is increasing with firm size, the above arguments further point to an
inverse relationship between employment growth and firm size. As the number
of employees increases, growth rates tend to subside. This indicates a trade-o!
between growth and survival (Dunne et al., 1989).
The above arguments suggest that di!erences in survival rates might be
explained by the liability of smallness. If so, the higher survival of spin-o!s
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can be explained by them being larger at entry. Industry experience tends
to improve productivity. Greater technological knowledge of the spin-o! en-
trepreneurs might allow spin-o!s to produce at lower unit costs, giving them
a competitive advantage over other entrants. For that reason, spin-o!s are
expected to enter more markets, leading to an increased start-up size (Ro-
berts et al., 2006). Moreover, Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) point out the
potential reverse causality that start-up size is an indicator of the founders’
expectations. Supporting this, Roberts et al. (2006) suggest that spin-o! en-
trepreneurs found initially larger businesses than others, as they are aware of
the (competitive) advantages arising from superior qualifications. Apart from
technological knowledge regarding production processes, prior industry expe-
rience also includes knowledge concerning relevant organizational structures
and routines, customers, suppliers, markets, products etc., giving spin-o! en-
trepreneurs a superior endowment of knowledge and helping them to iden-
tify unexplored business opportunities, thereby giving them a head start over
their peers (see e.g., Burton et al. (2001); Helfat and Lieberman (2002); Shane
(2003); Chatterji (2009)). Brüderl et al. (1992) show that industry-specific ex-
perience has a positive e!ect on start-up size. They argue that greater human
capital increases founders’ productivity by managing and organizing the pro-
duction process more e"ciently and attracting more customers and investors.
This reflects on production e"ciency and results in higher profits. Therefore,
despite possibly greater initial size, the risk spin-o! entrepreneurs take is rela-
tively smaller due to greater competency at the time of entry.
Hypothesis 1: Spin-o!s have more employees at the time of entry.
Yet another explanation to the spin-o!s’ relatively higher likelihood of sur-
vival relies on the theory of liability of newness. As presented above, the
liability of newness is triggered by a lack of organizational routines which are
not yet fully incorporated in younger firms. New firms are founded on the rou-
tines implemented by the founders. These routines are often based on founders’
prior experience as they will lean on routines already familiar to them. One
might expect founders to di!erentiate their organization from their prior em-
ployer depending on the estimated quality of the organizational structures of
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the latter. Immediately, this is rarely the case (Baron and Hannan, 2002).
But, Baron and Hannan (2002) argue further that the founders are actually
better o! sticking to a model familiar to them independently of how good it
might be objectively (see also Hannan and Carroll (1992)). Prior experience is
important as organizational culture and structures already start to take shape
in the early years, making the priorities and choices made during this initial
period crucial, as they might have long-lasting and permanent e!ects on the
organization’s routines and through that the firm’s performance (Stinchcombe,
1965; Schein, 1983). In other words, the performance of new firms is determi-
ned by the founders’ experiences prior to the start-up (Klepper, 2001b; Helfat
and Lieberman, 2002).
Klepper (2001b) explains the superior performance of spin-o!s over other
entrants based on the notion of routines from Nelson and Winter (1982). As
spin-o!s are established in industries where the founder has prior experience,
their routines are more likely to fit the challenges characteristic of that parti-
cular industry. The spin-o! entrepreneur has more experience of how to run a
business in that industry and how to make that business profitable (Agarwal
et al., 2004).
Returning to the core of liability of newness, Stinchcombe (1965) empha-
sizes the three central factors described above. First, the division of tasks
and responsibility in new and young firms is unclear as internal roles among
the employees are not yet distributed; a distribution that is partly based on
history and experience. Additionally, new firms lack a social structure of com-
munication. Potentially, spin-o! entrepreneurs already have a network within
the industry helping them in the early recruitment phase. They might recruit
former colleagues as well as others who are already part of their network. It is
possible that this could limit the liability of newness as a number of employees
as well as managers already share a history of experiences and organizational
culture. Thus, relationships and a basis of trust might already be established
among members of the organization and this could ease communication and
knowledge sharing, limit the degree of misunderstandings and, taken together,
result in increased e"ciency compared to other start-ups.
Relationships of trust are not only a relevant internal matter. The above
arguments point to lack of reputation and relationships to external partners
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as other significant factors. Following the argument of Dahl and Reichstein
(2007a), a spin-o! might inherit something other than technological knowledge
and organizational routines from its prior employer. In the case that the prior
employer (the parent firm) has a good reputation, this blueprint might be
transferred from the parent firm to the spin-o!, giving the spin-o! entrepreneur
a great advantage, for example, help the entrepreneur to raise finance and
attract the most talented employees. In other words, external parties (e.g.,
investors) cannot observe the new firm’s potential directly and therefore need
to rely on signals of legitimacy, credibility and profitability – even if the e!ect
on performance is only symbolic. The founders’ career history and network are
examples of indicators that might a!ect outsiders’ perception of the new firm
(Brüderl et al., 1992; Stuart et al., 1999; Higgins and Gulati, 2003). Following
similar lines of argument, Chatterji (2009) shows that new firms, within the US
medical device industry, secure funding more quickly than other entrants do,
when spawned by incumbent firms in the industry. Finally, as I discussed in
Chapter 3, studies on the role of parent firms suggest that spin-o!s from better
parent firms survive longer, and better parent firms have higher spawning rates
(see, e.g., Phillips (2002); Agarwal et al. (2004); Gompers et al. (2005); Dahl
and Reichstein (2007b); Klepper (2007)).
Taken together, the above arguments explain how stronger skills or com-
petences embedded in the spin-o!s help them cope with the barriers that lie
in the liability of newness. In addition to increased survival, this also makes
the spin-o!s a more homogeneous group with less performance variation. As
previously discussed, the great heterogeneity observed among new and younger
firms is partly explained by di!erences in the skills acquired by the founders
prior to the time of entry. Di!erent initial endowments of knowledge make
the entrepreneurs di!er in ability to identify and explore opportunities. As
the less-skilled, -gifted or -experienced entrepreneurs exit during the selection
process, the remaining (older) firms make up a more homogeneous group of
viable firms. But spin-o!s already constitute a group of higher-skilled entre-
preneurs at the time of entry. For that reason, we expect spin-o!s to reflect the
homogeneity and stability in job creation otherwise characteristic of relatively
older firms:
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Hypothesis 2: Spin-o!s constitute a more homogeneous group with more stable
growth patterns than other young firms.
If spin-o!s have a higher likelihood of survival, are a more homogeneous
group and show greater stability in overall job creation compared to other en-
trants, it might seem a natural conclusion that they, like older firms, should
experience a trade-o!, as discussed above, between growth and survival. In
other words, they might contribute less to the overall (net) job creation in
comparison to other young firms despite improved survival. Moreover, a com-
mon default assumption in economics is the positive correlation between risk
and return. When entering, spin-o! entrepreneurs might lower their risk by
imitating the business model, products, organizational structures etc. of their
parents. In a related model, Jovanovic (2004) shows how firms, switching from
new product development to safer returns, gain initial higher earnings at the
expense of long-run profits. Spin-o!s might have a higher likelihood of survi-
val because they take less risk, indicating a similar trade-o! between risk and
return. Other entrants, in contrast, might be more explorative and innovative
which, in turn, will lower survival but increase overall growth, for example, job
creation. In contrast to this, we argue that spin-o!s’ net job creation exceeds
that of other young firms.
First, the above arguments on greater spin-o! performance mention sui-
table (and quickly established) organizational routines, structures and culture.
While older firms might find themselves locked into existing routines, spin-o!s
are better able to change their organization and routines, if it is required by
the market, thereby making them more flexible (Klepper, 2001b). This higher
flexibility enables them to challenge incumbent firms, whereas other young
(and equally flexible) firms lack experience and routines to compete with both
incumbents and spin-o!s. Second, as described above, the spin-o! entrepre-
neur’s prior industry experience includes knowledge regarding the market and
competitors helping him/her identify unexplored business opportunities (see,
e.g., Burton et al. (2001)). In contrast to the above discussion, this speaks
against the perception of spin-o!s as less innovative and less willing to explore
new markets. Supporting this, Chatterji (2009) finds that non-technological
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rather than technological knowledge is important for spin-o! performance. Fi-
nally, Roberts et al. (2006) show that spin-o!s do not experience higher (or
lower) growth rates than other young firms. On the other hand, we argue that
if spin-o!s experience the same (gross) job creation as others, but are less likely
to exit or have negative growth, their net job creation should be greater.
Hypothesis 3: Spin-o!s have higher net job creation than other young firms.
This suggests that the relative net contribution to job creation by spin-o!s
exceeds that of other new firms. If supported empirically, this stresses not only
the importance of spin-o!s to continuous job creation, but also the economic
and political potential of promoting spin-o! entry rates.
5.3 Method
Data
We exploit two databases: the Danish Entrepreneurship Database and the Da-
nish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (referred to by its Danish
acronym, IDA). Both databases are maintained by Statistics Denmark. IDA
is a linked employer-employee database containing all incorporated companies
in Denmark and their employees from 1980 to 2006, which allow us to follow
the year-on-year employment flow of Danish firms. The Danish Entrepreneur-
ship Database identifies the primary founder of all new limited liability and
privately owned firms in Denmark from 1994 to 2004.2
Following Dahl et al. (2009) our sample consists of all (active) start-ups
in Denmark from 1995 to 2006. We only include start-ups from the private
sector. Additionally, due to regulation and reduced competition, we exclude
start-ups from the primary and the energy sectors. As we are investigating job
creation, our interest is confined to those start-ups that are (or become) actual
active businesses. We define this as start-ups with a minimum employment of
2IDA is merged with the Entrepreneurship Database through a third dataset, which
connects the firm-level data from the Entrepreneurship Database to the establishment-level
data from IDA. This implies, however, that the period of investigation must be reduced to
1995-2006, as this third dataset only includes observations from 1995 onward.
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one full-time equivalent in addition to the founder. Using this definition (mi-
nimum one full-time equivalent), we determine firm age from the first observed
activity. Similarly, we consider the firm closed after two successive years wi-
thout activity. Thus, we allow for a single year without activity (less than one
full-time equivalent).3 If the firm is later observed in the dataset we consider it
to be re-entered and we reset the age variable. We use information on activity
to determine the start-up year even though the year of o"cial registration is
in the database. The reason for this is that in many cases, no (or very limited)
activity is observed in the start-up until several years later. We argue that the
level of experience within these firms - and thus expected growth and likeli-
hood of exit - does not mirror that of established firms. In other words, using
business registration as a measure of start-up year would impose uncertainty
regarding job creation within di!erent age groups.
We identify a total of 142,278 start-ups from 1994 to 2004. From this
population, approximately only one in three has any employees (in addition to
the founder) at any point and even fewer ever employ as many as one full-time
equivalent. This reduces our population to 37,080 start-ups from 1994 to 2004.
All the start-ups in our sample are registered in the Danish Entrepreneurship
Database. Using the IDA database we run a series of additional controls to
verify that these start-ups are new businesses in compliance with the above
definition. This reduces the population further by approximately 7,500 start-
ups. Finally we exclude founders younger than 18 or older than 65 years of age
(this has only very little e!ect on the population size). The final population
consists of 29,583 start-ups, including 6,645 spin-o!s. Spin-o!s are businesses
founded by previous employees from incumbent firms in the same industry.
Following the approach of Chapter 3, we define this as the same four-digit
SIC-code.
We cannot track individual positions, but only make yearly observations of
the employment level in each firm. The implication of this is that we are not
able to capture whether a firm, within the same year, both creates and cuts one
3One deviation from this definition is firms which are active in 2005 but not in 2006.
Since 2006 is the last year of our observation period we cannot determine whether this is a
single year without activity. In these cases we consider the firms closed. As is clarified in the
following section, this deviation does not a!ect the overall calculation of job creation and
job destruction. It can only a!ect the ratio of job destruction due to exit.
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or more position, for example expands its research department and outsource
cleaning. Instead we observe the year-to-year net employment changes for
each firm.4 Thus, the disadvantage of this time frame is that the actual job
flow within our population is underestimated. If two employees are laid o! in
August and two employees are hired in October, then it is not revealed in the
statistics. The advantage, on the other hand, is that an annual statement does
not include every temporary and provisional change. We assume that annual
counts will provide a more accurate picture of the more permanent job flow
(Davis et al., 1997).
Job creation
In order to confirm (or reject) Hypotheses 2 and 3, we need a detailed investi-
gation of employment growth by spin-o!s and other entrants. As in Chapter
2, we follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and compute employment growth
for a particular firm, j, as:
gj,t =
Ej,t ! Ej,t"1
Xj,t
(5.1)
Xj,t =
Ej,t + Ej,t"1
2
, (5.2)
The growth rate, gj,t, is the di!erence between the number of employees in firm
j at time t, Ej,t, and the number of employees the previous year, Ej,t"1, in pro-
portion to the average number of employees within the two-year period, Xj,t.
The advantage of using the average employment level, Xj,t, over the initial
employment level, Ej,t"1, is that it allows for job creation and job destruction
by entry and exit, respectively, and it is symmetric around zero for job creation
and job destruction. Using Ej,t"1 instead would overestimate the growth rate
for job creation (gj,t > 0) and underestimate the growth rate in the case of
job destruction, i.e., lead to a numerically smaller gj,t (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1992). Equation 5.1 also takes into account the intuitive correlation between
size and growth. We expect more small than large businesses to double em-
ployment within a year. A business with only one employee, which recruits
4All information is generated ultimo November each year.
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additionally two employees, would have a growth rate of 200% using Ej,t"1
and just 100% using Xj,t (Equation 5.1). By comparison, a business with an
initial employment level of 50 employees and an equivalent increase in its sta!
by two employees would have a growth rate of 4 and 3.92%, respectively.
To investigate Hypothesis 3 and evaluate the potential di!erences in eco-
nomic contribution in terms of employment further, we are interested in the
overall net job creation from the two categories of start-ups (net job creation
is explained in Equation 5.6). The net job creation is divided into the two
components, gross job creation (JC) and gross job destruction (JD). The gross
job creation in subpopulation s at time t is the sum of employment increases
in all firms which either start-up or expand in the period between t ! 1 and t:
JCGROSSs,t =
!
gj,t>0,j$s
Xj,t
Xs,t
· gj,t (5.3)
Xs,t =
!
j$s
Xj,t (5.4)
The employment growth for each firm, gj,t, is weighted by the firm’s size (the
average number of employees, Xj,t) relatively to the size of the entire subpo-
pulation, Xs,t, which is the overall employment within firms characterized by
s, which represents di!erent age ranges. Finally, the weighted growth rates are
added up. Likewise, the gross job destruction at time t is the sum of all jobs
that are lost among all firms, which either reduce their sta! or exit over the
period from t ! 1 to t:
JDGROSSs,t =
!
gj,t<0,j$s
Xj,t
Xs,t
· |gj,t| (5.5)
Firms with an unchanged employment enter neither job creation nor job des-
truction. We point out that the job creation, JCGROSSs,t , also includes start-
ups, in which case employment will increase from zero to a positive num-
ber, generating a net growth rate, gj,t, of 200%. Similarly, job destruction,
JDGROSSs,t , includes firms which exit, in which case employment declines
from positive to zero generating a net growth rate of -200%. The overall em-
ployment net change is computed as the di!erence between employment at
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year t and t ! 1:
JCNETs,t = JCGROSS,t ! JDGROSS,t (5.6)
Thus, the net growth rate is total employment growth5 in percentages of the
average employment level within firms characterized by s, for example total
employment growth of spin-o!s aged one to three.
The overall reallocation accounts for the number of jobs that are created
and destroyed:
Reallocations,t = JCGROSS,t + JDGROSS,t (5.7)
Job reallocation at time t is the sum of the total job creation and job destruc-
tion, which has taken place within the period t ! 1 to t. Job creation cap-
tures the opportunities of employment within di!erent locations, industries,
age groups etc. depending on the classification, s. An increase in job creation
improves the chances of finding employment, all things being equal. Likewise,
an increase in job destruction increases uncertainty among those already em-
ployed. These opposite trends are summarized in the job reallocation. Thus,
job creation and job destruction are indicators of the heterogeneity of employ-
ment growth within di!erent age groups or within spin-o!s and other entrants,
and we shall interpret a higher job reallocation as an indicator of greater he-
terogeneity within the group of firms in question. Additionally, we include the
standard deviation of the individual firms’ growth rates (gj,t, Equation 5.1) as
an indicator of heterogeneity in the firms’ growth patterns.
5.4 Results
Size di!erences at start-up
Table 5.1 presents the average number of full-time equivalents employed at
spin-o!s and other entrants each year from age zero to nine. Comparing the
average start-up size, we find that the average spin-o! employs 1.84 full-time
5The overall employment level net change in proportion to the average overall employment
level in year t and t-1.
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Table 5.1: Average firm size for spin-o!s and other entrants, classified by age
Average size (95% confidence interval)
Age Others Spin-o!s
0 1.64 (1.62–1.67) 1.83 (1.78–1.89)
1 2.59 (2.53–2.66) 2.88 (2.78–2.98)
2 3.18 (3.09–3.28) 3.47 (3.30–3.63)
3 3.70 (3.56–3.85) 3.90 (3.64–4.12)
4 4.15 (3.94–4.36) 4.21 (3.88–4.53)
5 4.66 (4.41–4.91) 4.59 (4.15–5.03)
6 5.29 (4.91–5.67) 5.13 (4.56–5.69)
7 5.53 (5.08–5.98) 5.82 (4.96–6.68)
8 5.70 (5.09–6.31) 6.31 (4.97–7.65)
9 6.52 (5.54–7.50) 6.52 (5.36–7.67)
equivalents at the time of entry, whereas other new firms, on average, only
employ 1.64. This provides support to Hypothesis 1, that spin-o!s are larger
than other start-ups at the time of entry. This is also true for the two sub-
sequent years. However, one problem arises, as firms can never be reduced to
fewer than zero employees, whereas there is no upper limit. This should result
in a right-skewed distribution where the mean employment level might give an
inaccurate impression of the employment level in Danish start-ups.6 For this
reason, we further investigate the median and 75th percentile of employees at
di!erent ages for spin-o!s and other start-ups, respectively. These are illus-
trated in Figure 5.1. We no longer find size di!erences between the typical
spin-o! and other entrants at start-up and the following year. Comparing
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1, we reconfirm that outliers increase the mean value,
as the median at all ages is well below the mean. Investigating the median
for di!erent points in time, we find that the typical spin-o! is larger than the
typical start-up in the third, fourth and ninth years. For the remaining years,
the 50th percentiles are equal in the two groups. Looking at the 75th percentile
we observe even more di!erences, as the 75th percentile for spin-o!s exceeds
that of other young firms in the second, third, fourth and sixth years. These
results indicate that within some age ranges, the typical spin-o! is larger than
6When we investigate the actual distributions our suspicion is confirmed and we find high
positive values for skewness (not reported, but available upon request). Furthermore, we see
a tendency toward lower skewness for spin-o!s, indicating greater homogeneity in firm size.
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Figure 5.1: Median and 75th percentile of number of full-time equivalents of spin-o!s and
other entrants, classified by age
the typical start-up. This supports the argument that spin-o!s might expe-
rience a higher likelihood of survival as they are less exposed to the liability of
smallness.7
Job creation and stability in growth
Investigating Hypotheses 2 and 3, Table 5.2 shows the job creation and job
destruction at younger firms from zero to nine years of age, categorized as
spin-o!s and others. As job creation for firms of the age range zero to three
also includes jobs created by entry (as opposed to growth in established firms)
we also include the age range one to three. Furthermore, the main results are
summarized in Figure 5.2.
The subject of Hypothesis 2 is homogeneity and stability in growth. For
all age ranges, we find that job creation as well as job destruction is higher for
non-spin-o!s, which results in similarly higher rates of reallocation for these
firms, corresponding to a higher variation in job creation compared to spin-o!s.
Substantiated with a relatively lower standard deviation for spin-o! growth
7Figure 5.4, which shows Kaplan-Meier survival rates for spin-o!s and other entrants,
confirms a higher likelihood of survival for spin-o!s.
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Table 5.2: Job creation and job destruction of spin-o!s and other entrants, classified by
age
0-3 years: 1-3 years: 4-9 years:
Others Spin-o!s Others Spin-o!s Others Spin-o!s
JC (%) 55.11 52.46 29.42 28.49 14.17 13.48
JD (%) 22.12 18.72 26.04 21.77 17.53 16.56
Net growth rate (%) 32.99 33.73 3.38 6.72 -3.36 -3.07
Standard deviation 139.42 130.20 106.19 98.11 83.70 78.06
Reallocation rate 77.23 71.19 55.47 50.26 31.70 30.04
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Figure 5.2: Job creation and job destruction of spin-o!s and other entrants, classified by
age
rate we can confirm the notion of overall smaller variation in spin-o! growth
rates. This smaller variation is further illustrated by Figure 5.3, which shows
a boxplot of employment growth for spin-o!s and other entrants from age one
to nine. Job creation by entry is excluded, as it is always a growth rate of
200% with zero standard deviation. Figure 5.3 shows that the observations of
spin-o! employment growth are more clustered around the mean (in both cases
zero), indicating a smaller degree of dispersion in the distribution compared to
other young firms.8
8As a consequence of the enormous number of observations, outliers are not depicted in
Figure 5.3. In both cases the outliers, if included, would have appeared as straight lines
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Figure 5.3: Boxplox of employment growth, classified as spin-o!s and others
In Table 5.3, we group the firms according to their growth. We find that a
relatively larger share of spin-o!s have positive growth rates each year. This
result applies to most age groups, supporting the argument that spin-o!s are
able to convert initial better endowments of human and social capital into
larger and more rapidly growing businesses. Moreover, it is indicated that a
relatively smaller share of spin-o!s have negative growth rates during the first
years. After the sixth year, however, we find no systematic pattern.
In Table 5.2, gross job creation and gross job destruction give us the net job
creation, which was the focal point of Hypothesis 3. The net job creation for
firms of age range zero to three is 33.73% and 32.99% for spin-o!s and non-spin-
o!s, respectively. This results in only a small di!erence in net job creation of
0.74 percentage points. The di!erence in net job creation is more pronounced
for firms of age range one to three and with a net rate of 6.72%, spin-o!s’
net job creation is almost twice the magnitude of that in other young firms.
For firms older than four years, the di!erence in net job creation decreases
once again. Net growth is negative for both spin-o!s and others but it is less
negative for spin-o!s. For the three age groups investigated, we can confirm
going to 200 and -200, respectively.
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Table 5.3: Share of firms with positive, negative and zero growth, respectively, of spin-o!s
and other entrants, classified by age
Growth rate < 0 Growth rate = 0 Growth rate > 0
Age Spin-o!s Others Spin-o!s Others Spin-o!s Others
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
0 0 0 0 0 100 100
1 25.93 32.81"" 36.38 35.90 37.69 31.30""
2 29.50 33.25"" 38.30 37.86 32.20 28.89""
3 29.09 32.23"" 39.18 39.76 31.74 28.02""
4 29.36 32.17"" 39.03 39.94 31.60 27.89""
5 31.28 31.92 41.36 41.69 27.36 26.40
6 27.28 31.84"" 42.22 40.44 30.50 27.72"
7 31.40 30.90 41.79 42.54 26.81 26.56
8 30.31 29.12 41.12 44.21 28.57 26.67
9 26.43 26.17 42.68 46.05 30.89 27.78
10 25.79 28.54 42.63 44.32 31.58 27.15†
11 34.78 32.16 30.43 40.70 34.78 27.14"
Significance levels: † : 10% " : 5% "" : 1% indicates di!erences between
spin-o!s and other entrants using a chi-square test (not calculated for “Growth
rate = 0”).
Hypothesis 3 that spin-o!s have higher net job creation than other new firms.
An obvious explanation of this result is a proportional higher gross job creation
in spin-o!s. Table 5.2, however, tells a di!erent story. Within each age group,
gross job creation is actually relatively smaller for spin-o!s but at the same
time, they also show a relatively smaller job destruction, which more than
o!sets this. Thus, despite a lower rate of gross job creation, spin-o!s actually
achieve a higher net job creation. Higher likelihood of survival for spin-o!s
(Figure 5.4) drives this higher net growth, indicating that employment growth
does not necessarily have to happen at the expense of job security.
The importance of survival to net job creation becomes more obvious when
we investigate the job flow excluding job creation by entry. For both spin-o!s
and others the main job creation happens in firms within age group zero to
three. This was expected as this category includes job creation by entry, which
always equals a growth rate of 200%. The importance of entry to employment
growth is evident from the large di!erence in job creation between the two
categories of younger firms (0-3 years and 1-3 years). Because of their relatively
low hazard rate and thereby fewer exits, growth by entry accounts for a smaller
share of employment growth for spin-o!s compared to other entrants. For
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Figure 5.4: Kaplan-Meier survival rates for spin-o!s and other entrants
that reason, the spin-o!s experience a relative smaller decrease in net job
creation when moving from age range zero to three and up. Similarly, exit
has a significant e!ect on job destruction in both categories. We find that the
average number of employees in spin-o!s in the year of exit exceeds that of other
young firms. This makes exit more crucial to the destruction rate. However,
because of their smaller hazard of exit, job destruction by exit actually accounts
for a smaller share of spin-o! job destruction.
Overall, Table 5.2 and the additional results give strong evidence to support
Hypothesis 3. This superiority in (net) job creation emphasizes the spin-o!s’
great economic significance. But, exactly how important are spin-o!s to em-
ployment in Denmark? Moreover, what might the policy implications of these
results be? We shall explore these questions in the next subsections.
Relative importance of spin-o!s to employment growth in Denmark
High survival rates, increased stability and high net growth are indicators that
spin-o!s are important to employment growth. In order to verify this, we need
to consider the spin-o!s’ e!ect on total employment in the economy. However,
using the population of this paper makes such an analysis very di"cult and at
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best imprecise. Our population includes only Danish start-ups satisfying cer-
tain criteria. As previously discussed, we take a rather conservative approach
when selecting our population in order to ensure that all firms are in fact real
entrants and only true spin-o!s are included. This is likely to underestimate
the actual job creation, as we leave out some potential entrants. Therefore,
proving the importance of new firms to job creation will not be the aim of this
paper. Instead, we shall continue to focus on spin-o!s’ performance relative
to other entrants, when investigating their significance to employment. How-
ever, references to the literature on job creation by new and young firms are
considered. As described above, the crucial role played by job creation in new
and young firms to overall employment, is well established (Davis et al., 1997;
Westergård-Nielsen and Ibsen, 2005; Dahl et al., 2009; Haltiwanger, 2009). We
shall rely on these studies when we evaluate the importance of spin-o!s to em-
ployment based on their relative performance. Investigating employment and
job creation in Denmark, Westergård-Nielsen and Ibsen (2005) find that new
establishments account for approximately one-third of job creation (excluding
the public sector). This is supported by Dahl et al. (2009) who show that
new and young firms (0-3 years) account for 61% of the gross job creation.9
Moreover, 69.1% of the jobs created by new and young firms arise from entry,
corresponding to 43% of total job creation. As stated above, we add to this
literature by investigating the spin-o!s’ significance to employment compared
to other entrants. We illustrate the impact of spin-o!s’ increased stability and
high net growth on overall job creation by new and young firms.
For each category - gross job creation, gross job destruction, and net job
creation - we divide the total number of jobs created (or destroyed) into spin-
o!s and other entrants, respectively. Then the spin-o!s’ share of job creation
is compared to their share of firms and share of employment. As previously
discussed, we include two categories of young firms: 0-3 and 1-3 years, the
latter being exclusive of entry. Results are shown in Table 5.4.
In their first years, spin-o!s account for approximately 23% of the popula-
tion but, as a result of their higher survival rates, this share increases with the
age of the spin-o!s. Similarly, the spin-o!s’ share of employment rises from
9Dahl et al. (2009) investigate the yearly average job creation in Denmark from 1995 to
2006, excluding job creation in the public, primary and energy sectors.
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Table 5.4: Share of job creation and job destruction of spin-o!s and other entrants, classified
by age
0-3 years: 1-3 years: 4-9 years:
Others Spin-o!s Others Spin-o!s Others Spin-o!s
Share of firms (%) 76.83 23.17 76.47 23.53 72.63 27.17
Share of employment (%) 74.08 25.92 73.59 26.41 72.02 27.98
Share of JC (%) 75.08 24.92 74.52 25.48 73.10 26.90
Share of JD (%) 77.21 22.79 77.21 22.79 73.47 26.53
Share of net JC (%) 73.71 26.29 58.74 41.26 74.94" 25.06"
"Share of negative value
25.92 to 27.98%. As clarified in the following subsection, this is the result
of both superior survival and net job creation. As expected, based on Table
5.2, the spin-o!s’ share of job destruction is less than their share of firms and
share of employment. For example, spin-o!s accounts for 26.41% of the em-
ployment, but only 22.79% of the job destruction within firms of age group one
to three. This result applies to all age groups. On the other hand, spin-o!s
create fewer jobs (gross) than one would expect based on their employment
share. Nevertheless, they still outperform others regarding net job creation.10
The object of Table 5.4 is to examine the magnitude of the spin-o!s’ job
creation and their impact on total employment compared to other new and
young firms. When investigating the spin-o!s’ significance to employment, our
interest concentrates on net job creation. As already stated above, spin-o!s
have higher rates of net job creation and they are slightly larger at start-up.
The e!ect is that spin-o!s account for 26.3% of net job creation for age range
zero to three, while only accounting for 23.2% of the population. Moreover,
spin-o!s are responsible for an impressive 41.3% of the net job creation within
age range one to three, while only making up a quarter of the population.
Recalling the magnitude of job creation in new and young firms, this strongly
underlines the significance of spin-o!s to overall employment and job creation.
10Note that the net job creation is negative for both categories of firms within age group
four to nine, but smaller for spin-o!s.
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Do spin-o!s matter in the long run?
So far, we have investigated performance di!erences for di!erent age groups
separately. Generally, the tendency seems to be a superior performance by
spin-o!s in terms of job creation. However, what is the overall e!ect of in-
creased survival, higher net job creation and greater average firm size in the
long run? Overall, do spin-o!s rather than non-spin-o!s result in a marked
improvement in employment or is the di!erence barely perceptible in the long
run? We explore this question in the following, as our focus shifts from growth
rates to absolute employment.
Investigating long-term e!ects on job creation, the scale of data bounds
us. Our population includes start-ups from 1995 to 2006. This implies that
we can observe some entrants for 11 years and others for just one. This makes
comparisons di"cult and investigation of long-term e!ects is only possible for
a part of the population. As a solution to the latter, we only include start-ups
for the period from 1995 to 1998 in the following analysis. Thus, we are able
to track the total net job flow from four generations of entrants (1995-1998)
during their first eight years. The total net job flow is the total year-to-year
development in employment by one generation. We measure it as the number
of jobs created by entry, adding and subtracting the yearly job creation and
job destruction, respectively. The latter includes both negative growth and
job destruction by exit. Table 5.5 shows the total net job flow provided by the
four generations of entrants.
Table 5.5: Yearly average of total employment for spin-o!s and other entrants, classified
by age (year of start-up: 1995-1998)
Others Spin-o!s
Share of Share of
Age Firms Jobs total jobs (%) Firms Jobs total jobs (%)
0 4,970 8,446 75.59 1,397 2,728 24.41
1 3,662 9,207 73.27 1,146 3,359 26.73
2 2,886 8,967 71.41 988 3,590 28.59
3 2,409 8,636 70.69 859 3,580 29.31
4 2,028 8,324 71.04 746 3,393 28.96
5 1,731 7,823 71.19 651 3,166 28.81
6 1,484 7,302 69.80 580 3,159 30.20
7 1,305 6,875 68.72 518 3,129 31.28
8 1,167 6,651 69.31 467 2,945 30.69
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In total, 4,970 non-spin-o!s and 1,397 spin-o!s start up between 1995 and
1998. At the time of entry they employ 8,446 and 2,728 full-time equivalents,
respectively.11 In other words, in their first year, spin-o!s account for 24.41% of
a generation’s employment. In the second year (corresponding to age one), the
number of total employees rises for both spin-o!s and other entrants, whereas
the number of firms is reduced. The total number of employees depends on
the e!ect from two opposing factors. The first factor (the negative e!ect) is
the continuous reduction in the number of firms and the second factor (the
positive e!ect) is a yearly increase in the average firm size (the number of
employees). For both spin-o!s and others, total employment peaks in the third
year, after which total employment gradually declines as the negative e!ect of
firm exit becomes stronger. After eight years, only 1,167 of the other start-
ups still exist, whereas 467 of the spin-o!s remain. The important conclusion
of this analysis, however, is not the higher survival rate for spin-o!s, which
is already an established fact, but the spin-o!s’ relatively large share of a
generation’s employment. During the first nine years the spin-o!s’ share of
total employment has increased from 24.41% in the start-up year to 30.69%
of the employment eight years later. Recall that both survival and average
firm size have previously been illustrated for the entire population in Figure
5.4 and Table 5.1. We find a similar survival rate and average firm size for the
1995-1998 cohort. This suggests that the increase in share of employment is
the result of not only a higher survival rate, but also a relatively larger firm
size on average.
Finally, to make a clear illustration of what these di!erences in job crea-
tion mean to new firms’ long-term contribution to employment, we estimate
the total employment-e!ect after eight years. Based on the data presented in
Table 5.5, we find the expected returns on employment for spin-o!s compared
to other entrants. In other words, we obtain an estimate of spin-o!s’ relative
contribution to absolute employment, all things considered. Results are pre-
sented in Table 5.6. In order to make a comparison of the two groups and
expose the performance di!erence, we report the absolute job creation per 100
firms.
11This is the sum of employees in start-ups in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998.
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Table 5.6: Total employment per 100 start-ups (year of start-up: 1995-1998)
Years since Average Others Spin-o!s
start-up (1995-1998) only only
0 175 170 195
1 197 185 240
2 197 180 257
3 192 174 256
4 184 167 243
5 173 157 227
6 164 147 226
7 157 138 224
8 151 134 211
For each 100 non-spin-o!s that enter the economy, there is an immediate
contribution to employment of 170 full-time equivalents, corresponding to an
average firm size of 1.7 employees. After eight years, however, this number
diminishes to only 134 employees. In contrast, 100 spin-o!s employ 195 em-
ployees in the start-up year, and eight years later this number has increased to
211 as the positive e!ect from increases in firm size o!sets the negative e!ect
from exit. We find this to be the case only for spin-o!s. Of course, it is not
realistic (or desirable) that spin-o!s would ever account for 100 percent of the
start-up rate in Denmark. Furthermore, we must emphasize that the di!erence
in return on employment applies only to this ratio of spin-o!s and non-spin-
o!s, even though we have no reason to suspect that the results would change
dramatically by an increase in the share of spin-o!s. This being said, it is food
for thought that while today’s12 ratio of spin-o!s to other entrants gives an
expected return on employment after eight years of 151 employees for each 100
new firms established, it is likely that there is a potentially much higher return
if we were to increase the spin-o!s to non-spin-o!s ratio. Table 5.6 indicates
that an increase in spin-o!s’ share of start-ups by 10 percentage points from
approximately 22% today to 32%, would result in an increase in the return
to employment of 0.077 employee per start-up or, in terms of Table 5.6, an
increase from 151 to 159 employees after eight years for each 100 start-ups. In
other words, spin-o!s do matter to employment - especially in the long run.
12This refers to the average ratio from 1995 to 1998.
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5.5 Conclusion
If spin-o!s survive longer, are a more homogeneous group and show greater
stability in overall job creation compared to other entrants, it would imply
a relatively higher job security for spin-o! employees. Moreover, if spin-o!s’
job creation has no trade-o! between growth on the one hand and size and
stability on the other, then spin-o!s would be relatively more significant to job
creation in the economy compared to other start-ups. This has been the basis
of the present paper, and if proven, it could make promotion of this type of
entry an interesting target for industrial policy.
By detailed investigation of younger firms’ growth patterns we are able to
confirm that spin-o!s are a more homogeneous group showing greater stability
with potential to o!er higher job security to their employees compared to
other entrants. In comparison to other young firms, they not only survive
longer (which in itself indicates increased stability in growth patterns), but
their standard deviation in growth rates is smaller and they have a lower
reallocation of jobs, meaning that relatively fewer spin-o!s cut jobs within the
same period as many others create jobs. We argue that this increased stability,
homogeneity and higher likelihood of survival is the result of spin-o!s being
relatively less vulnerable to the liability of newness.
Despite a lower gross job creation, spin-o!s actually achieve a higher net
job creation, as their gross job destruction is also below that of other entrants.
The di!erence in the net job creation is most pronounced for firms within the
age range one to three. Resulting from fewer exits, the spin-o!s’ job destruction
is significantly lower for this age group, contributing to an increased net job
creation over other entrants. Furthermore, this result reveals that the entry
of new firms is responsible for the majority of job creation accounted for by
other entrants. Comparing the spin-o!s’ share of new firms to their share of
the net job creation, their superiority becomes obvious. While spin-o!s within
the age range one to three only make up a quarter of the population, their net
job creation accounts for more than 40%. These results illustrate how spin-o!s
play an important role to the employment in Denmark. An examination of the
longer-term e!ects to the economy emphasizes this. The tendency seems to be
that the gain of spin-o! entry over other start-ups is greater the further ahead
we look. Overall, the results suggest that changing the composition of today’s
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start-ups by promoting spin-o!s over other entrants, could lead to substantial
gains in terms of job creation.
Finally, we do not claim that our study captures the complexity of the
Danish economy. Our study does not consider the overall economic e!ects of
spin-o!s. For example, as investigated in Chapter 3, if spin-o!s are founded on
intellectual capital accumulated at the parent firms, they could be potentially
harmful to those firms. Chapter 3 confirmed a negative e!ect on parent firms’
performance from top employees who migrate into spin-o! entrepreneurship.
This result means that there might be an equivalent (or larger) decrease in
employment at the incumbent firms once parenting and now, perhaps, compe-
ting against these spin-o!s. In other words, we cannot rule out the possibility
that the overall economic e!ect of spin-o!s is in fact negative because the ne-
gative e!ect on the parent firms’ performance might outweigh the advantages
of spin-o!s over other entrants. Conversely, in opposition to this, the results
provided in this chapter might fuel the discussion on non-competition clauses
as a potential barrier to promote this type of entry.
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Summary
In three papers, this thesis addresses the overall research question: “What
are the e!ects of organizational disruptions on firm performance?” These pa-
pers investigate three di!erent types of organizational disruptions and their
e!ects on firms’ subsequent performance. These disruptive events include top-
employee migration, an unexpected death among top management teams, and
the rapid employment growth of start-ups. While the thesis also embraces
other fields of research, the process of organizational disruptions and their ef-
fects on an organization’s performance are the common denominator of the
three leading papers contained in this thesis. I investigate these examples
of organizational disruptions empirically, using a comprehensive Danish panel
dataset. In addition, this thesis also includes a background paper.
Organizational disruptions are any events that alter organizational rou-
tines or key features of an organization in a way that disrupts the internal
organizational processes. These disruptive events have the potential to push
the prevailing organizational “equilibrium” out of balance, destabilizing the
system and creating something new. Even if this eventually leads to positive
performance outcomes, and even despite the overall approval of the organiza-
tional members, the transition from “well known” to “chartered territory” is not
bound to be smooth. While some studies argue that organizations are generally
flexible and adaptive at baseline, organizational ecologists argue that organi-
zations are generally inert and hence vulnerable to organizational disruptions.
In other words, shocks to key organizational features are disruptive to internal
organizational processes with negative consequences for employees and firm
performance. At the same time, organizational inertia implies the presence of
routinized organizational activities, which require fewer resources and enhance
the e"cient coordination of tasks and resources. Overall, organizational inertia
implies increasingly e"cient organizations.
Routines are built on experience, and this experience may include insight
on how to adapt to changing environments. However, because they rely on pre-
vious experience, routines may not provide appropriate responses to new situa-
tions and they may, in fact, legitimize ine"cient behavior. At the same time,
organizational inertia can restrict an organization to a suboptimal position.
Disruptions can be beneficial to firm performance in this case by providing
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an opportunity to identify the need for and to initiate imperative organizatio-
nal change. In this sense, organizational disruptions can sometimes facilitate
necessary organizational change and lead to positive performance outcomes.
However, these disruptions are also potentially troublesome events with net
negative e!ects on a firm’s performance. Although a number of previous stu-
dies support the hypothesis that organizational changes and disruptions exert
a net negative e!ect on a firm’s subsequent performance, these studies tend
to focus on a limited number of disruptive and often endogenous events. For
these reasons, I argue that it is still largely an open question of when (i.e.,
what type of disruptions and what kind of firms) and with what magnitude,
organizational disruptions will a!ect a firm’s performance. In other words,
“What are the e!ects of organizational disruptions on firm performance?”
Chapter 1 is a synopsis that introduces the overall research question, me-
thod and findings. In this synopsis, I illuminate what I understand of “Orga-
nizational disruptions and firm performance”. I do so by presenting a model
of three key mechanisms that illustrate the process from the onset of an or-
ganizational disruption to its e!ects on firm performance. The key concepts
of this model and my thesis are structural inertia, organizational routines and
organizational members. In the three focal papers, I focus on di!erent aspects
of these key mechanisms, investigating and explaining the e!ects of organi-
zational disruptions on firm performance. This approach places the thesis
within the organizational ecology literature, and the thesis, itself, adds to the
stream of studies on inert organizations and argues that radical organizational
changes are, overall, disruptive to organizations, with detrimental e!ects on
a firm’s subsequent performance. The latter is the overall hypothesis of my
thesis. Chapter 1 also introduces the comprehensive Danish database, the In-
tegrated Database for Labor Market Research. This longitudinal database is
the empirical foundation for all four papers. This database provides annual
data on all Danish firms and their employees from 1980 to 2008. I discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of this database and its various applications. Finally,
Chapter 1 provides the overall conclusion of my thesis. It further emphasizes
the individual and collective contributions of the four papers and addresses the
limitations of the research.
Chapter 2 is a co-authored paper with Christina Guenther. The title of
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this paper is “Heroes today - but what about tomorrow? Gazelles and their
long-term performance”. In contrast to previous studies, which mainly focused
on the outstanding short-term performance of young, high-growth firms, this
paper analyzed the long-term performance of these companies. We investigate
this empirically, using the comprehensive Danish panel dataset, the Integrated
Database for Labor Market Research. We argue that rapid initial growth rates
impede the emergence of stable and e"cient routinized structures in newly
founded ventures, especially if the expansion is undertaken too hastily. This,
in turn, negatively a!ects the long-term performance of these companies be-
cause the initial composite of organizational structures and routines, or the lack
thereof, has a long-lasting e!ect on an organization’s development. Supporting
this hypothesis, we find that rapid initial employment growth negatively a!ects
the long-term survival and employment growth rates for these companies and
ultimately increases employee turnover. We also find that this trade-o! be-
tween an initial high growth rate and a firm’s long-term performance is partly
explained by the higher initial employee turnover in these high-growth firms,
which hinders the e"cient integration of new members into the organization
and hampers the development of a shared organizational culture and norms
and of e"cient organizational routines. This finding illustrates the significance
of imprinting and inertia in the creation of organizational structures. More-
over, it emphasizes the time aspect in establishing e"cient routines and the
importance of organizational foresight when choosing an organizational model
at the time of founding. Firms have a limited capacity to integrate new mem-
bers e"ciently into the organization, which significantly restricts the pace at
which firms can successfully expand. These results raise the question of whe-
ther industrial policy should aim to promote potential high-growth start-ups
over other entrants, even if this promotion comes at the cost of forgoing the
creation of more sustainable jobs.
Chapter 3 is a co-authored paper with Michael S. Dahl. The title of this pa-
per is “The e!ect of top-employee migration and spin-o!s on incumbent firms”.
In this paper, we investigate the performance e!ects of top-employee migration
with a special focus on top employees who depart to spin-o! entrepreneurship.
Spin-o! entrepreneurs are employees who leave incumbent firms to found their
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own firms in the same industry. Previous studies have found that these entre-
preneurs are significantly more likely to succeed compared with other, de novo
entrants. However, if spin-o!s are founded on the intellectual capital that
was accumulated at their parent firms, they may be potentially harmful to
the latter. One might expect that top-employee migration to rival incumbent
firms would have similar e!ects on the parent firm’s performance. We argue
that top-employee migration is largely detrimental to firm performance be-
cause it results in a loss of human capital, and because this event is disruptive
to organizational routines. Moreover, we expect increasing competitive pres-
sure to result when key employees resign to work for spin-o!s or incumbent
rivals. We investigated the e!ects of top-employee migration on parent firm
performance, exploiting the comprehensive Danish panel dataset. We found
negative performance e!ects from top-employee migration, regardless of where
the migrating employees end up working once they leave the parent firm, in-
cluding non-competitive destinations. This e!ect is greater for top employees
who leave to found spin-o!s and top employees who resign to work with com-
peting incumbent firms. The e!ect is not significantly di!erent between these
two categories of top employees. We also found that the negative e!ects on
the parent firm’s performance lessen over time. Overall, this study empha-
sizes the importance of top employees to firm performance. The decrease in
post-departure performance explains and, to some degree, incites the extensive
focus on employee retention through, for example, non-competition clauses.
Chapter 4 includes the last of the three major papers of this thesis. The
title of this paper is “Who loses a leader without losing ground: Unexpected
death in top management teams and firm performance”. In this paper, I ex-
ploit the exogenous variation in firm performance caused by sudden deaths
among top management personnel to investigate the consequences of a disrup-
tive organizational shock. At the same time, this paper studies which firms are
better and faster at absorbing the impact from this shock with fewer negative
e!ects on their subsequent performance. Organizational characteristics, such
as flexible routines, an excess capacity to adapt, and previous experience with
top management turnover events, can equip organizations to deal with unex-
pected organizational disruptions. The opposite of this flexible ideal might be
a highly routinized and inert organization. Because organizational inertia can
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circumscribe a firm’s willingness and ability to act and adapt to a new situa-
tion, significant organizational disruptions can exert greater and potentially
fatal e!ects on an inert firm’s post-shock performance. Nonetheless, I hypo-
thesize that inertia is a feature of more routinized, more e"cient and stron-
ger organizations, with a greater capacity to resist disruptive organizational
shocks. I also hypothesize that a greater internal opposition to organizatio-
nal change can lead to fewer potentially disruptive post-event changes in the
organization. Supporting this hypothesis, I found that a longer tenure of the
top management team mitigates the negative shock-e!ect of a team member’s
death, leading to a higher post-event performance than might otherwise be
expected. I argue that continuity in the top management team increases orga-
nizational stability and routinization. Conversely, I find that employee tenure
enhances the negative e!ect on post-shock performance. In keeping with the
previous paper, this conclusion suggests that organizations might benefit from
e!orts to retain the individuals in their top management positions.
Chapter 5 is the final paper of this thesis. This chapter is a background
paper that was co-authored with Michael S. Dahl. It is entitled “Spin-o!
growth and job creation: Evidence on Denmark”. This paper focuses on the
superior performance of spin-o!s in comparison with other start-ups. As such,
this study supplements Chapter 3, which also addresses the question of the
economic e!ects of employee migration and spin-o! entrepreneurship. Previous
studies have nearly exclusively investigated the comparative performance of
spin-o!s’ in terms of their survival. We added to this body of literature by
conducting a detailed empirical study of the performance di!erences between
spin-o!s and other entrants in terms of employment growth and job creation.
We found that spin-o!s are not only surviving longer, as the existing literature
suggests, but that they are also relatively more important for the economy as
a source of job creation. This finding has implications for industrial policy,
particularly by suggesting that substantial gains may accrue from targeted
entrepreneurial policies that promote spin-o!s over other entrants.
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Igennem tre artikler undersøger denne Ph.d afhandling det overordnede forsk-
ningsspørgsmål: “Hvad er e!ekterne af organisatoriske forstyrrelser på virksom-
heders performance?” Artiklerne undersøger tre forskellige typer af organisato-
riske forstyrrelser og disses e!ekt på virksomheders performance. Disse organi-
satoriske forstyrrelser er henholdsvis nøglemedarbejdere, der forlader virksom-
heden, toplederes uventede dødsfald og høj beskæftigelsesvækst i nystartede
virksomheder. De enkelte artikler trækker på flere forskellige forskningsområ-
der. Fællesnævneren er dog, at de alle beskæftiger sig med processen om-
kring organisatoriske forstyrrelser, og hvorledes denne proces har indflydelse
på, hvordan virksomhederne efterfølgende klarer sig. Derudover indeholder af-
handlingen også et baggrundspapir. De fire artikler er alle empiriske studier,
der er baseret på et meget omfattende dansk paneldatasæt.
Organisatoriske forstyrrelser er begivenheder, der påvirker og forandrer
virksomhedens organisatoriske rutiner eller væsentlige karakteristika hos virk-
somhederne. Dette forstyrrer og ødelægger interne processer i virksomheden.
Disse destruktive begivenheder bringer ubalance i den interne organisatoriske
orden ved at erstatte velkendte og stabile mønstrer og hierarkier med noget nyt.
Selvom dette med tiden kan medføre en positiv e!ekt på virksomhedens perfor-
mance, og på trods af medarbejdernes eventuelle opbakning til den pågældende
forandring, så kan overgangen fra en velkendt situation til noget ukendt være
en problematisk proces. Nogen studier argumenterer for, at organisationer
generelt er fleksible og omstillingsparate. I modsætning hertil argumenterer
“organizational ecologists” for, at organisationer generelt er mindre fleksible
og har en indbygget modstand mod forandring, der således besværliggøres og
tager længere tid. Dette gør samtidigt organisationerne mere sårbare over-
for organisatoriske forstyrrelser og større forandringer, der kan have negative
e!ekter på medarbejderne og være skadelige for virksomhedens performance.
På den anden side så medfører organisationers manglende evne og villighed
til forandring også, at deres aktiviteter er mere rutiniserede og dermed mere
e!ektive. Dette skyldes, at rutiniserede handlinger og aktiviteter kræver færre
ressourcer, ligesom det muliggør en mere e"cient koordinering og fordeling af
opgaver og ressourcer i virksomheden.
Organisatoriske rutiner bygger på erfaringer, herunder mulige erfaringer
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med, hvorledes organisationen bedst tilpasser sig skiftende omgivelser. Det er
dog ikke givet, at rutiner, der er baseret på erfaringer, vil være velegnet til at
håndtere nye og ukendte situationer. Dertil kommer, at fastholdelse i bestemte
organisatoriske rutiner kan medvirke til at legitimisere en potentielt ine"cient
adfærd og dermed fastholde organisationen i et ikke optimalt adfærdsmønster.
Hvis dette er tilfældet, kan organisatoriske forstyrrelser måske være positive
for virksomhederne i den forstand, at de kan hjælpe med at identificere og
efterfølgende bryde med potentielt ine"ciente rutiner. Dette peger på, at
organisatoriske forstyrrelser også kan have positive konsekvenser for virksom-
hederne og deres performance, i det de kan hjælpe med at facilitere nødvendige
organisatoriske forandringer. Omvendt kan dette også være en vanskelig og de-
struktiv proces, der kan skade virksomhedens performance i større eller mindre
grad. En række tidligere studier støtter hypotesen om, at organisatoriske for-
styrrelser og forandringer kan have negative konsekvenser for virksomhedernes
efterfølgende performance. Størstedelen af disse studier fokuserer dog på et
begrænset antal af organisatoriske forstyrrelser, ligesom mange studier lider
under endogenitetsproblemer. Jeg argumenterer således for, at det fortsat er
et åbent spørgsmål hvornår (dvs. hvilke typer af forstyrrelser og virksomheder)
og med hvilken e!ekt, organisatoriske forstyrrelser påvirker virksomheders per-
formance. Med andre ord, “hvad er e!ekterne af organisatoriske forstyrrelser
på virksomheders performance?”.
Kapitel 1 er en synopsis, der introducerer det overordnede forskningsspørg-
smål, metode og resultater. I synopsen klargøres det, hvad jeg forstår ved
afhandlingens titel “Organizational disruptions and firm performance”. I den
forbindelse præsenteres en model indeholdende tre hovedmekanismer til at fork-
lare processen fra organisatorisk forstyrrelse til en e!ekt på virksomhedens
performance. Disse hovedmekanismer, eller nøglebegreber, er “structural iner-
tia”, organisatoriske rutiner og organisatoriske medlemmer. I afhandlingens tre
hovedartikler undersøger og forklarer jeg e!ekterne af organisatoriske forstyr-
relser på virksomheders performance ved at fokusere på forskellige aspekter
af de tre hovedmekanismer. På baggrund heraf positionerer synopsen afhand-
lingen inden for “organizational ecology” litteraturen. Her bidrager afhandlin-
gen til litteraturen om “inert organizations” ved at advokere for, at radikale
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organisatoriske forandringer og forstyrrelser generelt er destruktive for organi-
sationer og dermed skadelige for virksomhedernes efterfølgende performance.
Dette er endvidere afhandlingens overordnede hypotese. Deruodver introdu-
cerer synopsen også det omfattende danske register data, Integreret Database
for Arbejdsmarkedsforskning (IDA). Dette omfattende paneldatasæt danner
det empiriske grundlag for alle fire artikler i denne afhandling. Databasen
indeholder detaljerede variable og har årlige observationer på alle danske virk-
somheder og deres medarbejdere fra 1980 til 2008. I Synopsen diskuterer jeg
styrker og svagheder ved databasen og dens anvendelsesmuligheder. Synopsen
indeholder også en samlet konklusion for afhandlingen og en diskussion af mu-
lige svagheder og begrænsninger. Derudover fremhæver synopsen de konkrete
bidrag fra de enkelte papirer og fra afhandlingen som helhed og diskuterer i
den forbindelse også konsekvenserne af afhandlingens resultater.
Kapitel 2 er en artikel, der er skrevet i fællesskab med Christina Guen-
ther. Titlen på dette papir er “Heroes today - but what about tomorrow? Ga-
zelles and their long-term performance”. I modsætning til tidligere studier, der
hovedsageligt fokuserer på unge vækstvirksomheders imponerende kortsigtede
performance, så undersøger vi, hvordan disse højvækstsvirksomheder klarer
sig på længere sigt. Vi undersøger dette empirisk ved hjælp af det omfattende
danske registerdata, IDA, der er beskrevet ovenfor. I artiklen argumenterer
vi for, at høj beskæftigelsesvækst i de første år af en virksomheds levetid kan
hæmme udviklingen af stabile og e"ciente rutinestrukturer i nyetablerede virk-
somheder, hvis ekspansionen sker for hurtigt. Dette har konsekvenser for virk-
somhedens langsigtede performance, fordi de initiale organisationsstrukturer
og rutiner, eller mangel på samme, har en langvarig indvirkning på, hvordan
virksomheden udvikler sig. Vores empiriske resultater understøtter denne hy-
potese. Vi finder, at høj beskæftigelsesvækst i de første år har negative e!ekter
på virksomhedens langsigtede beskæftigelsesvækst og overlevelseschancer samt
øger medarbejderudskiftningen. Vi finder også, at dette trade-o! mellem virk-
somhedens initiale beskæftigelsesvækst og langsigtede performance delvist kan
forklares med en højere medarbejderudskiftning hos disse vækstvirksomheder
i de tidlige år. Dette skyldes til dels, at en for høj udskiftning blandt medar-
bejderne vanskeliggør en e"cient integration af nye medarbejdere. Derudover
221
5. Resume på dansk
kan en høj medarbejderudskiftning forhindre, at der etableres en fælles orga-
nisationskultur, et fælles normsæt og e"ciente organisatoriske rutiner. Dette
understøtter hypoteserne om “imprinting” og “inertia” i organisatoriske struk-
turer. Det understreger også tidshensynet i forhold til at etablere e"ciente
rutiner samt betydningen af en vis fremsynethed i nystarte virksomheder, når
de vælger en organisatorisk model, i det organisatorisk træghed og modvilje
gør det vanskeligt at ændre den eksisterende model på et senere tidspunkt.
Artiklen viser også, at virksomheder har en begræsnet kapacitet til e"cient at
integrere nye medlemmer, hvilket lægger en væsentlig begrænsning på, hvor
hurtigt virksomheder kan ekspandere. Konklusionerne i denne artikel sætter
spørgsmålstegn ved, om det er hensigtsmæssigt at målrette erhvervspolitik-
ken mod vækstiværksættere og forsøge at fremme opstarten af disse frem for
opstart af andre iværksættervirksomheder. Artiklen påpeger, at en sådan po-
litik risikerer at fremme beskæftigelsen på kort sigt på bekostning af en mere
vedvarende jobskabelse.
Kapitel 3 er en artikel, der er skrevet i fællesskab med Michael S. Dahl.
Titlen på denne artikel er “The e!ect of top-employee migration and spin-o!s
on incumbent firms”. I artiklen undersøger vi, hvordan det påvirker virksom-
heders performance, når de mister en nøglemedarbejder. Vi fokuserer især på
nøglemedarbejdere, der forlader virksomheden for selv at starte en virksomhed
inden for samme branche. Denne gruppe af iværksættere betegnes “spin-o!s”.
Tidligere studier har vist, at spin-o! iværksættere klarer sig markant bedre end
andre nystartede virksomheder. Men hvis disse spin-o! virksomheder etableres
på baggrund af viden, som iværksætteren har med fra sin tidligere arbejdsplads
(modervirksomheden), så er der en risiko for, at spin-o!s er skadelige for mo-
dervirksomhederne. På den anden side, så kan man også argumentere for, at
lignende negative e!ekter bør forventes, i det tilfælde virksomheden mister
en nøglemedarbejder til en anden konkurrerende virksomhed. I artiklen argu-
menterer vi for, at tabet af en nøglemedarbejder har negative konsekvenser for
virksomhedernes performance, fordi det medfører et tab af humankapital, og
fordi det har karakter af en organisatorisk forstyrrelse, der negativt påvirker or-
ganisatoriske rutiner. Vi forventer endvidere et øget konkurrencemæssigt pres,
når nøglemedarbejdere forlader modervirksomheden for efterfølgende enten at
blive ansat hos en etableret konkurrent eller starter en spin-o! virksomhed.
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Igen anvender vi IDA til at undersøge, hvorledes nøglemedarbejderes afgang
påvirker virksomhedernes performance. Vi finder, at dette har negative e!ek-
ter på virksomhedernes performance uanset nøglemedarbejderens efterfølgende
beskæftigelsessituation. Denne negative e!ekt er dog større, når nøglemedar-
bejderen efterfølgende bliver ansat hos en eksisterende konkurrent eller bliver
spin-o! iværksætter. Der er dog ikke signifikant forskel på e!ektens størrelse
i de to tilfælde. Vi finder yderligere, at den negative e!ekt på modervirksom-
hedens performance aftager over tid. Resultaterne i dette studie understreger
først og fremmest nøglemedarbejdernes betydning for virksomhedernes perfor-
mance. Derudover så understøtter og forklarer dette et større fokus på fasthol-
delse af de vigtigste medarbejdere, eksempelvis gennem konkurrenceklausuler.
Kapitel 4 indeholder den sidste af de tre nøgleartikler, der direkte behandler
afhandlingens overordnede forskningsspørgsmål. Denne artikel har titlen “Who
loses a leader without losing ground: Unexpected death in top management
teams and firm performance”. Dette papir udnytter den eksogent bestemte
variation i virksomheders performance fra uventede dødsfald i topledelsen til
at undersøge konsekvenserne af et negativt organisatorisk chok. Artiklen stu-
derer også hvilke virksomheder, der er bedre og hurtigere til at absorbere de
negative e!ekter af et sådan organisatorisk chok. Det vil sige, hvilke virk-
somhedskarakteristika kan medvirke til at begrænse de negative konsekvenser
for virksomhedens efterfølgende performance. På den ene side kan der ar-
gumenteres for, at karakteristika såsom fleksible rutiner, ekstra ressourcer til
at imødekomme hurtig tilpasning og omstilling samt tidligere erfaringer med
udskiftning i topledelsen vil ruste virksomhederne til bedre at håndtere dette
chok. Omvendt vil dette betyde, at mindre omstillingsparate og meget ruti-
niserede organisationer vil være mere sårbare overfor sådanne organisatoriske
chok og derfor må forventes at opleve en større performancenedgang som følge
heraf. I modsætning hertil foreslår jeg, at netop disse mindre fleksible virksom-
heder, som følge af deres mere rutiniserede aktiviteter, også vil være relativt
mere e"ciente og stærke virksomheder med bedre forudsætninger for at mod-
stå eller overkomme et organisatorisk chok. Jeg argumenterer yderligere for,
at en generelt større intern modstand overfor organisatoriske forandringer kan
medføre færre potentielt skadelige forandringer i kølvandet på chokket. Mine
empiriske resultater understøtter denne hypotese. Jeg finder, at jo længere
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tid virksomhedens team af topledere har været i virksomheden, jo mindre bli-
ver den negative e!ekt på virksomhedens performance fra et uventet dødsfald
blandt toplederne. Jeg argumenterer for, at dette skyldes, at kontinuitet i
topledelsen medfører øget organisatorisk stabilitet og rutinisering. Dette gør
virksomhederne stærkere og mere modstandsdygtige overfor uventede organi-
satoriske forstyrrelser. Som det også var tilfældet i ovenstående kapitel, så
peger dette resultat i retning af, at organisationer har en fordel i at fokusere
på fastholdelse af nøglemedarbejdere. Dette gælder ikke mindst i topledelsen.
Kapitel 5 er afhandlingens sidste artikel. Dette er et baggrundspapir, der er
skrevet i fællesskab med Michael S. Dahl. Denne artikel har fokus på spin-o!
iværksætteres overlegne performance sammenlignet med andre iværksætter-
virksomheder. Denne artikel supplerer således kapitel 3, der også undersøger
økonomiske konsekvenser i forbindelse med spin-o! iværksætteri. Tidligere
studier har næsten udelukket fokuseret på spin-o! iværksætternes overlegne
performance i form af øgede overlevelseschancer. Vi bidrager til denne litte-
ratur gennem et detaljeret empirisk studie af spin-o! virksomhedernes jobska-
belse sammenlignet med andre iværksættervirksomheder. Vi finder, at spin-
o!s ikke blot overlever længere, de tegner sig også for et relativt stort bidrag
til jobskabelsen. Dette studie har især konsekvenser for erhvervspolitikken.
Vores resultater peger på, at der kan være betydelige økonomiske gevinster
ved en målrettet indsats for at øge opstartsraten for spin-o!s relativt til andre
iværksættere.
224
